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NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
In examining the record of the Burger Court, it is only natural
to concentrate on the results of the Court's decisions (has the Court
expanded or narrowed the rights of criminal defendants?) and on
the doctrines invoked (does the Court still adhere to the three-part
test for establishment clause challenges?). We tend to take as a
given the presence of the cases in the Court and to assume, if we
think about it at all, that the only tasks for the Justices are to decide
the cases and to write opinions explaining the decisions and their
relation to existing precedent. But this picture of the Court's work
is quite incomplete. With a few exceptions, the cases that become
"Supreme Court cases" do so as the result of a selection process
that is no less interesting and important than the decisional process
that follows.
To appreciate the significance of the selection process, it is
only necessary to juxtapose two sets of numbers. In each of the last
few Terms, the Court has received about 4,200 applications for re-
view.' The number of cases receiving plenary consideration has
been about 180 per Term.2 Plenary consideration means that the
case will get full briefing, oral argument, and, almost invariably, an
opinion on the merits.3 The decisions that emerge from this pro-
cess will be the ones that are analyzed in law reviews, reprinted in
casebooks, and relied on by lawyers and lower courts as authorita-
tive explications of the federal Constitution and laws. Some-Mi-
randa v. Arizona,4 Roe v. Wade,5 Brown v. Board of Education6-will
become household words.
The cases that do not reach the plenary docket will experience
a very different fate. The parties will not have the opportunity to
file full briefs, nor will they present oral argument; instead, the
Court will see only the application for review and the response urg-
ing the Court not to hear the case.7 With a few exceptions, the
decisions will be announced in bare orders unaccompanied by any
kind of opinion8 and having no precedential value for the future.9
The very fact that the disputes were brought to the Supreme Court
1 See section I(A) infra.
2 See section I(B) infra.
3 In the four Terms of the 1980's, only 27 of the 593 plenary decisions were not ac-
companied by a signed opinion. Most of these were cases in which the Court dismissed an
appeal or writ of certiorari on grounds implicating its jurisdiction or in which the judgment
was affirmed by an equal division of theJustices. The latter disposition has no precedential
value. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972).
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7 The initial document will be either a petition for certiorari or a jurisdictional state-
ment, depending on the mode of review. See notes 30-35 infra and accompanying text.
8 The exceptions are discussed in section I(C)(2) infra.
9 The exceptions are discussed in section I(C) infra.
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will be forgotten by all but the litigants. 10
How does the Court select, from among the 4,200 cases filed,
the 180 that it will hear and decide? Fully to answer that question
would require, at the least, examination of the Justices' private pa-
pers and docket books." Perhaps at some time in the future schol-
ars will be given access to those materials. In the meantime, much
can be learned by studying the Justices' opinions and orders against
the background of the parties' submissions, the holdings of lower
courts, and developments elsewhere in the legal system and society
generally. That is the approach taken in this article. 12 Because the
volume of material to be considered is so large, and the range of
hypotheses to be tested so wide, the conclusions offered here can
be at best preliminary.' 3
The article is divided into five parts. Part I provides some of
the necessary background and sets forth the premises that underlie
the analysis. Part II identifies several categories of cases that rarely
reach the plenary docket even though they constitute a significant
proportion of the Court's overall caseload. Part III analyzes the
changes in the issues that have received plenary consideration and
the forces that have influenced those changes. Part IV examines
the reasons for granting review in particular cases. The article con-
10 For example, a recent opinion cited three court of appeals cases in which the
Supreme Court had denied review; the opinion made no reference to the fact that the cases
had been brought to the Court. Fulton v. Warden, 744 F.2d 1026, 1035 n.1 (4th Cir. 1984)
(Phillips, J., dissenting). Cf R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 231
n.1 1 (1985) (implicitly rebuking courts that include "cert. denied" in citations to court of
appeals decisions "even though the Supreme Court has said time and again that denial of
certiorari imports no view on the merits of the decision below.").
11 For a recent attempt along these lines, see D. PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE
UNrrED STATES SUPREME COURT (1980) (reviewed in 92 ETHics 781 (1982)).
12 Unless otherwise attributed, the data in the article are based on my own research.
Lists of the cases included in the various categories are on file with the author. In the
interest of saving space, I have generally not identified the cases discussed, except where no
more than one or two were involved, or where the classification scheme required
illustration.
13 The article draws heavily on my earlier studies of the Court's modes of doing busi-
ness. In order of publication they are:
Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciay Act of 1925: The Plenary
Docket in the 1970's, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1709 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Plenary Docket I].
Hellman, The Supreme Court and Statutory Law: The Plenary Docket in the 1970's, 40 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Law].
Hellman, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights: The Plenary Docket in the 1970's, 58 OR. L.
REV. 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Civil Rights].
Hellman, The Supreme Court, the National Law, and the Selection of Cases for the Plenary Docket,
44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 521 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Plenary Docket II].
Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court's Exercise of Discretionary Re-
view, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 795 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Discretionary Review].
Hellman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal Do We Need It? Will It Work?, 11 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 375 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Intercircuit Tribunal].
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cludes with a brief look at the influence of lower court decisions on
the selection process.
I. Introduction
A. Cases Filed: What the Numbers Mean
Some readers will be surprised to learn that the number of
cases filed each Term is just over 4,000. The reason is that many
accounts of the Supreme Court's caseload, including recent state-
ments by Chief Justice Burger, have referred to a docket of 5,000
cases.14 But that figure, while not inaccurate, is misleading because
it encompasses all cases that appear on the docket in a given Term,
including those carried over from the preceding Term. In effect, it
counts some cases twice.
To gauge the magnitude of the Court's total caseload without
this kind of distortion, one can count either filings or final disposi-
tions. Because the Court is current in its docket, and has been for
many years, the two figures track one another quite closely. In this
article, unless otherwise stated, final dispositions will be used as the
denominator for analyzing the selection process.
15
There is, however, one context in which it is easier to look at
filings, and that is in tracing the patterns of growth in the Court's
overall caseload. Table I shows that, contrary to what is widely be-
lieved,16 the number of filings has not been increasing at an apoca-
lyptic rate. The total for the 1983 Term was only sixteen percent
higher than the figure for 1971-an increase, on the average, of
14 See, e.g., Burger, The Time is Now for the Intercircuit Panel, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1985, at 86, 87
("In the term completed lastJuly, there were 5,100 cases on the docket.") [hereinafter cited
as Burger, Intercircuit Panel]; Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J.
442, 442 (1983) ("In the term that ended lastJuly the Supreme Court had 5,311 cases on its
docket.") [hereinafter cited as Burger, 1983 Annual Report]; 131 CONG. REC. S3313 (daily
ed. Mar. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); id. at S3314 (statement of Sen. Heflin).
15 Counting final dispositions involves a slight distortion when the object is to compare
cases granted with those denied, because about half of the cases that receive plenary con-
sideration in any one Term were granted review in the preceding Term. Thus, for the
purpose of analyzing the criteria for selection, it might be more accurate to count plenary
cases at the time review is granted rather than at the time of final disposition. But this
approach is uncomfortably open-ended; it would also introduce distortions of its own. For
example, how should one treat cases that are granted review in one Term, but disposed of
before oral argument in the following Term? Moreover, if the analysis covers a period of
several Terms, as this one does, any distortion becomes truly minimal. On balance, I have
opted for the straightforward method of counting final dispositions as the measure of the
Court's total activity with respect to particular kinds of cases.
16 See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. S3313 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Thur-
mond) ("As we are all aware, the workload of the Supreme Court has dramatically in-



























































































































*Data on filings and dispositions are taken from the following sources: Federal
Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573,
613-14 (1972) (1953 through 1971 Terms); Discretionary Review, supra note 13, at 806 n.48
(1972 through 1979 Terms); 52 U.S.L.W. 3025 (1983) (1980 through 1982 Terms); 53
U.S.L.W. 3028 (1984) (1983 Term).
little more than one percent a Term.1 7 During the same period,
filings in the federal courts of appeals nearly doubled.' 8
The extremely modest rate of growth over the last decade rep-
resents a major change from what the Court experienced in the
17 The number of new cases docketed in the 1983 Term was 4,222. See 53 U.S.L.W.
3028 (1984). The figure for the 1971 Term was 3,643. Federal Judicial Center, Report of the
Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 614 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Freund Study Group].
18 See Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 382 n.32.
1985]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
1960's. In 1972, when the Freund Study Group issued an alarmist
report on the Court's ability to cope with its docket,' 9 it did so at
the end of a decade that saw an increase in the total caseload from
2,185 to 3,643.20 If filings had continued to grow at that rate in the
decade that followed, the number of cases confronting the Court in
the 1981 Term would have been 6,074.21 Instead it was only
4,422.22 And in the following Term the number dropped substan-
tially, to 4,201. 2 3 The 1983 Term brought an increase of only 21
cases over 1982,24 and at this writing the filings for the 1984 Term
are actually running slightly behind the pace of 1983.25
There is, of course, no way of knowing whether the pattern of
rapid growth will resume as suddenly as it ended.26 For present
purposes, it is sufficient to note that the selection process in the
1980's has been carried on against a background of stability in the
total number of petitions considered each Term.27
B. Cases Heard: What the Numbers Mean
As shown in Table I, the number of cases receiving plenary
consideration has ranged in recent years from 152 to 182 per
Term. However, these figures too can be misleading, because two
or more cases (generally ones arising out of the same lower court
proceedings) sometimes will be consolidated for argument and de-
cided in a single opinion. An opinion issued under these circum-
stances usually will require no more effort on the part of the
Justices, and will contribute no more to the national law, than if
only one case were involved. Thus, to count "cases" as such-that
is, docket numbers-tends to exaggerate the size of the plenary
docket.28
19 Freund Study Group, supra note 17, at 581-82.
20 See id. at 614.
21 Cf A. BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 34 (1973) (quoting prediction
by Chief Justice Burger that caseload will increase to 7,000 by 1980).
22 See 53 U.S.L.W. 3028 (1984) (statistical recapitulation of 1981, 1982, and 1983
Terms, based on final statistical sheet issued by the Court at the end of the 1983 Term).
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 The statistical sheet issued by the Court on May 22, 1985, reported that filings as of
that date totalled 3,613. At the same point in the 1983 Term the figure was 3,696.
26 See G. CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 56-62 (1976).
27 For further discussion of the changes in the total caseload, see G. CASPER & R. Pos-
NER, supra note 26; McLauchlan, An Exploratory Analysis of the Supreme Court's Caseload from
1880-1976, 64 JUDICATURE 32 (1980).
28 One might want to distinguish between, on the one hand, opinions involving only
separate appeals or petitions from the same judgment or order and, on the other, opinions
deciding two or more cases coming from different courts or involving different parties.
Opinions of the latter kind may well require additional effort because of the need to master
and adjudicate two or more sets of facts. Moreover, an opinion applying the governing
legal principles to multiple factual situations may provide more guidance to the bench and
[Vol. 60:947
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The more realistic approach is to count plenary decisions, with
the "decision" being defined as a case or group of cases decided in
a single opinion, memorandum, or order. When this practice is fol-
lowed, the number of plenary decisions per Term reduces to about
150. In this article, reference will be made to decisions except in
Part II, where the plenary docket will be compared with the total
docket.
C. A Caveat. Other Forms of Disposition
The focus of this article is on the criteria used by the Court in
selecting cases for the plenary docket. But denial of review and
grant of review are not the only options available to the Court.
Three other modes of disposition deserve brief discussion here:
summary affirmances and dismissals in appeal cases; summary opin-
ions; and summary reconsideration orders.
1. Summary Dispositions in Appeal Cases
The Supreme Court exercises both original and appellate juris-
diction, but it is the appellate jurisdiction that generates all but a
handful of the cases that reach the plenary docket.29 In delineating
that jurisdiction, Congress has distinguished between two modes of
review: appeal and certiorari. 30 The vast majority of cases can be
brought to the Court only by writ of certiorari. As to those cases,
the Court's jurisdiction is entirely discretionary; the Court may de-
cide the merits of the cause, or it may decline to do so. In contrast,
when a case falls within one of the narrow classes in which review
by appeal is available,3 ' Congress has conferred upon the losing
litigant a right of review by the Supreme Court. This means that
the Court cannot avoid the obligation to adjudicate the merits-to
decide whether the judgment below is erroneous.
32
The obligation to decide the merits does not, however, carry
with it an obligation to accord the case plenary consideration or to
write an opinion,33 and the Court has taken full advantage of that
bar than an opinion limited to one situation. Nevertheless, because even single-case opin-
ions vary greatly in the quantity of effort required, in the number of issues addressed, and
in the breadth of the guidance offered, it does not seem worthwhile to make the distinction.
29 In the four Terms of the 1980's the original jurisdiction accounted for only 9 of the
593 plenary decisions.
30 See Plenary Docket I, supra note 13, at 1721-23.
31 Two classes of cases account for all but a handful of the appeals that are brought to
the Court today: cases in which a state court has upheld a state statute against a claim of
repugnance to federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982), and cases in which a federal court of
appeals has struck down a state statute on federal grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1982). See
Discretionary Review, supra note 13, at 812-20.
32 See generally Gressman, Requiem for the Supreme Court's Obligatory Jurisdiction, 65 A.B.A.J.
1325 (1979).
33 See Plenary Docket 1, supra note 13, at 1722.
19851
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
freedom. In recent Terms most appeals have been disposed of by
summary unexplicated orders affirming the judgment of the court
below. 34 In appeals from federal courts, the disposition is one of
affirmance eo nomine; appeals from state courts are dismissed "for
want of a substantial federal question."
35
The distinction between the two modes of review retains con-
siderable significance both within and without the Court. Inter-
nally, as the Justices themselves have informed us, the obligation to
decide the merits of an appeal sometimes leads the Court to grant
plenary consideration to a case that would have been denied review
if it had come up by writ of certiorari.3 6 And for lawyers and judges
who want to know what the law is, the distinction is crucial to un-
derstanding the meaning of the Court's summary dispositions. The
denial of certiorari is (at least in theory) totally without precedential
significance.3 7 Summary dispositions in appeal cases, on the other
hand, constitute binding-though narrow and cryptic-precedents
for other litigation.38
These consequences, however, are likely to be of little interest
to the litigant whose application for plenary review has been de-
nied. Whether the piece of paper that comes back from the Clerk's
Office states "Appeal dismissed," "Judgment affirmed," or "Certio-
rari denied," the case is at an end; the judgment of the lower court
stands.
In this article, I treat the appeal/certiorari distinction in two
ways, depending on the context. In looking at cases that do not
reach the plenary docket, I generally do not distinguish between
the denial of certiorari and the summary dismissal of an appeal.
But in discussing the cases that do reach the plenary docket, I take
note of those instances where the obligatory jurisdiction appears to
have influenced the selection process.3 9
34 See, e.g., Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 389 n.71 (of 134 appeals decided on the
merits in the 1979 Term, only 32 received plenary consideration).
35 See Discretionary Review, supra note 13, at 812 n.87.
36 See Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 389-90 (quoting letter signed by all nine
sitting Justices).
37 See Discretionary Review, supra note 13, at 810-11; see generally Linzer, The Meaning of
Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227 (1979).
38 See Discretionary Review, supra note 13, at 817-18.
39 Legislation to eliminate the remaining elements of the obligatory jurisdiction has
been approved by both houses of Congress, but in different sessions. See Discretionary Re-
view, supra note 13, at 799; Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 391-92 & n.83. At this
writing the bill has been reintroduced only in the Senate. S. 833, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); see 131 CONG. REC. S3849 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Heflin). Senator
Heflin pointed out that unlike other proposals for court reform, this legislation "seems to
have the unqualified support of all of the affected parties," including all members of the




In a handful of cases each Term, the Court will write a brief per
curiam opinion without granting plenary consideration. 40 For the
most part, summary opinions are used to reverse lower court deci-
sions that a majority of the Justices believe are plainly contrary to
controlling precedent.41
Except for a few cases involving procedural issues,42 most of
the summary reversals in recent Terms have been cases in which
state officials challenged lower court rulings upholding constitu-
tional claims.43 Some of the summary opinions are quite significant
from a precedential standpoint,44 but their number is small enough
40 In the four Terms of the 1980's the Court issued a total of 62 summary opinions.
However, 5 of these involved motions to grant or vacate a stay of a sentence of death in
cases that had not been docketed. See, e.g., Alabama v. Evans, 461 U.S. 230 (1983). Sum-
mary opinions thus account for only 57 of the 9,000 cases that received final disposition
during this period.
Some of the opinions are so short and uninformative that as an a priori matter one
would probably not classify them as opinions at all. Cf The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98
HARV. L. REv. 87, 311 n.e (1984) (category of "written opinions" includes "per curiam
opinions containing sufficient legal reasoning" to be so classified). However, I have fol-
lowed the practice of including as "per curiam" opinions all dispositions labelled as such by
the Reporter of Decisions and printed in the "front of the book" with the plenary decisions
rather than in the "back of the book" with denials of certiorari and other orders. In this
connection, I note that the Reporter appears to have modified the classification system de-
scribed in my earlier articles. Some cases are now printed in the front of the book even
though it would be difficult to argue that the decision "lends itself to a headnote." See
Discretionary Review, supra note 13, at 808 n.64.
41 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2086 (1984) (reversing decision by
court that "continued to rely on the approach . . . rejected in [a recent case]"); NLRB v.
International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, Local 480, 104 S. Ct.
2081, 2082 (1984) ("As the decision of the Court of Appeals apparently is inconsistent with
this Court's precedents, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and reverse."); Leeke v.
Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86 (1981) ("Our holding in [an earlier case] controls disposition
here."); Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n,
450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) ("The holding below.. . cannot be reconciled with the princi-
ples set out in [a Supreme Court decision]"). See also Florida Dep't of Health, 450 U.S. at 151
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("Apparently recognizing [that the ruling below cannot be recon-
ciled with the Supreme Court decision], respondents urge the Court to grant certiorari and
hear argument on the question whether [the Supreme Court decision] should be
overruled.").
42 E.g., Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 457 U.S. 594 (1982) (holding that
court of appeals erred in failing to consider pendent state-law claim); Mariscal v. United
States, 449 U.S. 405 (1981) (directing court of appeals to reconsider applicability of "con-
current sentence" doctrine). Many of the procedural issues had implications for the
Court's own jurisdiction. Typically, the Court's disposition of the procedural question
avoided a decision on the merits of the substantive issues. See, e.g., Capital Cities Media,
Inc. v. Toole, 104 S. Ct. 2144 (1984) (possibility of adequate and independent state
ground); Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67 (1983) (mootness); Donovan v.
Richland County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 454 U.S. 389 (1982) (dismissing for want of
jurisdiction).
43 See Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855-56 & n.3 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing cases).
44 E.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982);Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981);
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that they can be largely ignored in analyzing the selection of cases
for plenary consideration.
3. Summary Reconsideration Orders
Denials of review, summary affirmances, and dismissals for
want of a substantial federal question account for all but a few
dozen of the 4,000 cases that do not receive plenary consideration.
However, one important category of dispositions remains to be
mentioned: the summary order vacating the judgment below and
directing the lower court to reconsider its ruling in light of an inter-
vening Supreme Court decision. Orders of this kind account for
between 40 and 90 dispositions each Term.
The reconsideration order is used in cases that the Court has
previously set aside to await the decision in a plenary case raising
similar or related issues. Once the decision is announced, the
Court takes a second look at the held case. If, upon reexamination,
the Court finds even a superficial inconsistency between the new
precedent and the judgment brought for review, the Court will re-
mand the case for further consideration by the lower court. If the
ruling below appears clearly in accord with the plenary decision,
the Court will simply deny review. 45
D. The Rule of Four
In occasional articles published over the years, the Justices
have described in some detail the procedures by which the Court
selects cases for plenary consideration. 46 For present purposes,
however, only one aspect of those procedures is important: the
"Rule of Four." Under the Rule of Four, only four votes-not a
majority-are required to set a case for plenary consideration.
47
And the available data indicate that a substantial proportion of the
cases on the plenary docket receive only the minimum number of
votes. 48 The plenary docket is thus shaped by shifting coalitions of
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980).
45 For further discussion see section II(F) infra; Hellman, The Supreme Court's Second
Thoughts: Remands for Reconsideration and Denials of Review in Cases Held for Plenary Decisions, 11
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hellman, Second Thoughts]; Hellman,
"Granted, Vacated, and Remanded" Shedding Light on a Dark Corner of Supreme Court Practice, 67
JUDICATURE 389 (1984).
46 See, e.g., Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 473,
477-82 (1973); White, The Work of the Supreme Court: A Nuts and Bolts Description, 54 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 346, 349 (1982).
47 See generally Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975 (1957).
48 Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1983); cf Bren-
nan, supra note 46, at 481-82 (of the cases granted review in the 1972 Term, "approxi-
mately 60 percent received the votes of only four or five of the justices. In only 9 percent of
(Vol. 60:947
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Justices, each of whom may have a different agenda and a different
set of priorities.
E. The Criteria for Plenary Review
At first blush it might seem quite anomalous, and even unjust,
that more than ninety-five percent of the cases that come to the
Court are disposed of without full briefing, without oral argument,
and without an opinion.49 The anomaly disappears, however, or at
least is substantially mitigated, if one accepts the orthodox view of
the Supreme Court's role in the American judicial system. In that
view, the function of the Supreme Court is not to correct errors in
the lower courts, but to "secur[e] harmony of decision and the ap-
propriate settlement of questions of general importance."50
Underlying this view is the recognition that virtually every case
that comes to the Supreme Court has already received at least one
level of appellate scrutiny.51 Admittedly, it is possible that another
look by another court might lead to a more "correct" or a more
"just" result. But that possibility alone is not a sufficient reason for
the Supreme Court to hear a case. To paraphrase Professor Bator,
"[a]ssuming that there 'exists,' in an ultimate sense, a 'correct' deci-
sion [of a case], we can never be assured that any particular tribunal
has in the past made it: we can always continue to ask whether [a
better decision could have been reached]." 52 Or in the familiar
words ofJustice Jackson: "[R]eversal by a higher court is not proof
that justice is thereby better done. There is no doubt that if there
were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of [the
Supreme Court's] reversals of [lower] courts would also be re-
the granted cases were the Justices unanimous in the view that plenary consideration was
warranted.").
49 "[C]an it be said that full justice is achieved when a court is forced by the sheer
necessity of keeping up with its business to decline, without even an explanation to hear 87
percent of the cases presented to it by private litigants?" Message from the President
Transmitting a Recommendation to Reorganize the Judicial Branch of the Federal Govern-
ment (Feb. 5, 1937), reprinted in S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, 26 (1937).
50 Hughes, Address of the ChiefJustice, 11 A.L.I. PROC. 313, 315 (1934) (emphasis added).
51 The only exceptions are cases brought by direct appeal from federal district courts.
Recent jurisdictional reforms have greatly limited the circumstances under which direct ap-
peals are available, see Discretionary Review, supra note 13, at 813-14, and in the first four
Terms of the 1980's only 91 cases reached the Court without having been reviewed by
another appellate court. About half of these were appeals from three-judge district courts;
the remainder (except for a handful of antitrust cases invoking the Expediting Act, 15
U.S.C. § 29(b) (1982)) were cases in which a single district judge had declared a federal
statute unconstitutional. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253 (1982). Most of the three-judge
court appeals did not receive plenary consideration; instead, the Court affirmed summarily.
See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
52 Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L.
REV. 441, 447 (1963).
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versed." 53 Thus it is sound to say, as ChiefJustice Hughes did, that
litigants who have argued unsuccessfully in the federal courts of ap-
peals or state appellate courts "have had their day in court. If fur-
ther review is to be had by the Supreme Court it must be because of
the public interest in the questions involved."5 4
The criterion of "public interest" is epitomized in a term first
given general currency in a speech by Justice Harlan: "certworthi-
ness." 55 In the orthodox view, a case is certworthy if it will enable
the Court to hand down a decision that will provide authoritative
guidance, substantially augmenting what is furnished by existing
precedents, for the resolution of a recurring issue of federal law.
Typical indicia of certworthiness would be the presence of an in-
tercircuit conflict or an appellate decision that calls into question
the lawfulness of government policy of wide applicability.
Rigid adherence to the orthodox view would mean that imme-
diately upon determining that a certiorari petition raised no issue of
general importance, the Justices would reject the case without fur-
ther consideration. However, as might be expected, the orthodox
view does not accurately reflect what the Court does in fact. Few
human beings, confronted with error or unfairness that is within
their power to correct, would invariably stand by and do nothing
simply because the case has no importance to anyone but the liti-
gants, and the evidence shows that in this regard as in others, the
Justices are quite human.56
Apart from the human element, there may be sound institu-
tional reasons for the Court to engage in review for error in partic-
ular classes of cases. For example, the Court's historic function as
guardian of the supremacy clause may require it to hear some
otherwise routine cases in which state courts have rejected federal
claims or defenses. 57 Less urgently, the Court's position at the
53 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (concurring opinion). JusticeJackson was
referring to Supreme Court review of state court decisions, but the point is applicable to
federal courts as well.
54 Letter from ChiefJustice Hughes to Senator Wheeler (March 21, 1937), reprinted in S.
REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 39 (1937).
55 See Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 REC. A.B. CiTy N.Y. 541, 549 (1958).
56 Cf Dunn v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 419 U.S. 919, 924 (1974) (Stewart,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari):
Because the factual setting of this case is unusual, the legal questions raised
are unlikely often to recur. While this is normally a sound reason to deny review,
the judgment before us is grossly unjust. The Service has noted that petitioner has
a "penchant for botching up his life." Perhaps so, but the Government's botching
up this case has served to complete the wreckage.
I would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment.
57 This does not necessarily mean that the Court should address the merits of all such
cases, or even those where the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the state court
erred in rejecting his federal claim. For one thing, the cases that would probably arouse the
greatest concern are those in which the state court's ruling has resulted in a deprivation of
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apex of the federal judicial system may sometimes justify supervi-
sory action in the interest of hierarchy and order.58
Yet even if the Court were to reject the strictures of the ortho-
dox view altogether, it is not clear that the results of the selection
process would be significantly different. Over the years, distin-
guished appellate judges have said that most cases can be decided
only one way, and generally on only one line of reasoning.5 9 In
appellate courts today, a large proportion of the cases involve noth-
ing more than the application of well-established principles to par-
liberty. But in that situation (unless the claim arises under the fourth amendment, see Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)), the petitioner has an alternate mode of redress: seeking a
writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. See Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions
of Federal Questions: The Need for Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 960-62
(1976). More fundamentally, an occasional error by a state court that results in the depriva-
tion of a federal right does not threaten the supremacy of federal law in a way that necessar-
ily requires Supreme Court intervention. Again to quote Professor Bator, "the possibility
of error [is] inherent in any process. The task of assuring legality is to define and create a
set of arrangements and procedures which provide a reasoned and acceptable probability
that justice will be done, that the facts found will be 'true' and the law applied 'correct.'"
Bator, supra note 52, at 448; see also id. at 451 & passim. As long as that standard is met, the
Court need not itself consider the merits of every case in which it appears that the state
court erroneously denied a federal claim. But see Sweat v. Arkansas, 105 S. Ct. 933, 938
(1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (the Court has a duty rigorously to
correct "an obviously aberrant failure by a State court to apply settled constitutional princi-
ples" so that fundamental rights are not "blurred and then gradually eroded by the tremen-
dous pressures put on those charged with enforcing the criminal law").
When a state court consistently disregards a controlling rule of federal law, the
supremacy function does come into play. The distinction between the isolated error and
the persistent misunderstanding is illustrated by a recent series of cases from the Missouri
state courts arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). In each instance, the
question presented by the petitioner was whether the state courts had erred in refusing to
instruct the jury that any award for lost future earnings must be reduced to present value.
The first two times the question came before it, the Court denied review, but when the
error was repeated a third time, the Court summarily reversed. Compare Dunn v. St. Louis-
San Francisco Ry., 621 S.W.2d 245, 253 (Mo. 1981) (holding that present value instruction
is impermissible), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982); and Bair v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,
647 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Mo.) (following Dunn), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 107 (1983); with St.
Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Dickerson, 105 S. Ct. 1347 (1985) (reversing Missouri appeals
court that followed Bair, stating that a 1916 Supreme Court decision had given a "clear
answer" contrary to the Missouri court's position). It is interesting to note that the inter-
mediate appellate court that decided Dickerson acknowledged the 1916 Supreme Court deci-
sion but felt obliged to follow the Missouri Supreme Court's precedents instead. See
Dickerson v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 674 S.W.2d 165, 170 (Mo. App. 1984).
58 See, e.g., Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535
(1983) (summary reversal) ("Needless to say, only this Court may overrule one of its prece-
dents. Until that occurs, [a case that the court of appeals doubted was still good law] is the
law, and the decision below cannot be reconciled with it."); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370,
375 (1982) (summary reversal) ("[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal
judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no
matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.").
59 See, e.g., Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly-Become-Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 222
(1961), reprinted in H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 1, 6 (1967); Aldisert, Appellate Justice, 11 U.
MICH.J.L. REF. 317, 318-19 (1978).
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ticular facts. 60 Many appeals challenge rulings that are subject to
reversal only if clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. In
short, the vast majority of appellate decisions are clearly correct, or
at least within the range of acceptability under the governing law.
These considerations help to explain why seventy percent of
the cases filed with the Court are so obviously unworthy of review
that not even one Justice requests that they be discussed at the
Court's conference. 61 In the next section of this article, I shall
identify several classes of cases that receive this treatment far more
often than not.
II. The Cases the Court Does Not Take
Research has identified six categories of cases that very seldom
receive plenary consideration, even though they constitute a signifi-
cant portion of the Court's overall caseload. Four of the categories
are defined by the status of the party seeking review: indigent liti-
gants; defendants in federal criminal prosecutions; defendants in
state criminal prosecutions;" and civil litigants representing them-
selves. The other two groups of cases are characterized by the na-
ture of the issues presented: state court cases involving spurious
federal claims and cases raising issues similar to those that have al-
ready been granted review in other cases.
A. Cases Filed in Forma Pauperis
The cases filed in the Supreme Court can be classified in ac-
cordance with a wide variety of criteria, but the statistical reports
issued by the Court itself recognize only one distinction: between
paid cases and cases filed in forma pauperis ("FP"), i.e., by indi-
gents.62 The distinction is purely mechanical, and is reflected in a
dual numbering system for docketed cases. Litigants who cannot
afford to pay court costs get FP status and docket numbers of 5000
and above. Those who pay go into the numbering system that
60 See Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of
Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 573, 621-22 (1981).
61 Brennan, supra note 46, at 479; White, supra note 46, at 349. Curiously, ChiefJustice
Burger has stated that "every filing is processed in a conference of the Court." Burger,
Intercircuit Panel, supra note 14, at 87 (emphasis added). However, this reference is consis-
tent with other Justices' descriptions if the reader understands, first, that "conference" re-
fers not to an in-person meeting but to the Justices as a group, see Hutchinson, Felix
Frankfurter and the Business of the Supreme Court, 0. T. 1946-0. T. 1961, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 143,
152 ("the Court's name for its institutional self"); and second, that "processed" means just
that-not "discussed."
62 See, e.g., 53 U.S.L.W. 3028 (1984) (reprinting the final statistical sheet for the 1983
Term). Surprising though it may seem, vital data such as the mode of review (appeal or
certiorari), court of origin (state or federal), and the nature of the proceeding (civil or crim-
inal) are not reflected in any of the statistical reports regularly issued by the Court.
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starts with 1 each Term. 63
FP cases account for 2,000 of the total filings each year, but
only a tiny fraction are given plenary consideration. The total for
the first four Terms of the 1980's was 44, an average of 11 per
Term. In contrast, paid cases, which generated about 2,200 filings
per Term, contributed an average of 160 cases to the plenary
docket.64
This record is not surprising, nor is it the product of discrimi-
nation against the poor. The vast majority of FP cases are filed by
indigent criminal defendants who have nothing to lose by seeking
Supreme Court review even if their arguments are clearly unworthy
of the Court's attention.65 And this is so whether the applications
are judged by certiorari standards or from the more tolerant stand-
point of review for error. Even Justice Brennan, who might be ex-
pected to have as much sympathy for indigent petitioners as any
member of the Court, has written that "in all but a handful of'
these cases, "the merits involved are almost certainly insufficient to
demand full review."
66
The FP cases that do reach the plenary docket fall into two
well-defined groups, depending on the court of origin. When the
Court accepts an indigent's petition from a federal court, the rea-
son almost always is to resolve an intercircuit conflict. Of the 17
federal court cases that received plenary consideration in the first
four Terms of the 1980's, 13 involved acknowledged conflicts; in 3
others, strong but arguable claims of conflict were made.67 And
most of the cases raised issues of statutory construction rather than
constitutional law.
63 Recently the Court has begun to give more careful scrutiny to the affidavits of indi-
gency that accompany motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and some motions
have been denied. See generally Brown v. Herald Co., 104 S. Ct. 331, 332 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). As a result, a few cases bearing docket numbers in the 5000 series will turn
out to be paid cases. Compare Unterthiner v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 104 S. Ct. 330 (1983) (No.
82-6765) (denying motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis), with Unterthiner v. De-
sert Hosp. Dist., 104 S. Ct. 973 (1984) (denying certiorari, presumably after the petitioner
paid the filing fees). However, cases of this kind constitute such a tiny percentage of the FP
applications that they can reasonably be ignored in describing the Court's practices.
64 If the 1980 Term is excluded, the average is 170. For reasons that I cannot fully
explain, the number of cases on the plenary docket in the 1977 through 1980 Terms was
substantially smaller than in the six Terms that went before or in the four Terms that fol-
lowed. See Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 418 n.179; Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at
526-33, 577-83.
65 See Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 382 & n.32.
66 Brown v. Herald Co., 104 S. Ct. 331, 333 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67 See Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3391 n.9 (1984); Dixson v. United
States, 104 S. Ct. 1172, 1181-82 (1984). In Segura, the government as respondent con-
ceded the conflict and acquiesced in the grant of review. See Brief for the United States at 4-
5, 7. In Dixson (an opinion that disposed of two consolidated cases), the lower court had
distinguished the decisions that provided the basis for the petitioners' claim of conflict, see
United States v. Hinton, 683 F.2d 195, 197 (7th Cir. 1982), but the Supreme Court's opin-
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The state court cases are a very different breed. Few of them
involved conflicts; rather, the dominant theme is one of concern
that the state court has improperly rejected a federal constitutional
claim. In 17 out of 27 cases in the 1980-1983 period the judgment
was actually reversed. In 3 other cases there were four votes for
reversal, and in 2 additional cases the opinions of the Justices gave
reason to believe that members of the Court who did not ultimately
vote to reverse might well have been concerned, at the certiorari
stage, that federal rights had been denied. 68 It is also worth noting
that 3 of the 27 cases were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds; if
we look only at the cases decided on the merits, the focus on review
for error becomes even more evident.
A somewhat more receptive attitude toward indigent petitions
characterized the earlier years of the Burger Court. In fact, three
distinct phases can be discerned. From 1969 through 1972 an aver-
age of 30 FP cases received plenary consideration each Term. For
the next eight Terms the average was 16.69 The 1981 Term
brought a sharp and sudden reduction in the number of FP cases
heard, and for the 1981-1983 period the average was only 8.70 In
all likelihood, this development will prove to have been primarily a
reflection of a broader trend in the work of the Burger Court: an
ever-increasing tendency to adjudicate constitutional issues (partic-
ularly those involving criminal procedure) at the behest of govern-
ment officials rather than in cases brought by persons challenging
government action. 7' However, further analysis will be required to
test this hypothesis fully.
B. Paid Petitions Filed by Federal Criminal Defendants
Most of the federal criminal defendants who seek Supreme
ion implied that a conflict did exist, see Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1181-82, and the dissent said so
explicitly, see id. at 1185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The one case that did not involve a conflict was Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983), in which the Court granted certiorari before judgment to resolve two recurring
issues in the administration of the death penalty.
68 See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 959 (1983) (Stevens, J., joined by Powell, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (upholding death sentence "[a]fter giving careful considera-
tion to this case and others decided by the Supreme Court of Florida"); H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398, 414 (1981) (Powell, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasizing ques-
tions not decided).
69 The 1972 Term, with 22 FP cases, can be viewed as a transitional one. However, in
the preceding Term the remarkable total of 43 indigent cases had appeared on the plenary
docket--one-quarter of all cases that received plenary consideration. As a result, the aver-
age for 1971 and 1972 is very close to the average for 1969 and 1970. And 1973's total of
16 is identical to the figure for 1974. All in all, it seems accurate to treat the 1969-1972
Terms as one period, and the next eight Terms as another.
70 At this writing it appears that the 1984 Term plenary docket will include 14 indigent
cases. However, it would be rash to infer a new pattern from a single Term.
71 For data through the 1979 Term, see Penary Docket II, supra note 13, at 577-78, 581.
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Court review do so as indigents, but in each of the last few Terms
the Court has also received between 320 and 400 paid petitions
challenging federal criminal convictions. 72 Few of these petitions
are granted. In the first four Terms of the 1980's, the Court
granted plenary consideration to only 9 paid cases filed by federal
criminal defendants, an average of little more than 2 per Term.
The average for the earlier years of the Burger Court was higher-
just under 4 cases per Term-but even then it could hardly be said
that applications of this kind constituted a substantial segment of
the plenary docket.
When the Court does grant a federal criminal defendant's peti-
tion, it usually does so in order to resolve an intercircuit conflict. In
the last five years, the Court has never granted a petition of this
kind except where a conflict was present. And one must go back to
1977 to find a Term in which more than a single petition was
granted in the absence of a conflict.73
C. Paid Petitions Filed by State Criminal Defendants
Like their federal counterparts, state criminal defendants gen-
erally appear in the Supreme Court in forma pauperis, but a sub-
stantial number of paid petitions are also filed. In recent years the
figures have ranged from 125 to 195. The proportion of cases that
receive plenary consideration is higher than it is for the federal de-
fendants, but still very low. In the four Terms of the 1980's the
total number of plenary decisions of this kind was 8, and in the last
three Terms of the 1970's it was 7.
When review is granted in a paid case filed by a state criminal
defendant, the reason generally is not to resolve a conflict, but
rather to permit the vindication of a federal right. Although the
judgments were actually reversed in only 4 of the 8 cases in the
72 The figures for the first four Terms of the 1980's (rounded to the nearest 5) were
335, 400, 320 and 320. Obviously, the 1981 Term was something of an anomaly, as indeed
it was from the standpoint of overall filings. That was the Term in which the total number
of new cases was 4,422-200 more than in any subsequent Term.
73 In the 1984 Term, 5 paid petitions filed by federal criminal defendants reached the
plenary docket. Three involved acknowledged conflicts; in the other 2, the defendants
could cite decisions from other circuits which, while distinguishable on their facts, certainly
reflected a narrower view of the scope of a federal criminal statute. Compare United States v.
Dowling, 739 F.2d 1445, 1448 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985), with
United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1982); compare United States v. Russell, 738
F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985), with United States v. Mennuti,
639 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit decision in Dowling relied on the same
court's earlier ruling in United States v. Belmont, 715 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1275 (1984). Why the Court granted review in Dowling after declining to hear
Belmont remains something of a mystery. See 29 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) 287
(1985) (summarizing defendant's certiorari petition and government's response; noting
that government disputed petitioner's claim of conflict between Belmont and Smith).
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1980-1983 period, there were at least four votes for reversal in all
but 2. The pattern is even more pronounced if we look at the
Court's work over a somewhat longer span of time. In 6 of the 7
cases that received plenary consideration in the last three Terms of
the 1970's the judgments were reversed (5 unanimously), and in
the remaining case there were four votes for reversal. Thus, of the
15 cases of this kind that reached the plenary docket in the seven
Terms 1977 through 1983, 10 were reversed and 3 others had four
votes for reversal.
The Burger Court's approach during its first eight Terms may
have been somewhat different. In that period the Court heard a
total of 31 cases brought by nonindigent state criminal defend-
ants.74 Thirteen of the petitioners secured a judgment of reversal,
and in 10 other cases there were four votes to reverse. To look at
the figures from the other side, the plenary docket included 6 cases
which, on the evidence of published votes after argument, do not
appear to have been taken for the purpose of correcting an errone-
ous rejection of a federal claim. Thus it is at least possible that until
the mid-1970's the Court was applying a somewhat more flexible
set of criteria in considering whether to hear a case of this kind.
D. Civil Cases Filed by Pro Se Litigants
In each of the first four Terms of the 1980's, the Court re-
ceived, on the average, 135 paid petitions filed by litigants in civil
cases who were representing themselves. These pro se petitions
complained of a wide range of grievances, most frivolous by any
standard, some fantastic. For example, one litigant twice sought to
set aside the 1980 presidential election.75 Another claimed dam-
ages for emotional pain and suffering as a result of injuries to his
74 To some degree, the higher average reflects the Court's greater interest in obscenity
issues; 10 of the 31 cases arose out of obscenity prosecutions. (However, 3 of the 7 paid
petitions filed by state criminal defendants in the 1977-1979 period also sought review of
obscenity convictions.) In this connection, it is interesting to note that among the dozens
of obscenity cases brought to the Court in the last few years, only a handful were filed by
indigents.
75 Stroom v. Carter, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983) (order dismissing appeal for want ofjurisdic-
tion) (jurisdictional statement summarized at 51 U.S.L.W. 3638 (1983)); Stroom v. Carter,
459 U.S. 866 (1982) (order denying certiorari) (petition summarized at 51 U.S.L.W. 3209
(1982)). Mr. Stroom made another effort in the 1984 Term. Stroom v. Carter, 105 S. Ct.
173 (1984) (order denying certiorari) (petition summarized at 53 U.S.L.W. 3161 (1984)).
Having failed in that endeavor, he sought to set aside the results of the 1984 election.
Stroom v. Carter, 105 S. Ct. 1194 (1985) (order denying certiorari) (petition summarized at
53 U.S.L.W. 3556 (1985)).
Other pro se litigants who have filed numerous unsuccessful applications for review
include RobertJ. Kondrat (8 petitions in the first four Terms of the 1980's) and George L.
Karapinka (4 petitions in the first four Terms of the 1980's; 2 more in the 1984 Term). See,
e.g., Kondrat v. United States Dep't of State, 457 U.S. 1121 (1982) (order denying certio-
rari) (petition summarized at 50 U.S.L.W. 3972 (1982)); Karapinka v. Union Carbide Corp.,
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dog.76 Another asserted that land had been taken illegally from his
aunt in 1921. 77
In this light, it is hardly surprising that during the four Terms
1980-1983, only 2 pro se petitions were granted, and neither was a
typical example of the genre. In one, a federal court of appeals had
held a state statute unconstitutional, and the case fell within the
Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction.78 In the other, the peti-
tioner was a member of the state supreme court's committee on bar
admissions who was named as a defendant in an antitrust suit
brought by an unsuccessful applicant. 79
E. Spurious Federal Question Cases From State Courts
Pro se litigants may not know that in reviewing cases from state
courts the Supreme Court can consider only the federal ques-
tions.8 0 But lawyers generally are at least dimly aware of this fact.
Thus, when a lawyer loses a state court case that has been litigated
and decided entirely on the basis of state law issues, he will recog-
nize that the state court's rulings on these matters do not, of them-
selves, provide grounds for Supreme Court review. And at that
point most lawyers will accept the reality that in our federal system
the case has reached the end of the road. But some attorneys are
not content to stop there. They attempt to argue that the substance
of the state court's judgment or the manner in which it was reached
violated some right under the federal Constitution. The due pro-
cess and equal protection clauses are most often invoked,8 1 but in-
459 U.S. 1070 (1982) (order denying certiorari) (petition summarized at 51 U.S.L.W. 3395
(1982)).
76 Burleson v. Howard, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980) (order denying certiorari) (petition sum-
marized at 49 U.S.L.W. 3377 (1980)).
77 Harris v. City of Norfolk, 104 S. Ct. 529 (1983) (order denying certiorari) (petition
summarized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3429 (1983)). See also Schwarz v. Coastal Resources Manage-
ment, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983) (order denying certiorari); Moore v. Khourie, 104 S. Ct. 49
(1983) (order dismissing appeal and denying certiorari). In Schwartz, the certiorari petition
presented the question, "Does using over 2 million dollars of Clean Water Act Funds to
bring millions of gallons of sewage to clean water seem like an atrocious waste of your
money?". Petition for Certiorari, Questions Presented (unpaginated). In Moore, the appel-
lant argued that the record of proceedings "present[s] a prima facie case that [the lower]
Courts have become 'Nobility' as denied [sic] by Article I of the U.S. Constitution." Juris-
dictional Statement at 5.
78 Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
79 Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
80 According to a recent national survey, 77 percent of the American public "incor-
rectly believes the Supreme Court can review and reverse every decision made by a state
court." Krasno, National Survey Examines Public Awareness ofJudicial System, 67JuDIcA-ruE 309
(1984).
81 See, e.g., Riffe v. International Harvester Co., 104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984) (order denying
certiorari) (petition summarized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3654 (1984)) (due process); Wold v. Bull
Valley Management Co., 96 Ill. 2d 110, 449 N.E.2d 112, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 345 (1983)
(petition summarized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3347 (1983)) (due process and equal protection); Bry-
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ventive counsel have also cited the contract clause, 2 the commerce
clause,83 and the seventh amendment.
84
These are the cases that I have labeled "spurious federal ques-
tion cases." Their numbers range from 30 to 60 each Term. It is
almost needless to say that none of these cases receives plenary re-
view. And until very recently one could have added confidently that
the cases took virtually none of the Justices' time. Today, however,
this conclusion must be reassessed in light of the fact that the Jus-
tices have begun to consider the possibility of awarding damages
against litigants who file frivolous petitions.
8 5
From the standpoint of workload, the soundness of this ap-
proach is very much open to question. While one can understand
the Justices' frustration at having to consider cases that clearly do
not belong on their docket, the actual imposition on their time is de
minimis if review is simply denied. But that will no longer be true if
the Court undertakes the task of distinguishing between cases that
are merely unworthy of review and those that are frivolous. That
determination does involve a question of judgment on which rea-
sonable persons can differ,8 6 and it can be expected to consume
substantially more time than the cases would otherwise require.
8 7
Nor can it reasonably be thought that the Court's overall workload
will be reduced because fewer cases will be filed. The Court is not
likely to impose sanctions very often,88 and in any event it is difficult
ant-Poff, Inc. v. Hahn, 454 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. App. 1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 1433 (1984) (jurisdictional statement summarized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3639 (1984)) (equal
protection).
82 See, e.g., Gustine v. Gustine, 104 S. Ct. 713 (1984) (order denying certiorari) (petition
summarized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3493 (1984)).
83 See, e.g., Moorer v. Clayton Mfg. Co., 128 Ariz. 565, 627 P.2d 716 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981) (petition summarized at 50 U.S.L.W. 3207 (1981)).
84 See, e.g., Taylor v. Lawson Milk Co., 104 S. Ct. 153 (1983) (order denying certiorari)
(petition summarized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3181 (1983)); Martin Roofing, Inc. v. Goldstein, 60
N.Y.2d 262, 457 N.E.2d 700, 469 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1681 (1984)
(petition summarized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3691 (1984)).
85 See Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 105 S. Ct. 1824, 1825 (1985) (opinion of Burger,
CJ., joined by Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.).
86 For example, ChiefJustice Burger urged the Court to impose sanctions in two cases
in which appeals were dismissed on March 25, 1985. In one of the cases, two otherJustices
joined in his recommendation; in the other, he was alone. Compare Talamini v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 105 S. Ct. 1824, 1825 (1985) (opinion of Burger, CJ., joined by Rehnquist and
O'Connor, JJ.), with Crumpacker v. Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Comm'n, 105 S.
Ct. 1829 (1985) (opinion of Burger, CJ.).
87 As four members of the Court have stated, "Any evenhanded attempt to determine
which of the unmeritorious applications should give rise to sanctions, and which should
merely be denied summarily, would be a time-consuming and unrewarding task." Talamini
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 105 S. Ct. 1824, 1827 (1985) (Stevens,J., joined by Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
88 See note 86 supra.
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to believe that the lawyers who file these petitions undertake a care-
ful cost-benefit analysis before proceeding.
The question, then, is whether the added burden to the Court
of devoting more attention to the least certworthy petitions can be
justified on the ground that it will permit the Court to compensate
litigants who have been exposed to unnecessary legal expenses in
responding to a frivolous application.8 9 Full discussion is beyond
the scope of this article, but an impressionistic survey suggests that
the number of petitions that are truly frivolous (as distinguished
from being merely uncertworthy) is small enough that the game is
not worth the candle. In particular, once we leave the realm of
cases involving spurious federal questions (which are relatively few
in number) for the cases where the federal questions have been
properly raised and preserved throughout the litigation, the frivo-
lous applications are much more difficult to identify.90
F. Cases Held for Plenary Decisions
As previously noted, when a case is filed that raises an issue
similar or identical to an issue presented by a case already chosen
for plenary consideration, the Court's practice is to put the new
case aside rather than to either grant or deny review. Later, when
the plenary decision is announced, the Court takes another look at
the held case. At that time the Court could, of course, decide that
the case warrants review in its own right, but study of the Court's
practices shows that the Court rarely takes that course. To explain
why this is so, it is necessary to analyze the possible relationships
between a held case and a plenary decision and the consequences
of those relationships for the exercise of the Court's functions.
First, the judgment of the lower court may be clearly consistent
with, or even compelled by, the new precedent. In that event no
purpose would be served by plenary consideration; on the contrary,
the only sensible course of action is for the Court to deny review.
And that is just what the Court has done in about 65 held cases in
each of the last four Terms. 91
89 See Park Ave. Inv. & Dev., Inc. v. Barkheimer, 105 S. Ct. 2171, 2173 (1985) (opinion
of Burger, C.J., joined by Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.); Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 105
S. Ct. 1824, 1827 (1985) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
90 See note 86 supra. Beyond this, as long as the Court continues to grant certiorari and
reverse in an occasional case that does not present any issues of "general importance," see
note 50 supra and accompanying text, it is hard to fault a litigant who, sincerely believing
that the lower court has grievously erred in his case, asks the Court to correct one more
isolated injustice.
91 This number can be only an approximation, because it is not always clear whether a
case has been held to await a plenary decision or for some other reason, or indeed whether
it has been "held" at all. When the lapse of time between the issuance of the plenary
opinion and the denial of review is minimal and the similarity of issues unmistakable, I have
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Second, it may be clear, in light of the new precedent, that the
judgment brought for review cannot stand. The lower court may
have come out on the wrong side of an intercircuit conflict resolved
by the plenary decision; it may have relied on a lower court ruling
that the Supreme Court reversed or substantially modified; or it
may have rested on a Supreme Court decision that the Justices
overruled. 92 In any of these circumstances it would be possible-
and perhaps desirable-for the Court to reverse outright, citing the
new precedent. 93 And under Chief'Justice Warren that is probably
what the Court would have done.94 More recently, however, the
Court's practice has been to vacate rather than reverse the judg-
ment and to remand the case to the lower court "for further consid-
eration in light of" the intervening decision. But whether the
disposition be one of reversal or remand, the one course of action
that would make no sense is plenary consideration; by hypothesis,
the held case is controlled by the new precedent. Thus these cases,
like those in the first group, are unlikely candidates for the plenary
docket.
This leaves the held cases in which the effect of the new prece-
dent on the lower court judgment is unclear. Typically, these cases
will involve a difference in the factual or legal context that argu-
ably-but not necessarily-calls for a different result from that of
the plenary decision. The held case may have been brought under
a different statute or legal theory; additional issues may be present
that were not raised by the case that received plenary consideration;
or the distinctions may be purely factual. 95 In any of these circum-
stances, the Court might be justified in granting plenary considera-
tion to clarify the scope or application of the new precedent. Thus,
generally felt confident in inferring the connection, but no doubt there are a few cases
where my conclusion is in error. (The inference is particularly vulnerable for petitions that
were filed only a short time before the announcement of the plenary decision.) Overall,
however, the figure probably errs on the low side, because it does not include FP cases
without reported opinions. Indigent petitions in which review is denied are not summa-
rized in United States Law Week; thus the issues in these cases could not be identified through
published materials.
The figure does include an average of 15 indigent cases per Term in which the court
below published an opinion. However, that figure is somewhat misleading because in the
1982 Term the Court set aside an unusually large number of FP petitions to await the
announcement of 3 important opinions on death penalty issues. If 1982 is excluded, the
average falls to 10.
The held/denied cases also include a per-Term average of 6 paid cases filed by federal
criminal defendants and 2 paid cases filed by state criminal defendants.
92 Illustrative cases are cited in Hellman, Second Thoughts, supra note 45, at 11-13 &
nn.35-37.
93 Id. at 34 & nn.113-14.
94 See id. at 7-8.
95 For illustrative cases, see id. at 17-18 & nn.51-53.
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in contrast to the cases in the first two groups, plenary review is a
real possibility.
An immediate grant of plenary review, however, may have a
number of drawbacks. The parties will not have developed the rec-
ord with the rule of the new precedent in mind. Subsidiary or con-
sequent issues, not addressed by the court below because of its
reliance on the prior law, may complicate the disposition or call
into question the suitability of the case as a vehicle for elucidating
the principles set forth in the plenary decision. For these or other
reasons, it may be desirable to give the lower court the opportunity
to consider the effect of the new precedent (and, if appropriate, to
send the case back to the trial court for further development of the
record) before the Supreme Court attempts to do so. Finally, con-
sistent with Court's general preference for allowing an issue to
"percolate" in the lower courts before granting review, the Court
will often want to hear what other courts have to say about the new
precedent before elaborating upon its meaning in any particular
case. 96
In this light, it is hardly surprising that held cases, even those
in which the disposition is not controlled by the new precedent,
very seldom receive plenary consideration. In the four Terms of
the 1980's more than 500 cases were set aside to await plenary deci-
sions;97 review was granted in no more than a dozen.9 8
96 For discussion of percolation, see Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 404-06.
97 Forma pauperis petitions account for about 60 of the held/denied cases; paid peti-
tions by criminal defendants (federal and state) account for another 30. These groups of
cases also contributed 54 of the held cases that were remanded for reconsideration in light
of the new precedent. Thus about 150 of the cases in this category overlap with the cases
previously discussed.
98 E.g., Springfield Township School Dist. v. Knoll, 104 S. Ct. 3571 (1984) (order
granting certiorari) (held for Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984)); Shea v. Louisiana,
104 S. Ct. 2167 (1984) (order granting certiorari) (held for Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct.
1338 (1984)); Solem v. Stumes, 103 S. Ct. 3568 (1983) (order granting certiorari) (held for
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983)); Allen v. Wright, 462 U.S. 1130 (1983) (order
granting certiorari) (held for Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983));
Herweg v. Ray, 453 U.S. 921 (1981) (order granting certiorari) (held for Schweiker v. Gray
Panthers, 453 U.S. 34 (1981)).
The figure in the text does not include cases held for plenary decisions that did not
resolve the common issue. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 452 U.S. 959 (1981) (order grant-
ing certiorari) (held for Kissinger v. Halperin, 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (mem.) (affirmance by
equally divided Court)). Compare also United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Mayor &
Council of Camden, 460 U.S. 1021 (1983) (order noting probable jurisdiction) (raising is-
sues under interstate privileges and immunities clause; held for White v. Massachusetts
Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983)), with Massachusetts Council, 460 U.S.
at 214-14 n.12 (pretermitting privileges and immunities issue).
Of course, if a held case that has been remanded for reconsideration returns to the
Supreme Court after the lower court has entered a new judgment taking the intervening
precedent into account, the Court may grant review of the new judgment. However, the
Court does so less often than one might expect. See Hellman, Second Thoughts, supra note 45,
at 19.
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G. Conclusion
In summary, the six classes of cases discussed in the preceding
pages accounted for an average of 2,800 petitions a Term during
the first four Terms of the 1980's-two-thirds of the Court's total
caseload. But in all four Terms they contributed only 72 cases to
the plenary docket-not even eleven percent.
Moreover, these categories do not come close to exhausting
the ranks of the almost-certain losers. Several smaller classes of
cases contribute at least a handful of filings each year, but seldom if
ever reach the plenary docket. These include cases in which a dis-
appointed entrepreneur has unjustifiably sought to turn a commer-
cial dispute or unsuccessful business venture into an antitrust
suit;99 diversity cases from federal courts that raise no issues of fed-
eral substantive law;' 00 and paid applications filed by state prison-
ers whose petitions for federal habeas corpus were denied in the
courts below.' 0 '
III. The Forces That Shape the Plenary Docket
With only 180 places on the plenary docket and 4,200 cases to
choose from (1,260 if we exclude the petitions that are denied
unanimously and without discussion); 10 2 with federal law governing
almost every aspect of American life; and with a system under which
minority coalitions can control the agenda, it would hardly be sur-
prising if the composition of the plenary docket reflected a degree
of randomness and unpredictability. But these centrifugal forces
are balanced by others that bring identifiable patterns of change
99 Typically the unsuccessful plaintiff is a retailer or distributor. See, e.g., Mesirow v.
Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 703 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 83 (1983);JBL Enters.
v. Jhirmack Enters., 698 F.2d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir.) ("When their contractual relations
broke down, the disappointed parties sought solace (and treble damages) from the court,
alleging various antitrust violations and related contract and tort claims."), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 106 (1983); see also Galardo v. AMP Inc., 104 S. Ct. 278 (1983) (order denying certio-
rari) (petition summarized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3310) (1983)); Philadelphia Lift Truck Corp. v.
Taylor Mach. Works, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 154 (1983) (order denying certiorari) (petition sum-
marized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3173 (1983)); Copenhaver v. Harris Enters., 104 S. Ct. 149 (1983)
(order denying certiorari) (petition summarized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3142 (1983)). However,
other business relationships also generate suits of this kind. See, e.g., L. & L. Howell, Inc. v.
Cincinnati Coop. Milk Sales Ass'n, 104 S. Ct. 1679 (1984) (order denying certiorari) (peti-
tion summarized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3690 (1984)) (suit by milk hauler against milk coopera-
tives). In the latter case the lower court commented, "[The plaintiff] apparently made a bad
bargain and seeks to utilize the antitrust laws to rectify this unfortunate situation." See
Petition for Certiorari at 7a (reprinting court of appeals opinion). As is typical of the cases
in these categories, the lower court's opinion was unpublished.
100 In the first four Terms of the 1980's only 4 cases of this kind received plenary consid-
eration. More than 25 petitions were filed in the 1983 Term alone.
101 No cases of this kind received plenary consideration in the four Terms 1980-1983.
At least 10 petitions were filed in the 1983 Term alone.
102 See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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and continuity to the work of the Court. Study of those patterns
sheds light not only on the process of case selection, but also on the
Court's interaction with the other forces that influence the develop-
ment of American law.
To understand these relationships, it is helpful to divide the
Court's work into four broad areas: civil rights, federalism and sep-
aration of powers, general federal law, and the jurisdiction and pro-
cedure of federal courts.103 Figure 1 depicts the composition of the
plenary docket in each of the ten three-Term periods from 1954 to
1983. The first five periods represent the Warren Court;1 04 the last
four, the Burger Court. In between is a transitional period' 05 -a
period marked by the arrival of four new Justices and a Court that
for much of the time operated at less than full strength. 10 6
103 For a description of the classification scheme, see Pleay Docket I, supra note 13, at
1739-43 (civil rights), 1760-65 (federalism and separation of powers), 1774-75 (general fed-
eral law), and 1785 (jurisdiction and procedure). Because issues of criminal procedure and
the constitutionality of police practices occupy such a large part of the civil rights docket, I
have given that topic a separate heading in the tables in the Appendix.
104 The first Term of the Warren Court, 1953, is omitted partly for reasons of symmetry,
partly because almost half of the cases decided by the Court in that Term were selected
during the tenure of ChiefJustice Vinson. In any event, little has been lost. In fact, to have
included the 1953 Term would have distorted the picture somewhat, because the number
of plenary decisions was only 85-substantially fewer than in any other Term in the Court's
modem history. Curiously, ChiefJustice Burger has repeatedly used the 1953 Term as a
benchmark for assessing the magnitude of the Court's current workload. See, e.g., Burger,
1983 Annual Report, supra note 14, at 442 (noting that the number of signed opinions more
than doubled from 1953 through 1982); Burger, Intercircuit Panel, supra note 14, at 87 (65
signed opinions in 1953 Term). In the Intercircuit Panel article the ChiefJustice acknowl-
edged that the number of signed opinions rose to 78 in 1954. He did not allude further to
the fluctuations in the size of the plenary docket over the last half century. See Plenary Docket
I, supra note 13, at 1730-34, 1789-94.
105 Although ChiefJustice Burger took office at the start of the 1969 Term, only a tiny
fraction of the cases in this period were selected by the "Burger Court" that came into
existence when Justices Powell and Rehnquist took their seats in the middle of the 1971
Term.
106 Chief Justice Burger was sworn in well before the start of the 1969 Term, see Ap-
pointment of Mr. ChiefJustice Burger, 395 U.S. xv (1969), but the vacancy created by the
resignation ofJustice Fortas in the midst of the 1968 Term, see id. at iii, was not filled until
the 1969 Term was almost over. See 398 U.S. iv (1970). Thus the Court operated with only
eight Justices for virtually all of the 1969 Term. The Court had a full complement for the
1970 Term, but the vacancies created in the summer of 1971 by the retirements ofJustices
Black and Harlan were not filled until well into the 1971 Term, when Justices Powell and
Rehnquist were sworn in. See 404 U.S. iv (1972).
I do not minimize the significance of the Court's work during this period. In fact,
several of the major constitutional initiatives of the last decade and a half were launched in
the first three Terms under Chief Justice Burger. Two of them emerged while the Court
was at less than full strength. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (7-0 decision) (sex
discrimination), discussed in text accompanying notes 137-42, 306-15 infra; Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (5-3 decision) (procedural due process in the administration of
government programs), discussed in text accompanying notes 151-58 infra; see also Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (4-3 decision) (due process limitations on creditors' reme-
dies). The modem line of precedents on the rights of aliens began with a decision of the
1970 Term by a full Court. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). And in the realm
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Figure 1
The Supreme Court's Plenary Business,
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Two things stand out immediately. First, the total number of
cases receiving plenary consideration is much greater under Chief
Justice Burger than it was during the years of the Warren Court.
From 1954 through 1968 the Court was deciding an average of 115
cases per Term; from 1972 through 1983 the average was 146. The
difference is even more striking if we look at signed opinions alone.
The Justices of the Warren Court authored an average of 92 opin-
ions per Term; their successors on the current Court are responsi-
ble for 134.107
Second, the nature of the cases has changed. Until the mid-
1960's, matters of general federal law constituted the largest seg-
ment of the plenary docket. However, toward the end of the War-
ren Court that distinction was usurped by civil rights, and
throughout the fifteen years of the Burger Court, civil rights cases
have occupied the dominant position. During the first half of the
1970's, issues of civil rights law actually accounted for more than
of criminal procedure, the jurisprudence of guilty pleas was developed largely during the
transitional period by a Court of fewer than nine Justices. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257 (1971) (4-3 division on remedy for broken plea bargain); McMann v. Richard-
son, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (5-3 decision). The abortion cases too were initially argued in the
1971 Term, but instead of issuing a decision by a seven-man Court, the Justices set the
cases for reargument. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416, 420 n.l (1983); R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 176-77, 186-89
(1979).
107 In other words, under ChiefJustice Warren 20 percent of the plenary decisions were
issued without signed opinions; for the Burger CourtJustices, this proportion has been cut
by more than half. For speculation as to the possible reasons for this development, see
Plenary Docket I, supra note 13, at 1732-33.
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half of all cases given plenary consideration. For a few years there-
after, the proportion diminished somewhat, but in the 1983 Term it
was as close to 50 percent as it could be: in 78 out of 157 plenary
decisions, the principal issue decided, addressed, or presented was
an issue of civil rights. 0 8
The predominance of civil rights cases will come as no surprise
to anyone who follows the work of the Court even in a casual way.
What is less well known is that matters of federalism and separation
of powers (mostly the former) also occupy a much larger segment
of the plenary docket than they did in earlier years. Nearly all of
the major areas of federalism litigation have experienced growth.
For example, challenges to state regulatory laws based on the nega-
tive implications of the commerce clause, which accounted for only
9 decisions in all sixteen Terms under Chief Justice Warren, gave
rise to 7 decisions in the last three Terms of the 1970's. Another 5
opinions were issued in the four Terms that followed. Cases in-
volving state taxation of interstate commerce dwindled to a handful
in the late 1960's, but in the 1980-1983 period alone there were 7
such decisions. These were augmented by 5 cases in which state tax
laws were challenged on the basis of federal statutes. Even the full
faith and credit clause, which disappeared entirely from the plenary
docket between 1966 and 1979,109 generated 3 decisions in the
later Burger Court." 0 The Court also granted review in 2 addi-
tional cases, but dismissed the petitions without reaching the merits
of the constitutional claims."'
In previous articles I have analyzed, issue by issue, the changes
in the composition of the plenary docket during the first decade of
the Burger Court." 2 While there would be value in bringing that
analysis up to date," 3 the more interesting approach is to turn di-
rectly to an examination of the institutions and activities that have
influenced the selection of cases for plenary consideration. I begin
by looking at the effect of forces originating within the Court;
thereafter, I note some of the many external influences.
A. Forces Originating Within the Court
In October 1972, the Court heard oral argument in two cases
108 At this writing, it appears that civil rights cases will constitute slightly less than half of
the plenary decisions in the 1984 Term.
109 See Plenary Docket 1, supra note 13, at 1768-69.
110 See Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 590-92.
111 See id. at 592-93 n.299.
112 The Burger Court's work through the 1976 Term is discussed in three articles: Ple-
nary Docket I, supra note 13: Civil Rights, supra note 13; and Statutory Law, supra note 13.
Developments through the 1979 Term are analyzed in Plenary Docket II, supra note 13.
113 Raw figures for the first three Terms of the 1980's are given, without analysis, in
Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13 at 447-56.
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that attracted wide public attention. Roe v. Wade' 14 presented the
question whether the federal Constitution limits state power to pro-
hibit abortions. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez"15
was a challenge to a school financing system that resulted in higher
educational spending in rich districts than in poor ones. Later in
the Term, the Court upheld the claims of the abortion plaintiffs and
rejected the attack on school financing. In the decade that fol-
lowed, the Court issued 11 more opinions dealing with abortion, 16
but there were only 2 plenary decisions that involved school
financing.11
7
These outcomes underscore the fact that one of the most pow-
erful forces shaping the plenary docket is the course of adjudication
within the Court itself. Several patterns can be identified. They are
not mutually exclusive; a particular area of doctrinal development
may illustrate more than one pattern at different times in its history.
First and most obvious, decisions recognizing new constitu-
tional rights typically require further attention by the Court to clar-
ify the nature and scope of the right. Few rights are self-defining;
even fewer are absolute. And because every holding that recog-
nizes a constitutional right limits, pro tanto, the autonomy of the
executive and the legislature to act in accordance with the desires of
the majority (or the bureaucracy), governmental litigants will seek
to cabin the holding in the narrowest way possible. At the same
time, potential beneficiaries will seek to expand its contours. Al-
most invariably, the tensions created by the competing forces will
be brought to the plenary docket for resolution.
Abortion is one prominent example of this phenomenon. Roe
v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton struck down abortion statutes that were
typical of those adopted by almost all of the states, but they did not
put abortion off limits to government regulation." 18 Within a few
years many states had adopted new abortion legislation, and four
114 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe was heard together with a companion case, Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
115 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
116 In addition to 9 cases primarily involving substantive due process issues, abortion
controversies generated one opinion addressing an equal protection claim, see Williams v.
Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); and one that purported to rest on vagueness grounds, see
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979). The figure in the text does not include decisions
involving adjective law, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (standing), or rights
under federal statutes, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
117 Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The
latter case involved the rights of aliens, and the former involved school financing only in an
attenuated way: the plaintiffs attacked a Texas statute that allowed school districts to deny
tuition-free admission to minors living apart from their parents or guardians if their pres-
ence in the school district was "for the primary purpose of attending the public free
schools." 461 U.S. at 323 n. 1 (quoting state statute). For further discussion, see note 482
infra.
118 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64.
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years after Roe the Supreme Court took the first in what was to be-
come a long series of cases treating the constitutionality of particu-
lar regulations."19 Some of the cases involved statutes requiring the
consent of the parents or husband of the pregnant woman; 20 some
dealt with laws limiting state funding for abortions; 12 1 others con-
sidered the constitutionality of laws regulating the procedures for
conducting abortions. 22 Abortion laws were directly at issue in 11
of the 31 decisions on substantive due process that were handed
down by the Burger Court in the twelve Terms beginning in
1972.123
Another example of this pattern is commercial speech. Until
about ten years ago, commercial speech-speech that does no more
than propose a commercial transaction-was excluded altogether
from the protections of the first amendment. 24 The Court repudi-
ated that position in the mid-1970's, 125 but did not assimilate com-
mercial speech with other forms of expression. 26 Commercial
speech was accorded a lesser degree of protection, and a distinct
mode of analysis was developed for testing the constitutionality of
particular regulations.' 27 Not surprisingly, over the last decade the
Court has taken a fair number of cases to define when, and to what
extent, commercial speech will be protected.
28
The pattern is also exemplified, although in a more complex
way, by the Court's decisions on capital punishment. For more
than a decade, Justices Brennan and Marshall have argued that "the
119 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The Court noted that the stat-
ute in question had been enacted not long after the federal courts, in reliance on Roe and
Doe, had struck down the state's previous abortion laws. See id. at 55-56. On the same day,
the Court considered two other abortion cases, but decided them on procedural grounds.
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
120 E.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
121 E.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
122 E.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983).
123 Two additional cases are scheduled for plenary consideration in the 1985 Term.
Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984),prob.juris. noted sub nom. Diamond v. Charles,
105 S. Ct. 2356 (1985); American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh,
737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984),juris. postponed, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
124 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350, 404-05 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that Court should re-
turn to distinction drawn in Valentine).
125 The pivotal cases were Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), and Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
126 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
127 The analytical approach emerged in full-blown form in Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980).
128 In the later Burger Court, there were 5 decisions that primarily involved commercial
speech issues and one that included an important secondary holding on the scope of the
doctrine. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 503-12 (1981) (plurality
opinion). The changing contours of the doctrine are well described in G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTrrTUIONAL LAw 1380-1406 (10th ed. 1980).
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death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 129 If the
full Court had adopted that position, the decision would have re-
quired little if any clarification; death penalty cases would have dis-
appeared from the Court's docket altogether. If, on the other
hand, the Court had adhered to its 1971 view that the procedures
for imposing the death penalty were to be left largely to the discre-
tion of the states, 30 the Justices would probably have taken an oc-
casional case to address the constitutionality of particular
procedures, but it is unlikely that capital punishment issues would
have come to occupy a major segment of the plenary docket.' 3 '
In fact, the Court took neither of these approaches. The Court
held that the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional, but that
the standards and procedures for imposing it would be subjected to
strict scrutiny under federal law.' 3 2 The result has been a long se-
ries of decisions considering the constitutionality of particular laws
and their application to particular situations. The uncertainty in-
herent in the Court's approach was compounded by the fact that
from 1977 through 1982 the Court overturned the death sentence
in all but one of the capital cases that received plenary considera-
tion, 33 while denying review (and thus allowing the sentence to
stand) in scores of other cases. 134 The 1982 Term, however, saw a
distinct shift in attitude that brought the results of the plenary deci-
sions into line with those of the cases not reviewed on the merits.
3 5
Thus it may be that the era of the Court's intensive involvement
with death penalty issues will soon come to an end. 3 6
129 See, e.g., Villafuerte v. Arizona, 105 S. Ct. 1234 (1985) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall file a similar statement in every death penalty
case, except when they publish opinions addressing other issues. The two Justices first
stated their position in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); id at 370 (Marshall, J., concurring).
130 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
131 See Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 313 ("In the end, [the 1971
opinion] concludes that, morally and intellectually, the Court has nothing to teach the
states about capital punishment.").
132 See, e.g., Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 958-59 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(citing cases).
133 The exception was Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (procedural changes in
death penalty statute do not constitute ex post facto law). See Discretionary Review, supra note
13, at 875.
134 In the four Terms 1977 through 1980, the Court denied review in more than 80
death penalty cases from Georgia alone.
135 In the 1982 and 1983 Terms the Court heard a total of 7 cases in which a sentence of
death had been imposed. The death penalty was upheld in all of the cases. (One case
involved the right to counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). See id. at
2071-72 & n. 1 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).) In one additional
case the Court affirmed a state court decision that set aside a sentence of death on double
jeopardy grounds. Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305 (1984).
136 See generally Weisberg, supra note 131. The last major battles will probably be fought
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Similar sequences can be seen in the Court's work in the
realms of equal protection and due process. In the early 1970's the
Burger Court issued a series of landmark decisions that provided
the precedential grounding for challenges to disparate treatment
based on gender 137 or on status as an alien. 138 But neither line of
precedents erected a rigid barrier like the one that prohibits gov-
ernments from discriminating on account of race.13 9 Classifications
based on sex did not have to meet the standard of "strict scrutiny,"
though more-ultimately much more-was required than a "ra-
tional basis."' 140 And while "strict scrutiny" was the general test for
classifications based on alienage, a "political function" exception
left room for states to exclude aliens from at least some govern-
mental positions.' 4' Thus in both areas the Court was called upon
to hear a continuing series of cases to define the circumstances that
might permit differential treatment.142 Similarly, the Court held
that the states are subject to the constraints of the due process
clause in revoking parole or probation or changing the status of
over the issues of whether jurors who have absolute scruples against the death penalty may
be excluded for cause in the guilt phase of a capital trial, see Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226
(8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); and whether statistical studies purporting to show racial bias in a
state's administration of the death penalty are sufficient to make out a prima facie case of
constitutional violation, see McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
An intercircuit conflict exists on the first issue, see Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 238-42, and the
recurrence of the second issue will likely prompt the Court to grant review even in the
absence of a conflict. See also Witt v. Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. 1415, 1417 (1985) (Marshall,J.,
joined by Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("This Court will certainly grant
certiorari to resolve [the Grigsby] issue in the immediate future because it presents a clear
split in the courts of appeals on an issue of constitutional law whose importance to the
administration of the States' criminal justice systems is undoubted.").
137 See text accompanying notes 306-15 infra.
138 See Civil Rights, supra note 13, at 22.
139 See Hunter v. Underwood, 105 S. Ct. 1916 (1985); Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879,
1881-82 (1984).
140 See Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 1387, 1397-98 (1984) (government must (a) show
a legitimate and "exceedingly persuasive justification" for a gender-based classification;
and (b) demonstrate a direct and substantial relationship between the classification and the
important governmental objectives it purports to serve).
141 See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
142 On sex discrimination, compare Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984) (permit-
ting differential treatment), with Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (forbidding differential treatment). On alienage discrimination, compare Bernal v.
Fainter, 104 S. Ct. 2312 (1984) (notaries public do not fall within "public function" excep-
tion), with Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (probation officers do fall within
"public function" exception).
In the seven Terms of the later Burger Court, one case in each category came within
one vote of receiving plenary consideration. Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739
(9th Cir. 1980) (executive order barring employment of aliens in the federal civil service is
constitutional), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981) (Brennan, White, and Marshall,JJ., dissent-
ing); A v. X, Y & Z, 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1982) (statute limiting rights of natural father is
constitutional), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982) (Brennan, White, and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
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prisoners. 143 But the particular interests that would trigger a right
to procedural due process, as well as the particular procedures that
would be required, were left for development on a case-by-case
basis.
4 4
Decisions cutting back on existing rights can also lead to fur-
ther involvement by the Court-here, to clarify the boundaries be-
tween the two lines of authority. For example, contrary to the fears
of some civil libertarians, the Burger Court has never overruled Mi-
randa v. Arizona.'45 What the Court has done is to nibble away at the
edges, 146 and every now and then to strengthen the rule. 147 This
process has resulted in a steady stream of decisions as the Court has
attempted to strike an appropriate balance between the rights of
criminal suspects and the needs of law enforcement.148 Indeed,
one of the Miranda progeny-the 1981 decision in Edwards v. Ai-
zona' 49 -itself prompted three additional grants of review in the
1980's.15o
The Court's reshaping of the Miranda doctrine has attracted
wide attention because the Miranda rules have become such a sym-
bol of the Warren Court's constitutional jurisprudence. A less fa-
miliar but more important example of the pattern is found in the
Court's decisions on procedural due process outside the areas of
corrections and public employment.' 5 ' Although the origins of the
"procedural due process revolution"' 52 can no doubt be traced to
the era of the Warren Court (and perhaps earlier), 5 3 "the major
143 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
555-58 (1974) (prison discipline).
144 Compare, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983), with Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S.
480 (1980). The Burger Court's approach to procedural due process claims by public em-
ployees initially followed a similar pattern, but in that area of law the doctrines appear to
have stabilized. See text accompanying notes 164-69 infra.
145 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
146 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct.
2626 (1984); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
147 The most noteworthy example is Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). See also
Smith v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490 (1984) (summary opinion).
148 In the first four Terms of the 1980's the Court issued 5 plenary decisions on Miranda
issues. These were augmented by 3 summary opinions. Another summary opinion,
although resting judgment on the due process clause, also drew heavily on the Miranda
doctrine. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982). At this writing the 1984 Term has brought
2 more plenary decisions and one summary opinion.
149 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
150 Shea v. Louisiana, 105 S. Ct. 1065 (1985); Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338 (1984);
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). Edwards has also generated 2 summary opin-
ions. Smith v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490 (1984); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982).
151 For discussion of the corrections cases, see text accompanying notes 143-44 supra;
on the public employee cases, see text accompanying notes 164-70 infra.
152 G. GUNTHER, supra note 128, at 647.
153 See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
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case launching the. . . revolution"' 154 was a decision handed down
in the first Term of the Burger Court, Goldberg v. Kelly. l55 Within a
few years, the philosophy of Goldberg had been given so expansive
an application in so many contexts thatJudge HenryJ. Friendly was
prompted to ask "whether government can do anything to a citizen
without affording him 'some kind of hearing.' "156 Yet even as
Judge Friendly spoke, the Court had begun to pull back from the
broadest implications of its initial decisions-without overruling
any of them. 57 The stage was thus set for a continuing series of
cases delineating the interests protected by the due process clause
and the particular procedures required before governments could
act. Issues of this kind generated a total of 25 decisions in the
seven Terms that began in 1977-and that figure does not include
the prison and public employee cases.158
These examples alone might suggest that no matter what the
nature of the Court's rulings, their effect will be to create a need for
further plenary activity to clarify the meaning of what has gone
before. Fortunately, the adjudicative process also works in the
other direction. A series of decisions may clarify the law to the
point where the Court need intervene only at rare intervals, at least
until an entirely new facet of the problem emerges. For example, in
Chief Justice Warren's last Term the Court held for the first time
that the fourteenth amendment limits the authority of states to im-
pose limitations on access to the ballot by minor parties and in-
dependent candidates.159 The effect of the decision was to cast
doubt on the validity of ballot access restrictions in every state. 160
Thus, unless the Court meant to say that states would have "to
place on [their ballots] all persons who claim to be candidates,"' 6'
it was inevitable that the Court would have to spend some time de-
lineating the scope of the new right. And so it did; ballot access
cases appeared on the plenary docket in almost every Term of the
U.S. 545 (1965); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 160-74
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
154 G. GUNTHER, supra note 128, at 647.
155 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The ChiefJustice himself dissented from this decision, id, at
282 (Burger, CJ., dissenting), but so did the father of much of the Warren Court's constitu-
tional jurisprudence. See id. at 271 (Black, J., dissenting).
156 Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1275 (1975).
157 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
158 Four of the decisions focused on the question of whether "state action" was present.
See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
159 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). In sharp contrast to the other constitutional
initiatives of the Warren Court, this ruling found the ChiefJustice himself in dissent. See id.
at 63.
160 See Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1133 n.68 (1975).
161 The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 60, 96 (1969).
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early Burger Court, with a trilogy of important decisions in the
1973 Term.1 62 More recently, however, the Court has given little
attention to the topic. The probable reason is that the decisions of
the early and middle 1970's have clarified the law to the point that
most disputes (to the extent they arise at all) can be settled without
resort to the Supreme Court.163
Perhaps more surprising, a similar pattern can be discerned in
the development of the law on procedural due process for govern-
ment employees. In the early years of the Burger Court this was a
subject of intense interest and great controversy. The seven Terms
yielded 7 plenary decisions on the topic, and in most of them the
Court divided sharply over the nature of the rights protected by the
Constitution and the procedures required for adverse action.
64
But in the later Burger Court the subject virtually disappeared from
the plenary docket. From 1977 through 1983 the Justices granted
review in only 2 cases involving the due process rights of public
employees. One resulted in an affirmance by an equally divided
Court; 65 in the other, the Court found that jurisdiction was lacking
over the constitutional issue' 66 (though the opinion did address it
in a footnote that later achieved some significance). 167 And in all
seven Terms there were no more than a handful of government em-
ployment cases in which one or more Justices dissented from the
denial of plenary review.1
68
These developments suggested that notwithstanding the mani-
festations of controversy in what were then the Court's most recent
162 For citations and discussion, see Developments in the Law--Elections, supra note 160, at
1139-48.
163 See, e.g., Goldman-Frankie v. Austin, 727 F.2d 603, 605 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Plaintiffs'
charge poses no new issue of constitutional law."). A noteworthy exception is Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). This, however, was the only case arising out of John
Anderson's independent presidential candidacy in 1980 to reach the Supreme Court.
164 See, e.g., Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976);
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). In addition, early in the 1977 Term the Court
issued a summary reconsideration order in a public employee case that prompted an ex-
tended dissent joined by fourJustices. Oregon State Penitentiary v. Hammer, 434 U.S. 945
(1977). On remand, the Oregon court adhered to its prior ruling. The case was again
taken to the Supreme Court, but this time the Justices unanimously denied review. Ham-
mer v. Oregon State Penitentiary, 283 Or. 369, 583 P.2d 1136 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
935 (1979).
165 Board of Educ. of Paris Union School Dist. v. Vail, 104 S. Ct. 2144 (1984), afgmem.
706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983).
166 Davis v. Scherer, 104 S. Ct. 3012, 3017 (1984).
167 Id. at 3019 n.10; see Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493
(1985).
168 In only 2 cases did the dissenting Justices file opinions, and one of them relied more
on concepts of substantive due process than on procedural norms. See Whisenhunt v.
Spradlin, 104 S. Ct. 404 (1983) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari) (privacy rights); Berg v. Berger, 439 U.S. 992 (1978) (Powell,
J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (urging summary reversal).
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encounters with the subject, the decisions had in fact brought a fair
degree of stability to the law. That inference was confirmed in the
1984 Term, when the Court, over a single dissent (and with some
argument over details), restated the "settled" rules that govern
these cases: first, that a public employee's right to due process " 'is
conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guaran-
tee;' "169 and second, that the Constitution requires "notice and an
opportunity to respond" before the employee is discharged for
cause. 170
Another example of this pattern-from outside the realm of
constitutional litigation-is the Lincoln Mills line of cases. The
Court held in 1957 that federal law, to be fashioned by the courts,
should govern the enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments.' 7' In the years immediately following, the Court was quite
busy filling in the contours of that law; indeed, section 301 litiga-
tion constituted the second largest segment of the labor law docket
in the late 1950's and the first half of the 1960's.172 Once the out-
lines had been delineated, the Court largely withdrew from the
field. Today the Court is active again, though with a new slant:
many of the cases involve suits by individual employees against
both union and employer-a type of litigation that was relatively
rare in the earlier period.'
73
The effect of a clarifying series of decisions on the plenary
docket can be particularly dramatic when the clarification points
strongly in a single direction.' 74 For example, one of the major ar-
eas of first amendment activity during the early Burger Court was
obscenity. In the seven Terms 1970 through 1976 the Court
169 Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985) (quoting Ar-
nett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974)). This portion of the opinion wasjoined by eight
members of the Court.
170 Id at 1495. Two members of the Court thought that due process requires additional
procedural protections when the employee disputes the facts profferred to support his dis-
charge. Id at 1497 (Marshall, J., concurring in part); id at 1499 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
171 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
172 See Statutory Law, supra note 13, at 17; Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 600 (Table
XIV).
173 See, e.g., DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S 151 (1983). DelCostello
largely (though silently) overruled a decision handed down only two years earlier, United
Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981). For discussion of the recent proliferation
of suits in which employees seek to recover from both union and employer for alleged
mishandling of grievances, see Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the Courts Do in
Fact, 34 BUFFALO L. REv. (forthcoming 1985).
174 A variation on this pattern is the single case (or group of cases decided together) that
sharply cuts back on a flourishing line of precedent. For example, in the 1984 Term the
Court issued a pair of decisions on the "state action" defense in antitrust that appeared to
put an end to the approach developed over a decade of intensive attention to the doctrine.
See Sims, High Court Cleans Up Its Own State Action Mess, Legal Times, Apr. 15, 1985, at 17.
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handed down a total of 20 decisions addressing the first amend-
ment issues raised by government attempts to regulate or prohibit
the distribution of sexually oriented materials. 175 With a few excep-
tions, these decisions upheld state power and rejected the first
amendment claims of the distributors and publishers.1 76 In the
seven Terms that followed, obscenity issues almost disappeared
from the plenary docket; only 3 decisions were handed down. And
the single opinion in the first four Terms of the 1980's dealt with a
new form of legislation designed to combat a problem that had only
recently come to the fore: "the exploitative use of children in the
production of pornography."177
The dearth of plenary decisions did not come about because
175 Five of these cases were decided on the same day in the 1972 Term as part of "a re-
examination of [the] standards enunciated in earlier cases involving [obscenity]." Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973). In 4 additional decisions during this period, the Court
avoided obscenity issues by upholding other constitutional challenges to governmental ac-
tion. Six plenary cases in which lower federal courts had ruled against the state on first
amendment grounds were reversed or vacated on the authority of Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny. See Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 572; see also text
accompanying notes 182-85 infra.
176 Of particular significance were the 1972 Term decisions in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973), and its companion cases, see note 175 supra, which began a new era in the
law of obscenity. See 413 U.S. at 29 ("[T]oday, for the first time since [the Court's first
major obscenity ruling] in 1957, a majority of this Court has agreed on concrete guidelines
to isolate 'hard core' pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment.").
The new guidelines provided considerably less protection for sexually oriented materials
than did the precedents of 1957 through 1973. See id. at 24-25 (material may be proscribed
even if not "utterly without redeeming social value"); id. at 31-34 (states need not adhere to
national standards of offensiveness).
In the four Terms that followed Miller, the Court heard 8 additional cases in this area.
Five of the decisions upheld state power. The constitutional claimant prevailed in the re-
maining 3 cases, but in 2 of them the Court did no more than reverse (unanimously) state-
court rulings that displayed extreme insensitivity to the first amendment. McKinney v. Ala-
bama, 424 U.S. 669, 676 (1976) (petitioner "was convicted and sentenced in a criminal
proceeding wherein the issue of obscenity vel non was held to be concluded against him by
the decree in a civil proceeding to which he was not a party and of which he had no no-
tice"); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S 153 (1974) (state court upheld criminal conviction for
showing film "Carnal Knowledge"). The decisions thus provided only a minor counter-
weight to the precedents rejecting constitutional claims. Only Erznoznik v. City ofJackson-
ville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), striking down a ban on nudity in drive-in films visible from
public places, upheld a first amendment claim of some controversy. And that case did not
involve obscenity in the legal sense. See id. at 208.
177 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982). The Court emphasized that it had
not previously considered "a statute directed at and limited to depiction of sexual activity
involving children." Id. at 753. Thus the grant of review did not constitute a departure
from the general pattern of avoiding mine-run obscenity cases.
In the 1981 Term the Court also agreed to hear an appeal challenging, on grounds of
prior restraint, the one-year closure provision of a state "moral nuisance abatement act."
However, the parties stipulated to a dismissal before oral argument could be heard. State ex
rel. Kidwell v. U.S. Marketing, Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981), prob. juris noted,
454 U.S. 1140, appeal dismissed pursuant to Rule 53, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982). A similar question
was brought to the Court in the 1982 Term, but the case fell one vote short of the four
required for plenary review. See note 179 infra.
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obscenity cases were no longer being brought to the Court. On the
contrary, a substantial number of petitions raised issues such as the
requirement of scienter, proof of community standards, and the cri-
teria for judging material aimed at deviant audiences. 178 But for a
majority of the Court, these cases raised no questions that had not
been resolved by the precedents of the 1971-1976 period.17 9 As
the 1980's progressed, the volume of petitions challenging state
laws declined also. 80 And the few cases in which constitutional
claims had been upheld were, with one possible exception, clearly
uncertworthyl 8 1
A similar pattern can be seen in the realm of Younger abstention
178 See Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 552.
179 In all seven Terms of the later Burger Court there was only one obscenity case in
which ajustice who had not dissented in Miller dissented from the Court's refusal to review
a ruling rejecting a constitutional challenge. Avenue Book Store v. City of Tallmadge, 459
U.S. 997 (1982) (White, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (arguing that Court should consider procedural safeguards required in nuisance
proceedings).
180 From 1977 through 1982, the number of claimants' petitions seldom fell much be-
low 10 a Term, and in the 1978 Term there were at least 24. However, the 1983 Term saw
only 3. As of April 16, 1985, I had found only 4 such cases in which review was sought in
the 1984 Term.
181 The arguable exception was Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 454 U.S. 1022
(1981), afg mem. 631 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1980). In that case the court of appeals held un-
constitutional a Washington state law establishing procedures for enjoining the sale and
exhibition of obscene materials. State officials invoked the Supreme Court's obligatory ju-
risdiction, but the Court affirmed summarily without opinion or citation. Three Justices
dissented on the ground that the lower courts "should have declined to act until the parties
had exhausted available state remedies," 454 U.S. at 1024 (Burger, CJ., joined by Powell
and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). But they did not argue that the statute as construed by the
court of appeals was constitutional. (In this regard, it is worth noting that the court of
appeals decision was a unanimous ruling by judges generally regarded as conservatives.) A
few months after the summary affirmance the Washington legislature enacted a new ob-
scenity law to replace the one that had been struck down. The Ninth Circuit held that this
statute too was unconstitutional, and again the state officials took an appeal to the Supreme
Court. This time the Court granted plenary consideration. J-R Distrib., Inc. v. Eikenberry,
725 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 76 (1984).
In all seven Terms there were only 8 obscenity cases in which the Court rejected a state
official's application for review. (Two of these primarily involved issues of Younger absten-
tion. See text accompanying notes 182-85 infra). No case other than Brockett drew even a
single dissent. The unanimous denials included one case that on the surface might have
appeared certworthy: Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 717 F.2d 517 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1615 (1984). The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, had affirmed by an equally
divided court a district court judgment that the movie "Caligula" was not obscene under
state or federal law. But the controversy among the lower court judges did not necessarily
mean that the case warranted the Supreme Court's attention. The equal division in the
court of appeals deprived the Justices of the assistance they would have received from a
focused appellate analysis of the issues, cf. Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 (1972)
(remanding case without decision on merits, in part "because we have not had the benefit
of the insight of the Court of Appeals"), and the opinion of the district court that was
affirmed by operation of law was devoted largely to a detailed analysis of the film to deter-
mine whether it was obscene under Miller standards. See Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe,
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and other federalism-related limitations on federal court power.18 2
Issues of this kind generated 24 decisions in the seven Terms 1970-
1976; all but 6 were heard at the behest of state officials after lower
courts had allowed plaintiffs to proceed with their challenges to
state official action.18 3 On balance, the rulings of this period ex-
pressed a strong antipathy to the use of the federal courts as a fo-
rum for attacking the constitutionality of state laws and practices, at
least where equitable relief was sought. 8 4 The message was clear,
and ultimately it reached its intended audience. In the seven Terms
that began in 1977, the Court found it necessary to hear only 5
cases in which state officials challenged lower court rulings that up-
held the availability of the federal forum for a civil rights claim. 8 5
And in all seven Terms there were only 10 other cases in which the
Court was even asked to review decisions of this kind.' 86
In other areas where the Court has sharply reduced the extent
of its activity, there is more room for debate over whether the ear-
lier precedents have significantly clarified the law; by the same to-
ken, it is more difficult to identify the reasons for the Court's
withdrawal. A good example is school desegregation. The first ple-
nary decision issued by the Burger Court arose out of a desegrega-
tion suit,' 8 7 and in the eight Terms 1969 through 1976 school
desegregation cases appeared on the plenary docket in every Term
but one. After a one-Term hiatus, the 1978 Term brought two im-
7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1798 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd, 702 F.2d 925 (11th Cir.), vacated, 717
F.2d 517 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
The Court summarily reversed one obscenity case brought to it by a prosecutor.
Cooper v. Mitchell Bros. Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90 (1981) (per curiam).
182 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see Civil Rights, supra note 13, at 36.
183 The cases are discussed in Civil Rights, supra note 13, at 36-40.
184 Id.; see also Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 570-72.
185 In all 5 cases the Court held, in accordance with the contentions of the government
officials who had sought review, that the lower courts should not have considered the mer-
its of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. E.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979). During
this period plenary review was also given to 2 cases brought to the Court by plaintiffs. In
both instances the Court granted certiorari to resolve an intercircuit conflict. Patsy v.
Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary,
454 U.S. 100 (1981).
186 Except for the obscenity case discussed earlier, see note 181 supra, there were no
cases after the 1978 Term in which even one Justice dissented from the Court's refusal to
consider a state official's challenge to a ruling rejecting a Younger (or similar) argument.
The implication is that in the remaining cases the lower courts clearly had not transgressed
the limitations imposed by the precedents of the 1971-1976 period. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v.
Peek, 636 F.2d 943 (5th Cir.) (unanimously affirming injunction based on finding that state
court prosecutions were brought in bad faith), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981); but see Sep-
tum, Inc. v. Keller, 614 F.2d 456 (5th Cir.) (2-1 reversal), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980).
In one case, two Justices dissented from the denial of review on the ground that the
lower court "ha[d], in at least two respects, gone beyond our cases in dismissing the action
under Younger." Etlin v. Robb, 458 U.S. 1112, 1113 (1982) (White, J., joined by Brennan,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
187 Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam).
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portant rulings.1 8 In both cases the Court affirmed court of ap-
peals decisions that required broad desegregation remedies in
northern cities; in both, strong dissents condemned the majority
for issuing "Delphic" pronouncements that constituted a drastic
departure from prior law.18 9 The Court also granted review in one
case involving busing for racial balance in a southern city, but after
oral argument in the 1979 Term the writ was dismissed without ex-
planation.19 0 Three Justices submitted a lengthy dissent arguing
that the remedy contemplated by the lower courts would "acceler-
ate the destructive trend toward resegregation"' 9 1 and put the
school district "well on the road to. . . 'separate but equal' condi-
tions."1 92 Outside the Court, the issues were no less contentious;
busing orders in particular aroused great anger among citizens and
prompted congressional efforts to enact restrictive legislation. 19 3
Given these circumstances, and considering the highly factual
inquiries that underlay the two decisions of the 1978 Term, it
seemed likely that the Justices would continue to be active in this
area. 19 4 And certainly the Court had ample opportunity to clarify
the meaning of its precedents: in the five Terms 1979 through
1983, more than 30 petitions were filed challenging various rulings
in desegregation cases. 9 5 But none reached the plenary docket.
The Court did hear 2 cases dealing with the constitutionality of
statewide measures adopted by voters to restrict busing for racial
balance. 96 And the Court was willing to consider a challenge by
black students to a quota plan adopted by a school board to prevent
de facto segregation resulting from "white flight."' 97 But none of
188 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton II); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
189 See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 491-92 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting); Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 542
(Rehnquist,J., dissenting). This characterization found some support in scholarly commen-
tary. See, e.g., Kitch, Color Consciousness and the Constitution: Weber, Dayton, and Columbus, 1979
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 6-7; Kurland, "Brown v. Board of Education Was the Beginning"--The School
Desegregation Cases in the United States Supreme Court: 1954-1979, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 309,
392-400. Other commentators were not convinced. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1978 Term,
93 HARV. L. REV. 60, 128-29 (1979).
190 Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1980).
191 Id at 452 (Powell, J., joined by Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
192 Id at 439.
193 See G. GUNTHER, supra note 128, at 185-87 (1984 Supp.).
194 This was certainly the expectation of commentators. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, supra note
128, at 789 n.7; Kurland, supra note 189, at 400 n.422 (suggesting that a Delaware case, see
note 198 infra, was "held for disposition pending elucidation of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in some unidentified case to be decided during the 1979 Term.").
195 Here and elsewhere in this discussion, multiple petitions from a single court of ap-
peals decision are counted as one case. If each petition were counted separately, the total
would be close to 50.
196 Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982); Washington v. Seattle School Dist.
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
197 Johnson v. Board of Educ., 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 448 U.S. 910
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the many cases involving standards of proof or the scope of reme-
dies was able to secure the requisite four votes.
1 98
If that were all, it would seem far-fetched to include school de-
segregation among the areas of the law that have attained relative
stability. But it is not all. What is striking about the certiorari peti-
tions refused by the Court is that the overwhelming majority were
filed by school officials or other litigants who were arguing that the
courts of appeals had erred in finding segregative intent or approv-
ing broad remedies.1 99 Only a single case was filed by dissatisfied
black plaintiffs.
200
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that black
students and their representatives 20 1 generally prevailed in the
courts of appeals, so that litigants other than school boards had lit-
tle occasion to seek Supreme Court review.20 2 That would seem
(1980). The case was ultimately remanded to the court of appeals without a decision on the
merits. Johnson v. Board of Educ., 457 U.S. 52 (1982) (describing prior proceedings).
198 One case came very close. In Delaware State Bd. of Educ. v. Evans, 446 U.S. 923
(1980), three Justices dissented from the denial of certiorari, arguing that the far-reaching
remedies imposed by the lower courts constituted an "express departure" from the
Supreme Court's precedents. Id. at 925 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Stewart and Powell, JJ.,
dissenting). A fourth Justice agreed that the case merited review, "but only when a full
Court is available to consider the important issues presented by the petitions for certio-
rari." Id. at 923 (statement of Burger, CJ.). The ChiefJustice was alluding to the fact that
Justice Stevens would not participate in the case; thus, on the basis of prior votes, it could
be anticipated that the Court would divide equally and so be unable to provide a decision
with precedential value.
In view of these statements, it was reasonable to conclude "that there were four Jus-
tices who, in an appropriate case, would be willing to grant review in order to reexamine
standards of proof and scope of remedies in the desegregation field." G. GUNTHER, supra
note 128, at 789 n.7. However, as will be seen, the "appropriate case" never came. See
notes 211-12 infra and accompanying text.
199 See, e.g., Rapides Parish School Bd. v. Valley, 104 S. Ct. 276, denying cert. to 702 F.2d
1221 (5th Cir. 1983); Coloma Community School Dist. v. Berry, 104 S. Ct. 235, denying cert.
to 698 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1983); South Park Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 104 S. Ct.
92, denying cert. to 699 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1983); Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ. v. Kel-
ley, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983), denying cert. to 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982).
200 The case was Armour v. Nix, 446 U.S. 930 (1980) (mem.), in which the Court sum-
marily affirmed an unpublished three-judge court decision that rejected some of the black
plaintiffs' arguments. See Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 639 F.2d 1243, 1259 (5th Cir.
1981).
The statement in the text is based on an examination of all school desegregation cases
on the paid docket, as well as all cases of any kind in which one or more Justices noted a
dissent from the denial of plenary review. Petitions filed by indigent black plaintiffs and
denied without any notation of dissent would not have been uncovered by this method;
however, they would have been found in the study of lower court decisions discussed in
note 203 infra.
Cases involving only claims by teachers and school administrators are excluded from
this analysis.
201 In some of the suits the litigant seeking desegregation remedies was the United
States government. E.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 647 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
202 Read literally, the language of the Judicial Code would permit the filing of a certio-
rari petition by the party who prevailed in the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)
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rather implausible, and in fact it is not what happened.20 3 What did
happen is that black plaintiffs lost very few cases that would have
warranted the filing of a certiorari petition. Some of the decisions
dealt only with procedural or other peripheral matters. 20 4 Others
involved the closing of a single school. 20 5 And when minority liti-
gants lost cases in which the issues were substantive and the dis-
putes system-wide, they generally were confronted with unanimous
appellate judgments adverse to their arguments. 20 6 Particularly in
view of the deference accorded court of appeals decisions by the
Supreme Court's 1979 opinions,20 7 the prospect of obtaining fur-
ther review would have been unpromising indeed. As for the re-
maining cases, the results did generally favor the claims of the
litigants pressing for desegregation. 208 Moreover, although the
lower courts were not always unanimous in their consideration of
the issues, most of the decisions manifested little disagreement as
to the controlling principles or their application.
20 9
Taken together, these patterns suggest that however Delphic
(1982). The Court has never considered whether article III or prudential doctrines might
qualify the statutory language, but in any event, "[s]eldom would a winning party want to
seek Supreme Court review of a decision favorable to him." R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 58-59 (5th ed. 1978); see also id. at 433-34.
203 The conclusions in this paragraph are based on a study of all court of appeals cases
from 1978 through 1983 that were classified in West's MODERN FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST
under the school desegregation key numbers.
204 See, e.g., Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 581 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1978) (reversing
district court order for failure to give notice and an opportunity for hearing); Bradley v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 577 F.2d 1032 (6th Cir. 1978) (rejecting challenge to proposed use of
building as community corrections center).
205 See, e.g., Mitchell v. McCunney, 651 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1981); Taylor v. Coahoma
County School Dist., 581 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1978).
206 E.g., Clark v. Board of Educ. of Little Rock School Dist., 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir.
1983); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1983). Of the 20 or so
decisions in which courts of appeals rejected substantive claims of litigants pressing for
desegregation remedies, there were only 3 in which a dissenting opinion was issued. Taylor
v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 648 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1981) (dissenting opinion of Brown,
J., at 653 F.2d 136); Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 639 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1981); Oliver
v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1980).
207 See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 463-64 (refusing to disturb findings of district court
"strongly affirmed by the Court of Appeals"); Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 534-35 n.8 (finding "no
reason . . . to upset" court of appeals judgment that rejected district court's factual find-
ings); Kurland, supra note 189, at 395-96.
208 In addition to the 30 or so cases that were brought to the Supreme Court, there were
about 20 cases in which school boards accepted court of appeals rulings that desegregation
had not been accomplished or that additional remedies were necessary.
209 In the years following Columbus and Dayton II the courts of appeals handed down
more than 60 decisions on substantive issues of school desegregation. All but 9 were unan-
imous. And one of the dissents addressed only the propriety of imposing a 90-day deadline
on the district court for compliance with the court of appeals' mandate. See Hoots v. Penn-
sylvania, 639 F.2d 972, 989 (3d Cir.) (GarthJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981).
Of the 22 substantive desegregation cases brought to the Supreme Court from the
courts of appeals in the 1979-1983 Terms, 14 were unanimous affirmances. There were 3
affirmances by divided panels and 4 unanimous reversals. In only one case was there a 2-2
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and novel the 1978 Term's decisions might have appeared at the
time, they (and the Court's earlier rulings) were now providing ade-
quate guidance for the resolution of current controversies. And
what is more significant from the standpoint of the Supreme Court,
the strong expressions of dissent that accompanied some of the de-
nials of review in the 1978 and 1979 Terms210 disappeared from
the Reports in the Terms that followed. In fact, from 1980 through
1983 there were only two votes for plenary consideration in any of
the 26 desegregation cases that were brought to the Court, and
both involved the same procedural issue.2 11 The implication is that
notwithstanding the dissatisfaction voiced by many commentators
and legislators, the judiciary was treating the law as settled.
2 12
A more subtle kind of internal force than those previously dis-
cussed is the occasional emergence of a collective sense (shared by
at least four Justices) that the time has come to clarify or reshape
the law in a particular area. Thus, in the mid-1970's, the Court
handed down a cluster of decisions that addressed several impor-
tant issues under the federal securities laws. These issues had been
percolating for years in the lower courts, but the Court had shown
little interest in resolving them.213 The 1976 Term brought an out-
pouring of cases interpreting Title VII's prohibition on employ-
ment discrimination. 214 One commentator, surveying the results,
suggested that "the law under Title VII [had been] completely re-
written." 2 15 In the late 1970's the Court turned its attention to the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. Several precedents
were overruled, including one that had been on the books for only
three years. 216
split between the federal judges who considered the dispute. See Kelley v. Metropolitan
County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
210 E.g., Delaware State Bd. of Educ. v. Evans, 446 U.S. 923 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,joined
by Stewart and Powell, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Huch v. United States, 439
U.S. 1007 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
211 Board of Educ. v. Davis, 454 U.S. 904 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (arguing that article III "case or controversy" no longer existed; urging Court
to grant certiorari limited to issues of intervention and mootness); Board of Educ. v. Davis,
459 U.S. 881 (1982) (same).
212 One case filed in the 1984 Term appeared to be a promising candidate for plenary
consideration, but review was denied without dissent. Diaz v. SanJose Unified School Dist.,
733 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2140 (1985).
213 Compare, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (Burger, C.J., joined by Douglas and White, JJ.,
dissenting), with Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). For further
discussion, see Statutory Law, supra note 13, at 13-14; Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 605-
06.
214 See Edwards, Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1976-77 Term, 1977 LAB. REL.
Y.B. 64.
215 See id. at 65, 82.
216 See Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 538-40. The Court's interest in double jeop-
ardy issues has continued unabated. Twelve decisions were handed down in the first four
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This phenomenon is also illustrated by the Court's cases con-
struing the due process clause as a limitation on state court jurisdic-
tion over nondomiciliaries. In the 1957 Term, the Court handed
down two decisions on this subject. One upheld the exercise of
jurisdiction in a brief unanimous opinion that barely hinted at the
complexities that the Court had previously found in this branch of
the law.21 7 The other rejected the jurisdiction by a narrow margin
on unusual facts-circumstances that led some commentators to re-
gard the holding as an aberration. 218 But in the remaining eleven
Terms of the Warren Court, the Justices did not take a single case
on territorial jurisdiction.21 9 Nor, for six Terms, did the Burger
Court. Meanwhile, decisions proliferated in the state courts and
lower federal courts. The dominant trend was toward expansion of
state authority to adjudicate the rights of nondomiciliaries,
220
though with so little guidance from the Supreme Court it is hardly
surprising that the cases went off in many different directions.
221
Finally, in the 1976 Term, the Court re-entered the arena with
Shaffer v. Heitner.222 But that case involved an egregious exercise of
state power;223 moreover, it was brought to the Court by
nondomiciliaries who were able to frame their challenge as an ap-
peal.224 There was thus no reason to think that the Court's grant of
Terms of the 1980's; one additional case was ultimately resolved on other grounds.
Thigpen v. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. 2916, 2918 (1984).
217 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); cf. International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (elaborate discussion of relevant considerations).
218 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); see Casad, LongArm and Convenient Forum, 20
U. KANs. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1971); Hazard, A General Theoy of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965
Sup. CT. REV. 241, 244.
219 One week after announcing its decision in Hanson, the Court denied review in Atkin-
son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
357 U.S. 569 (1958). Although Atkinson had obviously been held to await the disposition in
Hanson, it appears to embrace a more expansive view of state court jurisdiction. The rela-
tionship between the two cases was the subject of much discussion during the two decades
of Supreme Court silence. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 909, 961-65 (1960); cf Hanson, 357 U.S. at 263-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing
Atkinson with approval).
220 E.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1969); Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203,247 N.W.2d 913 (1976); State a reL
White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121,448 P.2d 571 (1968). See also Steele v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339, 344-49 (5th Cir. 1973) (quasi in rem jurisdiction), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 180-81 (2d Cir.
1967); P. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, CML PROCEDURE 237-38 (3d ed. 1983).
221 See Casad, supra note 218, at 11-12; Note, The Long-Arm Reach of the Courts Under the
Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L. REv. 175, 178-81 (1979) (inconsistent
applications of "effect" test).
222 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
223 See U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 908 (1977).
224 Most nondomiciliary challengers are not so fortunate. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 90 n.4 (1978).
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review presaged a renewed interest in the subject generally. Within
months, however, the Court had taken another case, 225 and by the
end of the 1983 Term 6 more jurisdiction decisions had been
handed down. 226 Of greater importance, the decisions repudiated
much of the law that had been developed by the lower courts dur-
ing the two decades of Supreme Court silence. Thus, in the realm
of products liability litigation, where courts had often gone to great
lengths to sustain plaintiffs' forum choices,227 the Supreme Court
insisted on an approach much more protective of defendants'
rights. 228 On the other hand, in a case involving a defamation
claim, the Court, "without addressing many of the competing pol-
icy considerations and without citing a single lower court decision,
jettisoned a considerable body of doctrine" that had given media
defendants some degree of protection from suits away from
home.
229
To some extent, the reshaping of the law of territorial jurisdic-
tion may have come about fortuitously, as the result of a greater
willingness on the part of litigants to seek Supreme Court review of
jurisdictional rulings. Most of the leading cases on state court juris-
diction during the period of the Supreme Court's silence were
never brought to the Court.230 But some were.231 This fact, to-
225 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). The Court granted review in Kulko in
December 1977. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 434 U.S. 983 (1977).
226 This figure includes Calder v.Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984), a case that I have classi-
fied as primarily involving the first amendment. See note 229 infra and accompanying text.
227 See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1969).
228 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
229 The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REv. 87, 168 (1984), discussing Calder v.
Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
230 E.g., Buckley v. New York Post Corp. 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967); Cornelison v.
Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976); Buckeye Boiler Co. v.
Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Fourth North-
western Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. Hilson Indus., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732
(1962); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625
(1965); State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 448 P.2d 571
(1968). All of these are jurisdiction cases that were reprinted or discussed in leading civil
procedure casebooks; all except Hilson upheld jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
In many of the cases where courts declined to exercise jurisdiction over a nondomicil-
iary, the decision was based on an interpretation of the state's long-arm statute. E.g., Feath-
ers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). These holdings
would not have been subject to review by the Supreme Court, and no such cases have been
included in the compilation above. It is true that some of the statutory decisions were
heavily influenced by constitutional considerations, e.g., O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc.,
123 Vt. 461, 465, 194 A.2d 568, 571 (1963) ("To require less than this in the construction
of the statute would present serious constitutional objections."), but it is doubtful that the
Supreme Court would have reviewed a holding of that kind in that era. But see Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977); Perkins v. Benguet Consoli-
dated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 443 (1952).
231 See, e.g., Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973) (quasi in rem
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gether with the marked shift in doctrine wrought by the decisions,
supports the conclusion that the spate of rulings resulted, as much
as anything else, from the Justices' own determination that the time
had come for some jurisprudential housecleaning in this area. 232
B. Other Influences
Table II in the Appendix lists more than a dozen areas of fed-
eral law that have occupied a substantially more prominent position
in the work of the Burger Court than they did in the Warren Court
era. To these can be added a somewhat smaller group of issues,
listed in Appendix Table IV, that achieved great prominence only
in the latter half of the Burger Court. But the process also operates
in reverse, as can be seen in Tables I and III: topics that in the not-
so-distant past loomed large in the Court's plenary work have now
faded into relative (or absolute) obscurity. While some of these
changes, particularly in the realm of civil rights, can be attributed
largely to forces within the Court, others came about principally as
the result of developments elsewhere in the legal system and in the
political, economic, and social life of the nation.
jurisdiction), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc) (quasi in rem jurisdiction), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967) (decision
based on long-arm statute), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968); Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d
443, 464-67, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80-82, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 24-27, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
It is also possible that some of the less celebrated cases that were brought to the Court
between 1958 and 1977 would have provided adequate vehicles for addressing issues of
territorial jurisdiction if the Court had been interested in the subject.
232 One commentator has suggested that "an initiative by the Court in the jurisdictional
area was inevitable and necessary" in large part because state courts had interpreted the
Court's long silence "as a signal that the due process clause had become merely a ritualistic
limitation on their jurisdiction." Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its
Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58
N.C.L. REv. 407, 422-23 (1980). However, the author goes on to say that the Court was
particularly troubled by the "marriage of jurisdiction and choice of law"-decisions that
pressed the limits of due process by applying forum law to out-of-state transactions having
only minimal connections to the forum. Id at 424-25. This view of the Court's concerns
appears to be inconsistent with the later affirmance (by a fragmented Court) in Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). See Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 592. However, it
finds some support in the 1984 Term decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S.
Ct. 2965 (1985) (holding that application of Kansas law to every claim in a multistate class
action exceeds constitutional limits).
The intensity of the Court's interest in jurisdictional issues is further underscored by
the grant of review in Gillette Co. v. Miner, 459 U.S. 86 (1982). The petitioner challenged
a state court's exercise ofjurisdiction over nonresident class plaintiffs in a multistate class
action suit. The respondent argued that the state court's judgment was not final, see Re-
spondent's Brief in Opposition at 5-7, but the Supreme Court accepted the case anyway.
After oral argument, the Court unanimously agreed that the judgment was not final and
dismissed the writ for want of jurisdiction. The issue returned to the Court in the 1984
Term; again review was granted. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235 Kan. 195, 679 P.2d
1159, cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 242 (1984).
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1. Congressional Legislation
The most obvious of the external influences is the legislation
enacted by Congress. Several major areas of statutory interpreta-
tion either did not exist or had barely emerged onto the legal scene
prior to 1969. For example, environmental protection laws, which
generated 23 decisions in the decade that began in 1974, were
largely a product of the late 1960's and early 1970's.233 The Free-
dom of Information Act ("FOIA"), which gave rise to 16 decisions
in the same period, dates from 1966 but did not become a major
subject of litigation until the 1970's.234
A striking illustration of this phenomenon is found in the realm
of labor law. For the Warren Court, "labor law" meant, more than
anything else, review of decisions by the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB"). 23 5 The Burger Court has continued to scrutinize
NLRB rulings,23 6 albeit at a slightly slower pace, 237 but in the last
few years NLRB cases have been outnumbered by decisions inter-
preting the federal employment discrimination law, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.238 As with FOIA, Title VII litigation took
some time to work its way up to the Supreme Court, but when it did
the effect was dramatic.23 9 While no subsequent Term has matched
the outpouring of 9 decisions in the 1976 Term,240 the average of 4
decisions a Term makes employment discrimination one of the few
statutory areas that consistently receive extensive plenary attention
from the Burger Court.241 Title VII litigation has also accounted
233 The Court's entry into the realm of environmental legislation is described in Statutory
Law, supra note 13, at 25-26. Later developments are summarized in Plenary Docket II, supra
note 13, at 621-22. Environmental law continues to be a major component of the general
statutory segment of the plenary docket; among the various federal "specialties," only a
handful have received plenary attention with greater frequency. For further discussion, see
notes 399-400 infra and accompanying text.
234 See Statutory Law, supra note 13, at 24-25; Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 619-20.
235 In the seven Terms of the later Warren Court there were 29 plenary decisions arising
out of NLRB proceedings. These accounted for nearly half of the 64 labor cases that re-
ceived plenary consideration during that period. (The latter figure includes 3 cases that
were vacated or dismissed without a decision on the merits.)
236 Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the Supreme Court scrutinizes the
review of NLRB rulings by the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441
U.S. 488, 497 (1979).
237 The plenary docket in the seven Terms of the later Burger Court included 25 NLRB
cases.
238 In the seven Terms 1977-1983 the Court issued 28 decisions on Title VII issues,
compared with the 25 NLRB cases. If we look only at the four Terms of the 1980's, Title
VII accounted for 18 decisions, while NLRB proceedings contributed 14. Review was
granted in another Title VII case in the 1983 Term, but certiorari was dismissed as improvi-
dently granted. .Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Vaughn, 104 S. Ct. 2163 (1984).
239 See Statutory Law, supra note 13, at 18-19.
240 As previously noted, the decisions of the 1976 Term brought a major revision in the
law of employment discrimination. See notes 214-15 supra and accompanying text.
241 In the seven Terms of the later Burger Court, the only area of federal regulation to
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for a substantial proportion of the plenary decisions that deal with
practice and procedure in the federal courts. 242
It would be wrong, however, to conclude from these examples
that the statutory segment of the plenary docket is the product of a
simple sequence: congressional legislation, followed by a prolifera-
tion of litigation in the lower courts, followed in turn by a series of
Supreme Court decisions. Statutes that establish new regulatory
schemes or create new causes of action do not invariably generate a
substantial volume of litigation in the lower courts. 243 And laws
that contribute significantly to the workload of the lower courts do
not necessarily have the same effect on the Supreme Court.244
But if the sequence is not inevitable, the question arises: why
Title VII? Why has the Court not devoted a similar degree of atten-
tion to, for example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act? Or
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act? Or the Truth in Lend-
ing Act? Each of these important recent enactments has generated
a large volume of litigation in the lower courts;245 yet all three to-
generate a larger body of plenary decisions was antitrust, and it can be argued that antitrust
litigation involves a much wider range of primary conduct. To put the 28 Title VII deci-
sions into further perspective, it is worth noting that during the same period issues of liabil-
ity and procedure under the Internal Revenue Code gave rise to only 22 cases.
Employment discrimination claims under other statutes accounted for another 9 ple-
nary decisions in the later Burger Court. Two arose under Reconstruction legislation.
General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982); Great Am. Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). One involved Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). A fourth case
construed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct.
1248 (1984). The remaining decisions dealt with age discrimination. See notes 298-300
infra and accompanying text.
242 Of the 30 decisions on jurisdiction and procedure in civil cases handed down in the
later Burger Court, 7 arose out of Tide VII suits. All but one of the 5 cases interpreting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did so.
243 For example, in 1973Judge Friendly listed a host of then-recent statutes that created
new federal causes of action, established new bases for district court jurisdiction, or author-
ized proceedings in the courts of appeals for review of agency orders. H. FRIENDLY, FED-
ERAL JURISDIC1ION: A GENERAL VIEw 22-27, 34-35 (1973). Some of those statutes have
given rise to a substantial volume of litigation in the lower courts, e.g. Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (1982) (first enacted in 1970), but others have not, e.g., Wholesome
Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. §9 671-74 (1982) (first enacted in 1967).
One statute not cited by Judge Friendly, the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7
U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1982), established a wide range of remedies for infringement of
"plant variety protection." See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2561-69 (1982). Perusal of the 1985 pocket part
to the United States Code Annotated, covering decisions through late 1984, indicates that
in its entire history the Act has not generated a single reported decision.
244 See Plenary Docket I, supra note 13, at 1782-83; Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 631-
32.
245 A useful measure of the volume of litigation in the lower courts, especially in this
context, is the number of headnotes generated by the reported decisions. See Plenary Docket
I, supra note 13, at 1784 n.269. The 1984 pocket part to the United States Code Annotated,
covering a period of less than nine years, includes more than 100 pages of headnotes on
issues of age discrimination, and another 100 pages on occupational safety. Headnotes of
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gether account for no more than a dozen Supreme Court deci-
sions.2 46 And there may be other areas of federal regulation in
which the contrast between the volume of litigation in the lower
courts and the extent of Supreme Court activity is even greater.
247
Fully to explain the special status of Title VII would require a
close examination of the cases that were denied review in these
other areas over a period of time. Such a study might well reveal
that certworthy petitions simply did not come to the Court very
often. For the present, however, we can look only to the Title VII
cases that did receive plenary consideration. And that line of in-
quiry does not disclose any consistent patterns. In fact, the data
undercut some of the most plausible a priori hypotheses. Less than
half of the decisions stated that certiorari was granted because of
conflict or disarray in the circuits.248 Requests for review by the
Solicitor General, which dominate some areas of the statutory
docket,249 played only a minor role here. A substantial proportion
of the cases involved quasi-procedural issues like attorneys' fees
and timeliness requirements, 250 but these were outnumbered by de-
cisions that addressed the merits of the discrimination claim.25'
Perhaps the explanation for the Court's great interest in em-
ployment discrimination litigation lies, at least in part, in the ten-
sion between the egalitarian ideals represented by Title VII and the
devotion to individual autonomy that has long marked American
society. Title VII commits the nation to "the removal of artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barri-
ers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
other impermissible classification." 252 But the process of achieving
that goal through lawsuits and administrative proceedings inevita-
bly interposes a governmental presence in spheres of individual
decisions interpreting the Truth in Lending regulations filled about 50 pages through
1982; the 1985 pocket part includes 12 additional pages.
246 In the seven Terms of the later Burger Court, there were 3 decisions on occupational
safety and 3 interpreting the Truth in Lending Act. For discussion of the Court's work in
the realm of age discrimination, see text accompanying notes 298-300 infra.
247 See Plenary Docket I, supra note 13, at 1782-83.
248 For discussion of the cases in the 1977-1979 Terms, see Plenary Docket II, supra note
13, at 612.
249 See text accompanying notes 399-413 infra.
250 I hypothesized that the Court would be more inclined to grant a large number of
petitions in an area of the law dominated by procedural issues because a Supreme Court
ruling on a procedural question is more likely than a substantive ruling to provide a prece-
dent of widespread general applicability. See Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 621 (discuss-
ing environmental cases).
251 Three cases dealt with burdens of proof, a matter that is procedural in one sense, but
probably closer to "substance" in the sense used here. Cf Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S.
109, 117 (1943) (in diversity action in federal court, state law controls burden of proof);
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939) (same).
252 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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decisionmaking and the development of personal relationships, far
more than the enforcement of laws governing occupational safety
or commercial lending or the issuance of securities. 253 In other
words, employment discrimination litigation implicates individual
liberty values in a way that distinguishes it from almost all other
areas of federal statutory governance. Thus, for a Court that de-
votes as much attention to civil rights issues as to all other aspects
of federal law, a proclivity for hearing Title VII cases rather than
other kinds of statutory claims would be only natural.
One other variety of congressional influence deserves mention,
although it probably operates more at the level of individual case
selection than in the shaping of the plenary docket over a period of
time. Much of the Supreme Court's statutory work is devoted to
clarifying ambiguities and filling lacunae in congressional legisla-
tion.254 Judges and scholars have been suggesting for years that the
preferable way to close a gap of this kind is for Congress to amend
the law to explain what it meant (or in any event what it means
now). 25 5 Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons the correction of
ambiguities and omissions in statutes already on the books has
never ranked high among congressional priorities.2 56 In recent
years, however, there have been signs that this situation may be
changing. Congress and its committees have demonstrated greater
awareness of the gaps in existing legislation and a willingness to do
something about them. The results can be seen in the Court's 1984
Term plenary docket. Three cases in which certiorari had already
been granted 257 and 2 that would probably have received plenary
253 See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1331 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J.,joined
by Scalia and Starr, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that under
majority ruling in sexual harassment case, employer could avoid liability only by "monitor-
ing or policing his employees' voluntary sexual relationships."); In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426
(5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (academic freedom), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); Snell v. Suf-
folk County, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1488, 1494, 1496 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (acknowl-
edging that racial and ethnic joking implicates "some of our most sensitive and deepest
conceptions of self and of our relationships with others," but holding that "an absolute
prohibition on racial 'joking' [by guards in a county jail] is mandated by the law."). Title
VII suits also provide the paradigmatic underpinning for the observation of former District
Judge Simon H. Rifkind that "[a] foreigner watching the discovery proceedings in a civil
suit would never suspect that this country has a highly-prized tradition of privacy enshrined
in the fourth amendment." Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 107
(1976). See, e.g., EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 528, 530-
31 (W.D.N.C. 1977); Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 87
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
254 See Stevens, Some Thought on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 176, 183 (1982).
255 See generally Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 787 (1963), reprinted in H. FRIENDLY, supra note 243, at 41.
256 See Statutory Law, supra note 13, at 38.
257 Employers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Ochoa, 105 S. Ct. 583 (1984); United States Dep't of
Justice v. Provenzano, 105 S. Ct. 413 (1984) (per curiam). In Ochoa, the Court granted
review to resolve an intercircuit conflict on a recurring issue under the Longshoremen's
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review258 were sent back to the lower courts for reconsideration or
other action in light of intervening statutes that mooted the contro-
versies in whole or in substantial part.
259
2. Other External Forces
When we leave the realm of congressional legislation and at-
tempt to identify the other external forces that have helped to
shape the composition of the plenary docket, the task becomes
much more difficult. Congressional legislation tends to be quite
particularized in its effect on the Court's business; thus, the impact
of labor laws will be felt primarily (though not exclusively) in the
labor segment of the docket. In contrast, the influence of political,
economic, and social forces will often be spread widely, but thinly,
among several areas of the Court's work. The effects may be less
visible; they may also be more difficult to isolate. Yet even when
these caveats are taken into account, it is surprising how seldom we
find a simple pattern of change or expansion in an area of primary
activity that correlates neatly with an increase or decrease in the
number of plenary decisions growing out of that activity. Impor-
tant developments in American life-computerization is one exam-
ple-may scarcely be reflected on the plenary docket at all.2 60
Others will generate decisions in one or two areas of the law, but
beyond them have little impact on the Court's work. In this section
I can do no more than sketch some of the patterns I have
discovered.
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. See Ochoa v. Employers Nat'l Ins. Co., 724 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir.) (rejecting view of Seventh Circuit), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 583 (1984). The
legislation cited by the Court in its remand order resolved the question by adopting the
Fifth Circuit's view. See 130 CONG. REC. S 11,626 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1984) (remarks of Sen.
Nickles); Ochoa v. Employers Nat'l Ins. Co., 754 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1985) (after remand).
In Provenzano, the Court had consolidated 2 cases for plenary review so that it could resolve
an intercircuit conflict on a Freedom of Information Act issue. Legislation enacted after the
grant of certiorari but before oral argument mooted the question.
258 Toan v. Cunningham, 105 S. Ct. 896 (1985); Heckler v. Lopez, 105 S. Ct. 583
(1984). See Lauter, Congress Moots Nearly 40,000 U.S. Court Suits, Nat'l LJ., Oct. 1, 1984, at 5.
259 The Court did give plenary consideration to one case in which a statute enacted after
the grant of review but before oral argument resolved an intercircuit conflict on the ques-
tion presented. Heckler v. Turner, 105 S. Ct. 1138 (1985); see also Heckler v. Turner, 105 S.
Ct. 2, 3 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, 1984). In a lengthy opinion, a unanimous Court
adopted the interpretation of the earlier legislation that had been confirmed for the future
by the new enactment. The Court did not explain what purpose was served by a detailed
exegesis of the prior law. Cf Lascaris v. Shirley, 420 U.S. 730, 732-33 (1975) (per curiam)
("In light of the resolution of the [issue by intervening legislation], we have no occasion to
prepare an extended opinion."). Lascaris, like Turner, involved the scope of state obligations
under the federally funded Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.
260 Authority is scarcely needed for the proposition that the computer has come to play
a pervasive role in virtually every aspect of the nation's economic and social life. Yet except
for a handful of decisions involving patents, computer law made no appearances on the




I begin with one of the most important developments in the
nation's economy during the Burger Court years. The Arab oil em-
bargo that brought an end to the era of cheap energy left its mark
on almost every institution in American life, and the Supreme
Court is no exception. To be sure, energy law, in one form or an-
other, has been part of the Court's work at least since the early
years of this century, 26 ' but the volume of decisions in the last few
Terms manifests a degree of involvement not previously seen. The
impact has been felt primarily in the federalism segment of the
docket. 262 For example, cases in which an exercise of state power
was challenged on the ground of preemption by federal energy reg-
ulation laws constituted such a minor element of the Court's work
in the 1960's and 1970's that it probably would never have oc-
curred to anyone to identify them as a discrete category. But in the
first four Terms of the 1980's, issues of this kind generated 6 ple-
nary decisions.263 Disputes between state and federal governments
over rights in land and other property seldom appeared on the ple-
nary docket until the 1970's, but in recent Terms they have become
a regular part of the Court's work.264 Five of the 11 decisions in the
later Burger Court involved oil-bearing lands. Disputes arising out
of the production or distribution of energy resources resulted in
opinions dealing with other federalism issues as well: the delinea-
tion of interstate boundaries, 265 limits on state powers under fed-
eral regulatory programs and other federal legislation,26 6 the scope
of national powers, 267 and limitations on state taxation of interstate
commerce.26
8
I do not suggest that the issues in these cases necessarily grew
out of the energy shocks of the 1970's, although that was certainly
true of 2 decisions involving federalism-based challenges to the ex-
ercise of national power 269 and at least one case in which a state tax
261 See The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548 (1914); see generally Arkansas Elec. Coop.
Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 377-80 (1983).
262 In fact, issues of energy law outside the context of federal-state relations received
surprisingly little attention from the Court. See text accompanying notes 271-72 infra.
263 E.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984) (nuclear power); Arkan-
sas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983) (electric
power).
264 See Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 595-96.
265 Louisiana v. Mississippi, 104 S. Ct. 1645 (1984) (oil and gas lease in bed of Missis-
sippi River).
266 Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
267 See cases cited in note 269 infra.
268 See cases cited in note 270 infra.
269 United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983) (challenge to windfall profit tax im-
posed on crude oil after marked rise in price of oil on world market); FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742 (1982) (challenge to provisions of Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
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was attacked on commerce clause grounds. 270 Rather, the in-
creased cost of fuel and the heightened interest in finding alternate
energy sources raised the stakes in almost every activity that in-
volved the production or distribution of energy. As a result, dis-
putes that might not have arisen at all became the subject of
litigation; lawsuits that might have come to an end in the lower
courts were brought to the Supreme Court. And with so much
more at stake, either in the particular case or in the application of
the challenged rule of law to other disputes, the Justices had much
more reason to grant plenary review.
It is all the more surprising, therefore, that issues of energy law
outside the context of federal-state relations received very little at-
tention from the Court in the years following the oil embargo. In
the seven Terms 1977-1983 there were only 6 plenary decisions
arising out of rulings by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion ("FERC") and its precedessor the Federal Power Commission
("FPC"). During that same period the Court denied review in 5
cases in which the lower court had rejected the agency's view of the
law.271 This record contrasts sharply with that of the preceding
seven Terms, when the Court handed down 12 plenary decisions
growing out of FPC proceedings and denied review in only 3 FPC
cases brought to it by the federal government. And the Court has
consistently refused to hear energy regulation cases from the Tem-
porary Emergency Court of Appeals ("TECA").272
These patterns suggest that the legal rules governing the allo-
cation of costs and opportunities among producers and consumers
1978, enacted as part of a package of legislation designed to combat nationwide energy
crisis).
270 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (upholding high sever-
ance tax on output of Montana coal mines). The dissent pointed out that the sharp increase
in the severance tax that prompted the constitutional challenge had been enacted by the
Montana legislature in the immediate aftermath of the Arab oil embargo. Id. at 639-40
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). A concurring opinion noted the connection between "the Na-
tion's energy needs" and "the trend in the energy-rich States to aggrandize their position
• . . by imposing unusually high taxes on mineral extraction." Id. at 637 (White, J., concur-
ring). The decision in Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (striking down tax on
"first use" of gas brought into Louisiana, principally from the Outer Continental Shelf),
may also fit the description in the text. See Pierce, The Constitutionality of State Environmental
Taxes, 58 TUL. L. REv. 169, 176 (1983) (proposing replacement for tax struck down by
Supreme Court; arguing that the imposition of a tax on the use of oil and gas pipelines is
justified because the "state's increased infrastructure expenditures" result from "Louisi-
ana's role as a staging ground" for "the biggest single battle in the United States' war to
obtain energy independence").
271 In 4 of the cases the Solicitor General asked the Court to grant review; in one, he did
not.
272 The Court's lack of interest is particularly striking in view of evidence that TECA
"has inadequately controlled administrative decisionmaking" and has "fail[ed] to secure
agency compliance with procedural safeguards." Elkins, The Temporary Emergency Court of
Appeals: A Study in the Abdication ofJudicial Reponsibility, 1978 DUKE L.J. 113, 119, 151.
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of energy do not, of themselves, rank high among the Court's con-
cerns; it is only when the rules implicate federal-state relations that
the Justices are likely to intervene. One possible explanation for
this dichotomy is that a high proportion of the federalism cases are
brought to the Court by appeal or as original jurisdiction cases,
whereas the pure federal law disputes can be taken up only by peti-
tion for certiorari. However, in view of the broader pattern of in-
terest in federalism issues that cuts across so many substantive
areas of the law,275 I am inclined to think that a concern for preserv-
ing the balance between federal and state power is, as much as any-
thing else, the dominant force here.
Other important economic developments have made even less
of a mark on the plenary docket. The tremendous expansion in the
portion of the nation's economy devoted to health care has been
reflected in a booming segment of the legal profession,274 but for
the Supreme Court the effects have been quite modest. The impact
has been felt most strongly in the antitrust segment of the docket.
In the four Terms of the 1980's, a total of 18 antitrust cases re-
ceived plenary consideration. Seven of them involved various as-
pects of the health care industry, including maximum fee
arrangements for physicians, 275 exclusive contracts between a hos-
pital and a firm of anaesthesiologists, 276 and the sale of pharmaceu-
tical products to state and local government hospitals.2 7 7 What
makes this kind of concentration so striking is that during the same
period, in the view of one prominent commentator, the Court was
"select[ing] cases of slight antitrust importance and leav[ing] other
questions of transcendent significance unreviewed." 27s Nor could
it be said that the medical context was merely adventitous; on the
contrary, a central theme of the cases was the application of estab-
lished antitrust rules in the new setting of medical practice and re-
lated activities. 279
273 See text following note 108 supra; Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 598.
274 See Couric, Health Care: Fertile Field for Lawyers, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 18, 1985, at 1. Health
care expenditures now represent 10.8 percent of the gross national product, compared with
6.1 percent in 1965. 1985 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 96.
275 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
276 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
277 Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150 (1983).
278 Handler, What to Do with the Supreme Court's Burgeoning Calendars?, 5 CARDOZO L. REV.
249, 264 (1984). My own analysis of the Court's antitrust work in the late 1970's lends
support to this view. See Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 602-05.
279 One case involved the interaction between the antitrust laws and a statute that specif-
ically regulated health care providers and facilities. National Gerimedical Hosp. & Geron-
tology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378 (1981). In most of the other
cases, the formulation of the questions emphasized the importance of the health care con-
text. For example, in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984), the
Solicitor General filed a brief supporting the petition for certiorari on the ground that "[b]y
applying a per se rule of illegality to a common practice, the decision below conflicts with
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The business of health care might also have been expected to
make a substantial contribution to the labor law segment of the
docket. In 1974, Congress amended the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA") to extend its coverage to employees of nonprofit
health care institutions.280 Because hospitals "give rise to unique
considerations that do not apply in the industrial settings with
which the [Labor] Board is more familiar," 281 the Board and the
courts were required to reconsider, in this new context, the entire
body of rules developed over the years for the governance of labor-
management relations. 2 2 Thus it was not surprising that in the late
1970's the Supreme Court decided 2 cases in rapid succession that
involved the validity of no-solicitation rules in hospitals. 28 3 But
those decisions proved to be the end as well as the beginning of the
Court's involvement with labor law issues in the health care con-
text. There were no additional cases reviewing the rules governing
union organizing drives, nor did the Court address the much-liti-
gated questions of the scope of the appropriate bargaining unit, the
employee status of interns and residents, or the 10-day notification
requirement for strikes at health care institutions.
Study of the development of the law in these areas indicates
that a variety of circumstances accounts for the absence of deci-
sions. With respect to no-solicitation rules, the Court's silence af-
ter 1979 is easy to explain: the courts of appeals generally upheld
the Board's approach, and none of the hospitals sought further re-
view in the Supreme Court.28 4 Union organizers did ask the Court
the decisions of every other court of appeals that has considered antitrust challenges to
exclusive arrangements between hospitals and physicians." Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 5. In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), the
Court reversed a court of appeals decision that had expressed reluctance to subject the
medical profession to per se rules against price-fixing in a way that would preclude physi-
cians from setting maximum fees. And in Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119
(1982), the Court granted certiorari to resolve an acknowledged intercircuit conflict on the
question whether an insurance company, in using a medical peer review committee to de-
termine whether particular treatments and fees were "necessary" and "reasonable," was
engaged in the "business of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
and thus immune from antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 122.
280 See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 485 (1978).
281 Id. at 508 (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 554 F.2d 477, 481 (1977)).
282 The Board and the Courts were also called upon to interpret "special [statutory]
notice provisions unique to the field of health care," enacted as a result of Congress's "con-
cern with the potential disruption in the delivery of health care services stemming from
labor disputes." Zimmerman, Trends in National Labor Relations Board Health Care Industry
Decisions, in HEALTH CARE LABOR LAW 7 (I. Shepard & A. Doudera eds. 1981). See notes
286-87, 293 infra and accompanying text.
283 NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., 442 U.S. 773 (1979); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
483 (1978). Between these decisions the Court issued one summary per curiam opinion on
the same topic. NLRB v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 439 U.S. 9 (1978).
284 A 1985 manual of health care labor law cites 4 post-1978 court of appeals decisions
that considered the validity of hospital no-solicitation rules. 1 HEALTH CARE LABOR MANUAL
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to reverse the Board's determination that interns and residents are
not "employees" within the meaning of the NLRA, but in a proce-
dural setting that made it almost impossible for the Court to reach
the issue.28 5 The other two areas of dispute, however, were
squarely presented to the Court, and in petitions filed by the Solici-
tor General. In the 1977 Term, the Government asked the Court to
review a Seventh Circuit decision that rejected the Board's broad
application of the strike notification proviso. 28 6 But at that time no
other court had ruled on the point raised; thus it is understandable
that the Justices chose to allow the issue to percolate further.
28 7
More surprising is the refusal to address the question of the appro-
priate bargaining unit in the health care industry. By the time the
Solicitor General filed his petition in the 1979 Term,288 issues of
this kind had been litigated in five circuits, four of which had em-
phatically rejected the Board's approach.289 Admittedly, there
probably was not a square intercircuit conflict,290 but the courts of
appeals had expressed some disagreement among themselves as to
(Health Law Center) 4:50-56 (1985 revision). In all 4 cases the Board's orders were en-
forced; in none of them did the employer petition for certiorari. In one case not mentioned
in the manual the court of appeals denied enforcement of a Board order invalidating a no-
solicitation rule. Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
case was remanded for further analysis by the Board, but if any further proceedings took
place they have not been reported. Curiously, this decision does not appear to have been
cited in any of the other court of appeals cases on no-solicitation rules.
285 Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Fanning, 642 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en
banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981). The court of appeals held that the district court had
no jurisdiction to consider the organizers' challenge to the Board's decision. Even if the
Supreme Court had disagreed with this jurisdictional ruling, it presumably would have re-
manded the case for consideration of the status issue by the lower courts. The correctness
of the Board's ruling was also challenged indirectly in the context of a preemption case. See
NLRB v. Committee of Interns & Residents, 566 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1977) (supporting
Board's position that federal law preempted efforts to organize interns and residents under
state labor laws), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1980).
286 NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 548 F.2d 704 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 837 (1977).
287 A few weeks after the denial of certiorari in the Seventh Circuit case, the District of
Columbia Circuit reached a similar conclusion. Laborers' Int'l Union, Local 1057 v. NLRB,
567 F.2d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The government did not seek review of this decision.
288 NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971
(1980).
289 See Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d at 26-27 (describing decisions of Third, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits); see also NLRB v. HMO Int'l/Calif. Medical Group Health Plan, Inc., 678
F.2d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[The Board's community-of-interest analysis ... has...
led to a nearly perfect record of reversals of the NLRB by the Court of Appeals in review of
health care bargaining units."). The Board's bargaining unit determinations were upheld
in NLRB v. Sweetwater Hosp. Ass'n, 604 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1979), and Bay Medical Center,
Inc. v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979). See also note
290 infra.
290 In the circuit that upheld the Board's selection of an appropriate bargaining unit, the
court distinguished the other circuits' cases rather than disagreeing with them. See Bay Med-
ical Center, Inc., 588 F.2d at 1177-78.
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the proper tests;29 ' perhaps more important, the Board had an-
nounced its intention to adhere to its position.292 Under these cir-
cumstances, a Supreme Court decision would have made a
significant contribution to clarifying the law. Two Justices did vote
to grant review, but they could not persuade two others to join
them.
2 93
Apart from antitrust, then, only one segment of the docket was
affected more than minimally by the emergence of health law as a
major area of legal practice. In the four decades of the 1980's the
Court heard 5 cases involving statutory questions raised by the
Medicare and disability benefit provisions of the Social Security
Act.294 Issues of this kind had generated only a single decision in
the preceding decade.295 Yet it is probably more accurate to view
the Social Security cases as a reflection of a related but distinct de-
velopment in American life: the growing number of old people and
their ever-increasing demands for resources and insistence on
rights.296 Here again, however, the consequences for the plenary
291 See St. Francis Hosp., 271 N.L.R.B. No. 160 at 12-13, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1465,
1469 (1984) (the courts of appeals "have not been unified upon a proper standard for
deciding appropriate units in this industry").
292 See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979).
293 NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 445 U.S. 971 (1980) (Brennan and White, JJ., dissent-
ing).
Five years after the denial of review in Mercy Hospital, the Board repudiated the ap-
proach condemned by the courts of appeals. In its stead the Board adopted a "disparity of
interests" test previously embraced by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, but with a greater
degree of flexibility, as suggested in a Second Circuit opinion. St. Francis Hosp., 271
N.L.R.B. No. 160 at 15-17, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1465, 1470-71 (1984).
The Board also modified its approach to the strike-notification provision in response to
adverse court decisions. See Painters Local No. 452 (Henry C. Beck Co.), 246 N.L.R.B. 970
(1979).
294 E.g., Heckler v. Day, 104 S. Ct. 2249 (1984).
295 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979). In this case the court of appeals had
granted relief to the plaintiffs in reliance on the due process clause, but the Supreme Court
rested judgment largely on statutory grounds. See also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971) (primarily addressing procedural due process issues, but also discussing evidentiary
requirements for disability determinations under the statute).
In the last four Terms of the 1970's the Court rejected 3 government petitions in So-
cial Security cases. One involved the same issue as one of the cases that received plenary
consideration in the 1980's. Compare White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978), with Heckler v. Day, 104 S. Ct. 2249 (1984). Another of the
rejected petitions raised an issue closely related to a question resolved in one of the later
plenary decisions. Compare Whitecliff, Inc. v. United States, 536 F.2d 347 (Ct. Cl. 1976)
(permitting judicial review of health care providers' claims under pre-1973 Medicare Part
A), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977), with United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201 (1982)
(rejecting judicial review of claims under Medicare Part B). At this writing, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, successor to the Court of Claims, adheres to the view that
the Supreme Court's decision in Erika did not impair the validity of the holding in Whiteclif.
See Spokane Valley Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 688 F.2d 771, 775-76 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
296 See, e.g., Longman, Taking America to the Cleaners, Wash. Monthly, Nov. 1982, at 24;
Fallows, Entitlements, Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1982, at 51; Hurd, 'Old' Doesn't Mean 'Poor,'
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docket have not been as great as might have been expected. 297 The
other major law invoked by the elderly is the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). Although ADEA issues gave
rise to 4 decisions in the two Terms 1977 and 1978,298 only one
ADEA case reached the plenary docket in the five Terms that fol-
lowed.299 What made this particularly surprising is that, as already
suggested, there was no dearth of litigation in the lower courts; in
less than a decade, the reported cases alone generated headnotes
that filled well over 100 pages in the United States Code Anno-
tated.3 00 The Supreme Court's near-silence came to an end in the
1984 Term, when 3 ADEA cases received plenary consideration,
but only time will tell whether this was the start of a period of inten-
sive activity or merely the product of happenstance.
Of course, not all segments of the economy have been ex-
panding during the last fifteen years, and some of the downward
trends have been reflected in the composition of the plenary
docket. For example, three of the mainstays of the statutory work
of the Warren Court were the Interstate Commerce Act, the Rail-
way Labor Act, and the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA").
In the seven Terms of the later Burger Court, all three statutes ac-
counted for only 8 decisions. There can be little doubt that this
change resulted in large part from the greatly diminished role of
the railroads in the national transportation system. But other
forces were at work also. The reduction in the number of decisions
reviewing ICC orders coincided almost exactly with the repeal of
the legislation that required three-judge district courts, with a di-
rect appeal to the Supreme Court, for challenges to ICC rulings.30 '
And the profusion of FELA cases on the plenary docket in the
1950's was not simply a reflection of the significance of railroad ac-
cidents in the nation's economy; rather, it was a product of the be-
lief shared by a majority of the Justices that the Court had a special
responsibility "to exercise its power of review in any [FELA] case
where it appears that the litigants have been improperly deprived
of" their right to a jury determination. 30 2 That belief no longer
holds sway within the Court.30 3 Thus, while the number of em-
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1982, at A31, cols. 5-6; Passell, More Gold in the Golden Years, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 12, 1985, at A30 cols. 1-3.
297 Challenges to various provisions of the Social Security Act accounted for 4 of the 33
cases in which the Supreme Court reviewed lower court decisions holding federal statutes
unconstitutional. See section IV(B) infra.
298 All 4 of the cases involved intercircuit conflicts.
299 Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981).
300 See note 245 supra.
301 See Statutory Law, supra note 13, at 11-13.
302 Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 509 (1957) (emphasis added).
303 The passing of the old era was signaled by an opinion ofJustice Douglas dissenting
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ployee FELA petitions is undoubtedly smaller than it was decades
ago,30 4 it is also true that cases that probably would have received
plenary consideration or even summary reversal in the 1950's are
now denied review without dissent.
30 5
b. Changes in Social and Political Life
Of the social and political developments that have marked the
decade and a half since ChiefJustice Burger took office, none have
had as great an impact on the nation as the rise of the women's
movement. The Supreme Court has played a major role in that
revolution, and the effects can be seen in the composition of the
plenary docket. Issues of sex discrimination, which with one excep-
tion were entirely absent from the Court's work under ChiefJustice
Warren, 306 have become a major component of the civil rights
docket in the Burger Court. Starting with the pathbreaking opinion
in Reed v. Reed307 in the 1971 Term, the Court has issued a total of
21 decisions addressing the constitutionality of governmental dis-
tinctions based on gender. In the realm of statutory law, claims of
sex discrimination accounted for 14 of the 28 Title VII decisions in
the seven Terms 1977 through 1983.308
from the denial of certiorari in two cases brought to the Court in the 1972 Term. In both
cases the lower courts had set aside jury verdicts in favor of injured employees. Justice
Douglas lamented that "[i]f the voice of Hugo Black were still heard and heeded, these two
cases would be granted and reversed outright. That would be my vote. But at the very least
we should put [them] down for argument." Felts v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 409 U.S.
926, 929 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). But Justice Douglas
dissented alone. See also Hartel v. Long Island R.R., 414 U.S. 980 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
joined by Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
304 The only available data are those collected by Dean Casper and Judge Posner for
three-Term periods in the 1950's and 1970's. Their figures show that the average number
of certiorari petitions filed each Term in FELA cases from state courts declined from 9 in
1956-1958 to 3 in 1974-1976. The average number of petitions from federal courts fell
from 10 to 3. Casper & Posner, The Caseload of the Supreme Court: 1975 and 1976 Terms, 1977
Sup. CT. REV. 87, 94 (Table 7). These figures of course include employer as well as em-
ployee petitions.
305 See, e.g., Beimert v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 412 (8th Cir.) (upholding
jury instruction on causation), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2659 (1984); Conway v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 720 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1983) (overturning jury verdict for plaintiff), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1911 (1984); Biggs v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 110 Ill. App. 3d 709, 442
N.E.2d 1353 (1982) (directing verdict for railroad), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983).
306 The one relevant precedent of the Warren Court was Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961). In that case the Court upheld a state statute limitingjury service by women to those
who registered with the clerk of court their desire to be placed on the jury list. However,
the Court declined to consider the continuing validity of the proposition that a state may
constitutionally limit jury duty to males. See id. at 60. Rather, in affirming the murder con-
viction of a woman who had been tried by an all-male jury, the Court found "no substantial
evidence . . . that [the state had] arbitrarily undertaken to exclude women from jury ser-
vice." Id. at 69.
307 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
308 Two of the cases involved claims of discrimination on the basis of both race and sex.
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It is true that the proliferation of constitutional cases resulted
in part from the Court's own decisions-decisions that signalled an
end to the long-held view that nothing in the fourteenth amend-
ment "preclude[s] the States from drawing a sharp line between the
sexes."30 9 But the Court would hardly have received (or taken) so
many opportunities to mark out the limits of the new approach if
the egalitarian forces represented by the feminist movement had
not seized upon those initial decisions to challenge laws in every
realm of human endeavor from marriage to military service.3'0 In-
deed, although most of the early cases began in the lower courts as
"ad hoc efforts rather than [as] part of concerted litigation," 3 " the
course of argument in the Supreme Court very definitely was not ad
hoc. On the contrary, the Justices were confronted with-and influ-
enced by-a pattern of advocacy consciously designed not simply to
win particular cases, but to effect changes in the legal system and
ultimately in society.
3 1 2
This endeavor was substantially aided by the operation of the
obligatory jurisdiction. All but 3 of the Court's sex discrimination
cases, including the first 9, were brought as appeals. As a result,
the only way the Court could avoid granting plenary review was to
affirm summarily.313 But the Justices were not likely to find that an
attractive option. If the lower court had accepted the constitutional
claim, summary affirmance would disable all governments from en-
forcing similar laws;3 1 4 if the constitutional claim had been rejected,
summary affirmance would fly in the face of the Zeitgeist.31 5 Thus
Of course, many of the decisions arising out of sex discrimination claims resulted in rulings
applicable to all Title VII suits.
309 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). Goeseart was disapproved in Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976).
310 See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (military service); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979) (alimony obligations).
311 J. GREENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SoCIAL CHANGE 371
(1977).
312 See id. at 371-72, 381. Professor (nowJudge) Ruth Bader Ginsberg and the American
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") argued or submitted briefs on behalf of the constitutional
claimant in virtually all of the sex discrimination cases of the early 1970's. The influence of
the ACLU is particularly visible in the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973). In that case the Court came within one vote of designating sex as a suspect
classification, thus triggering "strict scrutiny" of gender-based discrimination. See note 140
supra.
313 As previously noted, dismissals for want of a substantial federal question in cases
from state courts are tantamount to affirmances. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
314 See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
315 Admittedly, it is difficult to identify the point at which the Zeitgeist would have made
it impossible for the Court to summarily affirm a decision rejecting a constitutional chal-
lenge to a statutory scheme that discriminated on the basis of sex. In this connection, it is
worth noting that only challenges to statutes (as distinguished from attacks on particular
executive decisions) can be brought to the Court on appeal. Thus the Court would have
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it was to be expected that the Court would grant plenary considera-
tion and confront the constitutional arguments on the merits.
The Court's willingness to address, and largely accept, the
claims of the feminists contrasts sharply with its response to the
homosexual rights movement. During the past decade, numerous
cases have been brought to the Court raising issues of homosexual
rights in a variety of contexts, including criminal law enforce-
ment,3 1 6 education, 31 7 and public employment.3 18 The claimants
have invoked the due process clause,31 9 the equal protection
clause,3 20 and the first amendment.3 2' There can be no doubt that
the issues are recurring, and the results in the lower courts have not
been uniform. But with two exceptions, and sometimes over strong
dissent, the Court has consistently refused to grant plenary consid-
eration to any of the cases. 322 One of the exceptions is simply inex-
plicable; 323 the other was a case in which a federal court of appeals
had struck down a state statute, thus giving the state the opportu-
nity to invoke the Court's obligatory jurisdiction.32 4 As fate would
have it, however, the obligation imposed by the United States Code
was lifted by the fortuity of a Justice's illness.3 25 The result was an
affirmance by an equally divided Court that allowed the Justices to
avoid once again the issuance of a plenary opinion in a homosexual
been confronted, not with isolated acts of individual officials, but with discriminatory rules
embodied in positive law.
316 E.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd
mer., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); People v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
317 E.g., Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,joined by Blackmun,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d
1317 (5th Cir. 1984), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1860 (1985).
318 E.g., Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 909 (1982); Gish v. Board of Educ., 145 N.J. Super. 96, 366 A.2d 1337 (1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (Brennan and Marshall, .I-, dissenting); Gaylord v. Tacoma
School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977)
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
319 E.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), afd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Gaylord v. Ta-
coma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977)
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
320 See Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 105 S. Ct. 1373, 1376-79 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
321 See notes 317-18 supra and accompanying text.
322 See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 105 S. Ct. 1373 (1985) (Brennan,
J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434
U.S. 1080 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
323 See New York v. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 2332, 2334 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
324 National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir.), prob. juris.
noted, 105 S. Ct. 76 (1984).
325 See Greenhouse, Mysteries of Tie Votes and Calls for Reargument, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3,




Inability to invoke the obligatory jurisdiction may be one rea-
son why the homosexuals have been unable to secure the place on
the plenary docket that fell so easily to the women's movement, but
it is not the only reason. The critical distinction, I believe, is that in
the view of the Justices the nation is not yet ready for a definitive
ruling on homosexual rights. For the Court to hold, for example,
that an avowed homosexual has a constitutional right to teach in a
public school would engender further disrespect for the Court
among a substantial body of citizens who are already disillusioned
by the Court's decisions on abortion, school prayer, and 'busing.
On the other hand, for the Court to place its imprimatur on govern-
mental actions that penalize individuals for their sexual preferences
might well have the effect of encouraging further displays of intol-
erance.3 27 If the Justices were confident of the proper resolution of
the constitutional issues, concern about public reaction probably
would not stand in the way,3 28 but if they regard the questions as
open and difficult, deferring a definitive resolution has two impor-
tant advantages. 329 It gives the Justices a chance to observe what
happens in those states and circuits where homosexual rights have
been recognized to one degree or another, and it leaves open the
possibility that at some later time the legal issues will be dearer or
the attitudes of the public more relaxed. 330
326 Board of Educ. v. National Gay Task Force, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985) (mem.).
327 Cf Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1773, 1775 (1967) (noting that
the Court has never decided whether the police may suppress a demonstration when unrest
by a hostile crowd becomes uncontrollable; suggesting that if the Court were to hold that
they may, this would encourage the police to underestimate their ability to maintain order,
and they would move against the unpopular demonstrators rather than attempting to con-
trol the hostile audience). Nearly two decades later, the Court still has not resolved the
hostile audience question. See Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
328 But see Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court,
1948-1958, 68 GEO. LJ. 1, 95-96 (1979), quoting Memorandum of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
on Naim v. Naim (read at Conference, Nov. 4, 1955). In his memorandum Justice Frank-
furter suggested that the Court should avoid deciding the constitutionality of a Virginia
miscegenation statute. He argued that "due consideration of important public conse-
quences is relevant to the exercise of discretion" in deciding whether to address an issue,
and that to strike down the Virginia statute would "very seriously. . . embarrass" the im-
plementation of the school desegregation decisions. The Court ultimately acted in accord-
ance with Justice Frankfurter's view. See id at 62-66; see also S. WAsBy, A. D'AMATO, & R.
METRAILER, DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER 132-49, 266-76 (1977) (avoidance
of racial issues in other contexts).
329 See G. GUNTHER, supra note 128, at 1661-62.
330 The Court may have been following a similar strategy in the 1970's when it repeat-
edly refused to consider the constitutionality of public school regulations limiting students'
hair length, even after the issue had spawned conflicting decisions in eight circuits. See
Freeman v. Flake, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(citing cases). If so, the strategy worked. By the time the Court heard a long-hair case (in
the context of public employment, see Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976)), the contro-
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The examples given thus far have been drawn largely from the
realm of civil litigation. This focus is easily explained. The crimi-
nal law portion of the Court's work is overwhelmingly dominated
by issues of procedure (broadly defined); unlike the lower courts,
the Supreme Court very seldom addresses questions involving the
definition of crimes and defenses.33' And while it is predictable
that the doubtful and recurring issues of substantive law that arise
in criminal prosecutions would reflect changing currents of societal
concern, one would probably not expect to find any such thread
among the procedural rulings.
Two-thirds of the Court's criminal procedure work in the first
four Terms of the 1980's conforms to this expectation. The deci-
sions interpreting the protections accorded defendants by the fifth,
sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments arose, with a handful of
exceptions, out of prosecutions for murder, rape, burglary, and
other timeless objects of criminal sanctions. One area of criminal
procedure diverges sharply from this pattern, however, and it is the
one that occupies by far the largest segment of the docket. In the
four Terms of the 1980's the Court handed down 31 decisions in-
terpreting the fourth amendment's ban on unreasonable searches
and seizures. Two-thirds of the cases arose out of prosecutions for
narcotics offenses-crimes that accounted for only 3 decisions in all
other areas of constitutional-criminal procedure. The Court's con-
tinuing and intensive involvement with the fourth amendment33 2
thus appears to be, in no small part, a product of the escalating war
on drug trafficking being waged by the nation's law enforcement
agencies.
There remains, however, the question why drug prosecutions
are so prominent among the fourth amendment cases and almost
invisible everywhere else in the Court's criminal procedure work.
The answer, I think, lies in the nature of the crimes. The activities
versy had died down, and what was once a gesture of defiance had lost its capacity to arouse
passions. Cf I COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, SEC-
OND PHASE HEARINGS 332 (1974) (colloquy between Bernard G. Segal, Esq., and Judge
Roger Robb):
MR. SEGAL: I would feel that it is the obligation of some court somewhere to see
that citizens of the United States on as fundamental a matter as the right to have
their hair the length that they want it, and all the more if their parents want the
length, shall have that decided and not have it go on month after month and year
after year without a decision. ...
JUDGE ROBB: Maybe the conflict will evaporate when the fad changes....
Nor should it be thought that long hair was not as controversial in its time as the issue of
homosexual rights is today. See, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 705 n.3 (W.D. Wis.),
afd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
331 In fact, as will be seen in Part IV, the Court almost never addresses issues of substan-
tive criminal law except to resolve acknowledged intercircuit conflicts. See note 363 infra
and accompanying text.
332 See Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 533-38.
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that are the subject of drug prosecutions-the manufacture, posses-
sion, and distribution of controlled substances-are carried on be-
hind closed doors, and in the ordinary course of events no one who
knows about the activities will report them to the police. Thus the
process of law enforcement does not begin with a known crime,
with the efforts of the police being directed to discovering and ap-
prehending the person who committed it; rather, the object, is to
determine whether a criminal offense has been (or is being) com-
mitted.333 In the context of drug trafficking, that task will require
the use of informers, undercover agents, surveillance, and other in-
vestigative techniques that are likely to raise issues under the fourth
amendment.334 But if those techniques are successful, guilt will
usually be plain-and conviction assured-so that there will be no
need for police or prosecutors to resort to practices that raise sub-
stantial questions under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amend-
ments. In this light, it is not surprising that the litigation of search
and seizure issues is so closely linked with the prosecution of drug
crimes, and vice versa.
In other areas of federal governance that have been subjected
to intensive scrutiny by the Supreme Court over a period of years,
the Court has generally succeeded in bringing greater clarity and
certainty to the law, thus reducing the need for additional authori-
tative decisions. That has not been the experience with the fourth
amendment. On the contrary, the Court continues to issue a seem-
ingly endless stream of opinions that draw ever-finer distinctions in
assessing the lawfulness of police behavior and the admissibility of
evidence.3 3 5 To be sure, the dominant trend in recent years has
been to give greater leeway to police and prosecutors,33 6 but there
have been enough decisions upholding defendants' claims3 3 7 to as-
sure further controversy and the development of new issues that
will require the Court's attention.
338
333 See A. HELLMAN, LAWS AGAINST MARIJUANA: THE PRICE WE PAY 58-59 (1975). Most
of what is said in that volume about marijuana law enforcement applies equally to the inves-
tigation of other narcotics crimes.
334 See id. at 162.
335 Compare United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985), with United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696 (1983); compare United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), with United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
336 E.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 104 S.
Ct. 1735 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
337 E.g., Hayes v. Florida, 105 S. Ct. 1643 (1985); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091
(1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
338 For example, in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court severely
restricted the authority of police to conduct warrantless searches of luggage and other
closed containers, while United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), gave wide latitude for
warrantless searches of vehicles. Inevitably, the Court was confronted with a case (arising
out of a drug prosecution) in which contraband was seized in a warrantless search of a
suitcase located in the trunk of a vehicle. The state court held that the case involved a
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To some extent, the disarray results from the deep divisions
within the Court itself and the divergent responses engendered by
particular facts as the Court shapes the legal rules on a case-by-case
basis in the manner of the common law.339 But the shifting con-
tours and emphases can also be attributed to the fact that the pre-
dominant context for the decisions is the investigation of narcotics
crimes. This is because the investigative techniques used in that
pursuit are the very techniques that are most likely to intrude upon
the privacy and security of the innocent as well as the guilty.3 40 And
although the Court might not go as far as it should in protecting
those values, it does not ignore them. Thus, as long as the war on
narcotics remains a high priority among law enforcement agencies,
and as long as the exclusionary rule is retained in some form,3 4 1 the
Court will experience no release from the sordid world of drug traf-
ficking and the "not very nice" defendants3 42 who invoke the con-
stitutional guarantee that protects the privacy and security of
everyone.
IV. Reasons for Granting Review in Particular Cases
In the preceding pages I have identified some of the forces that
play a role in determining the kinds of issues that will occupy a
prominent position on the plenary docket in any given period. An-
alyzing the reasons for the grant of review in particular cases is a far
more difficult task, involving a much greater element of speculation
"container search" rather than a "vehicle search," and suppressed the evidence. The eight
participating Supreme Court Justices divided equally and thus failed to provide an authori-
tative resolution of the issue. Oklahoma v. Castleberry, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985), af'g mem.
678 P.2d 720 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984). The vehicle search precedents also stand in sharp
contrast to decisions according a high degree of protection against warrantless searches of
"the home." E.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2097 (1984). Again, the inevitable
happened: prosecutors sought to introduce evidence seized in a warrantless search of a
motor home. The state court held that the case was controlled by the "home" precedents
rather than the "vehicle" precedents, but the Supreme Court disagreed. People v. Carney,
34 Cal. 3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
339 See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984) (5-4 decision; five Justices
agreed that the challenged evidence was admissible because derived from a source in-
dependent of an earlier search; only two Justices upheld the validity of an earlier seizure);
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (unanimous reversal; no majority opinion); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (5-4 decision; no majority opinion); United States v. Sharpe,
457 U.S. 1127, 1128 (1982) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (Court remanded case for reconsidera-
tion in light of United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); author of Ross insisted that that
opinion "sheds no light on the proper disposition of this case"). Compare also United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (unanimous reversal; fourJustices concurred in result), with
United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (6-3 decision) (addressing two questions left
unresolved in Knotts).
340 See A. HELLMAN, supra note 333, at 162-63; United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
105 S. Ct. 3304, 3314-15 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
341 See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (modifying exclusionary rule).
342 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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and subjective evaluation. To be sure, some Court opinions do
provide an explanation for the decision to grant plenary considera-
tion. But those cases are a minority.3 43 And the brief statements
can hardly reflect the different and overlapping reasons that may
have prompted individual Justices to vote to hear a case. For exam-
ple, Justice White may have been swayed by the presence of an in-
tercourt conflict;3 4 4 Justice Stevens may have been unwilling to
summarily affirm a case within the obligatory jurisdiction;3 45 and
Justice Brennan may have been concerned primarily with correcting
an erroneous denial of a federal right.
346
The analysis is made still more problematic by the fact that. it is
post hoc. Almost any Supreme Court decision will have some prece-
dential value (and thus will be cited and relied upon) simply be-
cause it is a Supreme Court decision. Thus, from a retrospective
standpoint, the criterion of "general importance" 347 is easily satis-
fied. But that kind of justification can be misleading when the ob-
ject is to determine how a case looked to the Justices at the time the
application for review and responsive papers were filed.348
343 In the four Terms of the 1980's, fewer than half of the plenary decisions gave any
explanation at all for the grant of review, and in many of these the Court merely set forth
the question it had agreed to decide. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1357-58
(1984) ("We granted certiorari to decide whether the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment prohibits a municipality from including a creche, or Nativity scene, in its an-
nual Christmas display."). In some of the other cases the Court simply said that the ques-
tion was "important," without further elaboration. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1037 (1983).
344 Over the last decade, Justice White has often voiced concern about the Court's fail-
ure to resolve intercircuit conflicts. See Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 396 (citing
cases). And Justice White is the only member of the Court who has filed a substantial
number of opinions dissenting from the denial of certiorari on conflict grounds without
arguing that the judgment below was in error. See Discretionary Review, supra note 13, at 867
n.369.
345 Justice Stevens takes a very narrow view of the Court's certiorari function and never
notes his dissent from the denial of discretionary review. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259,
273-76 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940, 942
(1978) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari); Stevens, supra note 254,
at 179-80. (Justice Stevens did vote to grant certiorari in one case in which the Court sum-
marily vacated the judgment below. Rodriquez v. Harris, 455 U.S. 997 (1982).) However,
in the four Terms of the 1980's Justice Stevens dissented from the denial of review in more
than 30 cases that came before the Court on appeal.
346 See Sweat v. Arkansas, 105 S. Ct. 933, 938 (1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari). Cases presenting all three of these features are of course rare, but they do
occur. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984); Mennonite Bd. of Mis-
sions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
347 See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
348 A good illustration of the problem is City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983) (Lyons II). The city, as petitioner, argued that the district court had overstepped the
boundaries of federal judicial power in issuing an injunction against the use of
"chokeholds" by city police. The petition did not allege an intercircuit conflict; did not
claim that the issue was a recurring one; and did not even assert that the lower court's
decision would have any impact outside the particular case. Amicus briefs in support of the
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With these limitations taken into account, it is possible to iden-
tify four broad categories of reasons for the grant of plenary review.
Three of them are relatively well defined (which is not to say that
the classification of particular cases is always easy): intercourt con-
flicts, compelling interests of the federal government, and doubtful
recurring issues. The fourth category embraces all other reasons
petition were filed on behalf of other cities and law enforcement officials, but the amici
focused primarily on the anticipated consequences of the chokehold ban. See, e.g., Brief of
the Los Angeles Police Protection League at 5-6 ("U]udicial prohibition of the use of neck
control holds by officers except in life-threatening situations will have a severe impact on
public and police officer safety."). To the extent that the amici addressed the legal signifi-
cance of the case, they did so by emphasizing what would happen if other courts were to
follow the Ninth Circuit's holdings on standing and federalism. See, e.g., Brief of the Na-
tional Institute of Municipal Law Officers as Amicus Curiae at 7 (arguing that if the
Supreme Court allowed the Ninth Circuit decision to stand, this would give a "signal [to all
federal courts that] would result in a multitude of lawsuits . . . challenging all kinds of
police procedures and, therefore, would force municipalitites to constantly defend the in-
ternal practices of their law enforcement agencies."). But the judgment brought for review
was a per curiam affirmance of a preliminary injunction, with the court of appeals saying
only that it found no abuse of discretion. Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 417, 418
(9th Cir. 1981). Thus it is quite possible that on a different record a different result would
have been reached, even by the same court.
Given what has been said thus far, and taking into account the further fact that the
Ninth Circuit's judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court, one might readily conclude
that review was granted, not because the case presented a question of "general impor-
tance," but for the purpose of correcting an erroneous judgment. See also City of Los Ange-
les v. Lyons, 449 U.S. 934, 937 (1980) (Lyons 1) (White, J., joined by Powell and Rehnquist,
JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari in an earlier phase of the case raising essentially the
same issues) ("Of course, we cannot give plenary consideration to every misapplication of
constitutional requirements, but the decision of the Court of Appeals appears so at odds
with our precedents that I dissent from denial of certiorari."). Yet the decision that
emerged has proved to be an important precedent on the authority of federal courts to
enjoin governmental practices that are alleged to violate constitutional rights, but not in
ways that will foreseeably affect particular individuals in the future. See, e.g., Palmer v. City
of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 569-72 (7th Cir. 1985); Curtis v. City of New Haven, 726 F.2d 65
(2d Cir. 1984); Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1446-47 (5th Cir. 1984); Buie v.Jones,
717 F.2d 925, 927-29 (4th Cir. 1983).
But that is not the end of the inquiry. The Court held in Lyons II (as the dissenters in
Lyons I had argued) that reversal was compelled by existing Supreme Court precedent, par-
ticularly O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
If that assessment is correct, it suggests that the later lower court decisions that cited and
relied on Lyons H would have (or in any event should have) reached the same results even if
the Court had denied review in that case as it did in Lyons I. Certainly, as I have already
pointed out, there was nothing in the certiorari petition or the amicus briefs to indicate that
the Ninth Circuit's decision was anything but an isolated deviation from the course marked
out by O'Shea, Rizzo, and other existing precedents. From that perspective, it can be argued
that the frequent invocation of Lyons I by the lower courts gives a misleading impression of
the "general importance" of the decision.
For the dissenters in the Supreme Court, however, the ruling in Lyons 11 represented a
significant extension of existing precedents. See Lyons II, 461 U.S. at 123-24 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Some commentators agreed. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARv.
L. REV. 70, 219 (1983). Thus, ironic though it may seem, the grant of review in Lyons II can
be most easily reconciled with the orthodox view of the Court's function if one accepts the
interpretation of the decision offered by the dissenters-Justices who, in all likelihood,
voted against hearing the case.
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for review. By definition, it is an unruly category; cases are con-
signed to it only when it appears that none of the other three fea-
tures was present at the time review was granted.
In the pages that follow, I refine and illustrate these categories,
with the aim of illuminating the role played by each in the selection
process. The analysis is based primarily on a study of the Court's
work in the first four Terms of the 1980's. Of course, when it is
possible to draw conclusions about the Court's practices over a
longer span of time, I do so. However, it is worth emphasizing that
for the most part the patterns cannot be described with numerical
precision. Rather, each of the categories and subcategories is de-
fined initially by a core of cases in which the probable reason for
review can be surmised with a high degree of confidence. Other
cases are classified on the basis of whatever evidence is available,
including the opinions in the Supreme Court, the opinions of lower
courts, the submissions of the parties and amici prior to the grant
of review, and scholarly commentary. I make the best judgments I
can, but I recognize that someone else looking at the same indicia
might well read them differently.
Two other preliminary observations are in order. First, as the
nature of the categories may suggest, I tend to begin my examina-
tion of a case by looking for reasons for review that comport with
the orthodox concept of the Supreme Court's functions. I recog-
nize that the orthodox view does not fully reflect what the Court
does in fact, or even (more debatably) what it ought to be doing.349
Nevertheless, it is a useful starting point. In particular, when a peti-
tioner's claim of intercircuit conflict or general importance is sup-
ported by judicial opinions or scholarly commentary, I generally
accept the characterization without investigating much further. On
the other hand, it would be naive to take such assertions at face
value when they fail to gain support outside the adversary process,
and in that situation I look for other explanations.
Second, consistency with the orthodox view is probably easier
to find in the selection of cases involving matters of general federal
law and the jurisdiction and procedure of federal courts than in the
segments of the docket devoted to civil rights and federalism. The
probable explanation for the difference is that the Burger Court,
even more than its predecessors, attaches great importance to
maintaining equilibrium between the competing values of state au-
tonomy and national supremacy. This in turn means that the Court
is willing to hear some cases that implicate those values but are
otherwise lacking in significance "beyond the particular facts and
349 See notes 50-58 supra and accompanying text.
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parties involved." 350 However, further development of this point is
best deferred until we have examined the results of the case selec-
tion process from the orthodox perspective. 35'
A. Intercircuit Conflicts
Among the orthodox justifications for Supreme Court review,
the most firmly established is the intercircuit conflict.3 52 For pres-
ent purposes, a conflict exists when two or more appellate courts
have attached different legal consequences to transactions that are
identical in all relevant respects.353 Failure to resolve a conflict can
have three undesirable consequences. First, efficient planning and
negotiation are frustrated when lawyers, in formulating advice to
their clients, must take account of multiple rather than single con-
tingencies at key points in their analysis.3 54 Second, the existence
of a conflict encourages people to litigate rather than settle their
disputes; when each side can point to a favorable precedent that is
squarely on point (albeit from a different jurisdiction), both sides
are likely to exaggerate the probability of ultimate vindication and
thus to resist compromise.3 55 Finally, the simultaneous proclama-
350 See Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, 69 S. Ct. v, vi (1949).
351 See section D infra.
352 For example, conflicts are listed first in the Court's own description of "the character
of reasons that will be considered" in the exercise of discretionary review. See Sup. CT. R.
17.1.
353 There may appear to be an element of question-begging in this formulation, inas-
much as the very question that divides the parties may well be that of identifying the consid-
erations made "relevant" by existing precedent. For the most part, I am content to accept
the characterizations stated or implied by the courts that address the issues. The reasons
for this approach are discussed in Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 393-94 n.88. See also
note 378 infra and accompanying text.
354 To some degree, of course, this difficulty exists whenever the analysis turns on a
legal issue that is unresolved, irrespective of whether it has given rise to an actual conflict;
in fact, the uncertainty may be present even if no appellate court has considered the point.
See Griswold, The Supreme Court's Case Load: Civil Rights and Other Problems, 1973 U. ILL. L.F.
615, 630 ("[lt takes at least two decisions to make a conflict, and the law of the country
remains uncertain until the conflict is finally made and then eventually resolved."). Never-
theless, I think there is a difference between the legal issue that is open because there are
no controlling decisions, so that the lawyer must reason by analogy or extrapolation from
precedents on related issues, and the issue that has been decided differently by two or more
appellate courts. The former is inevitable in a common law system, see Intercircuit Tribunal,
supra note 13, at 420; the latter bespeaks a malfunctioning of the system. Moreover, from
the standpoint of a lawyer's confidence in his ability to predict what the courts will do in
fact, the existence of squarely conflicting appellate decisions will generally be more of an
impediment than the total absence of cases on point. Cf State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97, 108-11, 550 P.2d 1185, 1190-92 (1976) (dis-
cussing the analogous problem of nonmutual collateral estoppel when the outstanding de-
terminations are actually inconsistent on the matter sought to be precluded).
355 See Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. &
EcoN. 249, 271 (1976). The actual consequences for any particular dispute will of course
depend on the amount at stake, the parties' aversion to risk, the anticipated costs of litiga-
tion, and other factors. See D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 15-18 (1983)
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tion of inconsistent interpretations of federal law by appellate
courts in different parts of the country tends to cast doubt on the
rationality and evenhandedness of the legal system.
356
In this light, it is not surprising that the largest segment of the
plenary docket is devoted to the resolution of intercourt con-
flicts.3 57 Specifically, conflicts were present in more than one-third
of the 593 cases that received plenary consideration in the first four
Terms of the 1980's. Included in this group are all cases in which
the Court explicitly stated that review was granted because of a con-
flict;358 cases in which the Court's opinion pointed clearly to the
existence of a conflict but did not specify it as the reason for grant-
ing review;3 59 and cases in which the conflict was acknowledged by
one or more of the lower courts.3 60 Also included are a few cases in
which the petitioner's claim of conflict was persuasive notwith-
standing the absence of any of the preceding indicia.3 61
(arguing that greater legal uncertainty does not increase the likelihood of litigation because
uncertainty will "accentuate the parties' aversion to risk" and increase the costs of trying
the case). It is not clear how Professor D'Amato's analysis would apply to a situation where
there are no cases squarely on point from the particular jurisdiction, but courts in other
jurisdictions have resolved the issue in inconsistent ways.
356 See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and
Internal Procedures: Recommendationsfor Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 374 (1975) (report of Profes-
sor Summers) [hereinafter cited as Hruska Commission Report].
357 Most of the cases involve conflicts between courts of appeals; a few involve conflicts
between state courts, or between state and federal courts, on issues of federal law. In refer-
ring to conflicts, I shall use the terms "intercircuit" and "intercourt" interchangeably.
358 In some of the cases, a reading of the full opinion suggests that the grant of review
may have been prompted more by concern about an erroneous ruling in the court below
than by the presence of an unresolved conflict. See notes 365-74 infra and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, rather than speculating about other considerations that may have influ-
enced the Court, I have counted as conflict cases all decisions that cite the existence of a
conflict as a reason for review.
359 For example, the Court sometimes refers to a conflict in the lower courts without
explicitly saying that the conflict led to the grant of review. See, e.g., Flanagan v. United
States, 104 S. Ct. 1051, 1053-54 n.2 (1984); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S.
56, 60 n.1 (1981). In Mitchell the conflict was called to the Court's attention in a memoran-
dum filed shortly before the grant of review. Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition at
1.
360 See, e.g., Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 908-09 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
rev'd, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Swank v. United States, 602 F.2d 348, 350 (Ct. Cl. 1981), aff'd,
451 U.S. 571 (1981). Sometimes the acknowledgement of conflict came from a court other
than the one whose decision was reviewed. Compare, e.g., Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230, 1231
(Alaska 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981), with McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210
(1981) (reversing unreported California decision).
361 See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). The conflict here was between
cases like the decision below, which held that the double jeopardy clause bars reprosecu-
tion after a mistrial caused by prosecutorial "overreaching," see id. at 670 (quoting lower
court), and decisions holding that the prohibition applies only if the prosecutor intention-
ally sought to provoke the defendant to move for a mistrial, e.g., United States v. Roberts,
640 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942 (1981). The conflict is described at
length in the amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General after the grant of review, see Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13-15, but I think it would have emerged with
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In several important areas of statutory law, the Court almost
never grants review except to resolve a conflict. For example, the
Court handed down 20 decisions on federal tax liability in the dec-
ade 1974-1983. All but one resolved intercircuit conflicts.3 62 Dur-
ing that same period the Court heard 28 cases involving the
interpretation of substantive federal criminal statutes. All but 2 or
3 resolved intercircuit conflicts.3 63 The Court has given plenary
consideration to only 10 bankruptcy cases in the last ten years. In-
tercircuit conflicts were present in all but one of those cases. 364
Other areas dominated by conflict resolution include tax proce-
dure, admiralty and maritime law, Federal Tort Claims Act litiga-
tion, and private civil rights litigation.
Once we move away from these areas, however, the role of
conflicts in the case selection process becomes considerably less
well defined. At least three kinds of problems stand in the way of
confident characterization. First, conflict resolution cannot be en-
tirely separated from review for error. If the Justices hear a case
because they agree with the petitioner that the decision below is
contrary to sound principles, the odds are good that some court
elsewhere will have decided a similar case differently. There is a
conflict, and to one degree or another it is genuine, but it is not the
reason for the grant of review. 365
Even when the Justices declare explicitly that they heard a case
to resolve a conflict, other indicia may cast doubt on the complete-
reasonable clarity from examination of the cases cited in the certiorari petition. In any
event, the number of cases in which the identification of the conflict is unsupported by
court opinions is very small.
362 The exception was Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979). See
Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 617-18. The Court has followed this approach for many
years. See Statutory Law, supra note 13, at 21-22; Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals,
57 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1163 (1944).
363 In one case the government as respondent supported the application for review so
that the Court could resolve an incipient conflict. See Memorandum for the United States at
10, Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100 (1979). However, the Court ultimately decided the
case on other grounds. See 442 U.S. at 105. Another case may have presented a conflict,
but the conflict probably was not the reason for the grant of review. See United States v.
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), discussed in Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 620-21 n.449.
Only in Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980), was it clear that no conflict was pres-
ent. See Brief for the United States at 11 (supporting defendant's petition for review so that
Court could "clarify the options available to prosecutors and sentencing courts in light of
[an earlier decision]").
364 The exception was United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 77 (1975).
365 See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 & n.4 (1981) (not-
ing in text that "the decision below is all but foreclosed by our prior case law"; adding in
footnote that "[t]he decision below also conflicts with those of other Courts of Appeals
.... "); United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 363, 367 n.4 (1981) (in sixth amendment
case, unanimously reversing Third Circuit's "extraordinary" remedy of dismissal of indict-




ness of this explanation. For example, in United States v. Rylander,36 6
the Court stated that review was granted "because of a conflict
among the various Courts of Appeals." 367 But the Court never
identified the supposedly conflicting cases. The certiorari petition
filed by the United States did so,3 68 but the respondent contro-
verted the assertions of conflict, 369 and indeed one of the decisions
cited repeatedly by the government as being in conflict with the
decision below came from a circuit which, more recently, had re-
jected the government's position.370 In view of the fact that the
Court reversed the lower court's judgment with only one dissent, it
is plausible to conclude that the Justices would have taken the case
even if there had been no other decisions on point.37'
Sometimes the signals are even clearer. In Bernal v. Fainter,372
the Court granted certiorari to review a Fifth Circuit decision up-
holding a Texas statute that required notaries public to be United
States citizens. The Court did not expressly give a reason for hear-
ing the case, but it did note that the Fifth Circuit's decision "con-
flict[ed] with the holding of every other State and federal court
decision that has considered the constitutionality of statutes barring
aliens from eligibility to become notaries public. '3 73 By a vote of 8
to 1 the Court then reversed the Fifth Circuit's judgment. Without
a doubt, the opinion tells us that the Fifth Circuit decision created
what the Court regarded as a genuine conflict; but with equal clarity
the opinion informs us that the conflict was not the reason the
Court granted review.
374
366 460 U.S. 752 (1983).
367 Id at 753.
368 Petition for Certiorari at 11, 13, 16-17.
369 Brief in Opposition at 4-9.
370 The government insisted that the decision below was in conflict with United States v.
Hankins, 565 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir.), affd on rehearing with additional reasons stated, 581 F.2d 431
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979). See Petition for Certiorari at 13-17. How-
ever, the government also asked the Court to review United States v. Meeks, 642 F.2d 733
(5th Cir. 1981), a case that in the government's view embodied the same legal error as
Rylander. See Petition for Certiorari at 9, Rylander v. United States, 460 U.S. 752 (1983).
But in Meeks the Fifth Circuit, albeit by a divided vote, held that Hankins was distinguishable
on three separate grounds. Meeks, 642 F.2d at 735. The petition in Meeks was held to await
the decision in Rylander; the case was then remanded for reconsideration. United States v.
Meeks, 461 U.S. 912 (1983). Ultimately the Fifth Circuit accepted the government's posi-
tion. United States v. Meeks, 719 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1983).
371 See also United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 (1983) (Court stated
that it granted review because of an intercircuit conflict and the importance of the question,
but did not specify the conflicting cases; Court then reversed the judgment below).
372 104 S. Ct. 2312 (1984).
373 Id. at 2316 n.4.
374 See also United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1983) (stating that Court
granted review to resolve an intercircuit conflict on an issue of statutory interpretation;
adopting "the prevailing view" and holding that the "restrictive reading" accepted by the
court below "flies in the face of the plain meaning of the statute"); Potomac Elec. Power
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The uneasy relationship between error correction and conflict
resolution is not the only obstacle to identifying the cases that are
reviewed because of a conflict. A second difficulty is that it is not
always clear whether a conflict exists.3 75 Half a century ago, Felix
Frankfurter and Henry Hart posed the question, "What constitutes
a 'conflict'?" 3 76 The answer, they recognized, "imports into the
matter the whole of the lawyer's traditional technique of analysis
and distinguishing of cases. . . . [M]any questions of degree inev-
itably remain."3 77 Thus, two decisions may conflict with one an-
other if the issue is defined in broad terms, but not if it is defined
narrowly. 378 And as the arguably relevant distinctions grow in
Co. v. Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1980) (noting that the decision below was
"apparently the first and only federal court decision" to accept a particular construction of
the statute; reversing the judgment by a vote of 8 to 1).
375 Both difficulties are illustrated by Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The peti-
tioner, the attorney general of South Dakota, asked the Court to review and reverse an
Eighth Circuit decision holding that a life sentence without the possibility of parole for a
seventh nonviolent felony constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Court agreed to
hear the case; however, after plenary consideration the judgment below was affirmed by a
vote of 5 to 4.
Among other arguments for review, the petition asserted that the Eighth Circuit's rul-
ing conflicted with decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. In fact, the Eighth Circuit had
been ambivalent about the possibility of conflict, stating:
To the extent that the crimes in [the Fifth and Ninth Circuit cases] differ from the
relatively minor property offenses at issue here, we believe those cases may be
distinguished. To the extent that those cases rejected a disproportionality analysis
in reviewing a life sentence without parole, however, we decline to follow them.
Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 587 n.14 (8th Cir. 1982). Yet it is highly unlikely that the
Court's deliberations at the certiorari stage turned on whether the Eighth Circuit was per-
suasive in distinguishing the allegedly conflicting cases. Rather, I surmise that review was
granted because the fourJustices who ultimately dissented from the decision on the merits
thought that the ruling below could not "rationally be reconciled with" the holding in Rum-
mel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 304 (1983) (Burger,
CJ., joined by White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). The dissenters may have
been joined by Justice Blackmun, who formed part of the majority in Rummel, but now
joined the new majority in Solem. Indeed, perhaps Justice Blackmun voted to grant review
for the purpose of reconsidering the earlier case.
Taking all of these circumstances into account, I have not classified Solem as a conflict
case. (The Court's opinion-by the Justice who wrote the dissent in Rummel-did not give a
reason for granting review.)
376 Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1933, 48 HARv. L.
REV. 238, 268 (1934).
377 Id. at 268-69.
378 For example, in Farmar v. United States, 689 F.2d 1017, 1025 (Ct. Cl. 1982), a case
involving oil depletion allowances, the Court of Claims acknowledged that its "overall views
. . . var[ied] from those expressed" in a Seventh Circuit decision, but argued that "the
ultimate holdings . . . may not necessarily be inconsistent" because the Seventh Circuit
dealt with advance royalties, while the Court of Claims case concerned lease bonuses. The
Supreme Court granted review in both cases. It affirmed the Seventh Circuit and reversed
the Court of Claims, making no distinctions between advance royalties and lease bonuses.
Commissioner v. Engle, 104 S. Ct. 597 (1984). Thus, although the Court did not explicitly
give a reason for review, it is fair to conclude that the Court agreed with the petitioners that
the Court of Claims had created an intercourt conflict, and that certiorari was granted for
that reason. Similarly, in First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), the
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number or persuasiveness, the "conflict" shades into the "side-
swipe"-a difference in approach or emphasis that would not nec-
essarily lead to inconsistent results on identical facts.3 79
Beyond this, the directness of a conflict is only one element-
and not necessarily the most important-of what makes a case
certworthy. After all, the Supreme Court does not take conflict
cases out of an esthetic desire for symmetry in the law or to satisfy
an academic interest in finding a principle that will reconcile seem-
ingly inconsistent holdings. Rather, the Court takes conflict cases
because a conflict generally-but not invariably-bespeaks a doubt-
ful and recurring legal issue which, if not resolved, will create un-
necessary uncertainty for lawyers, lower courts, and those who must
govern their activities in accordance with federal law.380 Thus, if an
issue has generated a large body of appellate decisions manifesting
a variety of approaches, the fact that the seemingly inconsistent rul-
ings could be reconciled through "the lawyer's traditional tech-
nique of analysis" becomes largely irrelevant. On the other hand, a
direct and acknowledged conflict may not warrant review if the in-
consistent decisions are not likely to cause uncertainty at the level
of primary activity or in the litigation process.38 1
Not surprisingly, cases fitting the latter description seldom
reach the plenary docket,38 2 while the former pattern is not uncom-
mon. For example, in Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associ-
ates,3 8 3 the Court granted review "to consider whether a marine
construction worker, who was injured while performing his job
upon actual navigable waters, and who would have been covered by
Solicitor General, opposing the grant of review, insisted that "the 'conflicts' alleged by [the]
petitioner [were] nothing more than differences in results dictated by the differences in the
facts." Brief for the NLRB in Opposition at 13. But the Court stated that the decision
below "appear[ed] to be at odds with decisions of other Courts of Appeals," 452 U.S. at
672, and that review was granted "[b]ecause of the importance of the issue and the continu-
ing disagreement between and among the [Labor] Board and the Courts of Appeals," id. at
674.
379 See Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 406-13.
380 See Statutory Law, supra note 13, at 22, 41-44.
381 See Harlan, supra note 55, at 552.
382 Three cases that do appear to fit the profile are Tuten v. United States, 460 U.S. 660
(1983) (government, as respondent, conceded conflict but argued that the decision re-
jecting its position was "so clearly aberrational" that the issue did not require Supreme
Court resolution, Memorandum for the United States in Opposition at 3; Court granted
review anyway and affirmed unanimously); Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980)
(government, as respondent, conceded conflict but urged Court to deny review on ground
that the decision below was correct and the contrary holdings were "isolated deviations,"
Brief for the United States in Opposition at 9; Court granted certiorari anyway and affirmed
unanimously); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (government, as respondent,
conceded conflict but urged Court to deny review because petitioner would lose under
either of the competing rules, Brief for the United States in Opposition at 6; Court granted
certiorari anyway and affirmed unanimously).
383 459 U.S. 297 (1983).
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the [Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation] Act
before 1972, is 'engaged in maritime employment' and thus cov-
ered by the amended Act."' 384 The court below, the Second Circuit,
had rejected coverage.385 The Supreme Court noted that the Ninth
Circuit was in agreement with the Second, while the Fifth Circuit
had taken a contrary position.386 But the Fifth Circuit decision
cited by the Court was an en banc opinion handed down after re-
view was granted in Perini. At the time the Court considered the
petition in Perini, the governing law in the Fifth Circuit was stated
by the panel opinion, which argued that the employment activities
of the worker in the case before it were "distinguishabl[e]" from
those of the workers in the Second and Ninth Circuit cases.38
7
In hindsight, with the benefit of an en banc decision that
frankly rejected the views of the Second and Ninth Circuits rather
than focusing on factual distinctions, it is easy to say that the con-
flict was genuine. Yet even if the Fifth Circuit had adhered to its
original approach, the Supreme Court would still have been justi-
fied in granting review in Perini. In one circuit after another, marine
employers and their insurers were pressing the argument that an
employee injured while working on navigable waters is not covered
by the LHWCA unless he can show that his employment possesses
a "significant relationship to navigation or to commerce." The
courts responding to this contention were not speaking with one
voice. A definitive answer from the Supreme Court would clarify
the rights of employees and the obligations of insurers whether or
not a square conflict existed.388
B. Compelling Interests of the Federal Government
In the second group of plenary decisions, about one-third the
size of the first, the Court granted review in response to a compel-
ling interest of the federal government. Most prominent are the
cases in which the lower court had held a federal statute unconstitu-
tional. In the four Terms of the 1980's there were 33 cases of this
384 Id. at 299.
385 Churchill v. Perini N. River Assocs., 652 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1981).
386 Perini, 459 U.S. at 302 n.8.
387 Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 664 F.2d 463, 468 (5th Cir. 1981), on rehear-
ing, 680 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
388 For other illustrations of this pattern, see Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 562,
567-68 n. 17 (1978) (initially stating that Court granted review "[b]ecause of apparent dif-
ferences among the Courts of Appeals"; later suggesting that all but one of the allegedly
conflicting cases could be reconciled on their facts); cases cited in note 378 supra. See also
Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1319 n.200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (distinguishing decisions
of Tenth and Ninth Circuits), rev'd sub nom. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feld-
man, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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kind.389 All but 3 were brought to the Court by appeal,390 and in all
but 3 the United States government was the party seeking re-
view.391 Of equal importance, there were no cases during this pe-
riod in which the Court refused to consider a properly presented
government claim that a lower court had erred in striking down an
act of Congress.3 92
As this discussion suggests, lower court decisions holding fed-
eral statutes unconstitutional are usually easy to identify, and the
grant of plenary review can be predicted with great confidence.
When the subject of an invalidating decision is not an act of Con-
gress but a policy or program of an executive department or admin-
istrative agency, and the basis for the ruling is not the Constitution
but a statute,3 93 analyzing the operation of the certiorari practice
becomes somewhat more difficult. The reason lies in the process
that brings federal government cases to the Supreme Court.3 94
When a government agency loses a case in a court of appeals, it can
389 Curiously, in the last three Terms of the 1970's the Court confronted only 13 such
cases. As an a priori matter, it is tempting to speculate that the increase in the number of
lower court decisions holding federal statutes unconstitutional came about as a result of
President Carter's appointments to the bench. However, examination of the cases discloses
that only a small minority can be attributed to Carter appointees. Probably a more signifi-
cant factor was the repeal in 1976 of the law requiring a three-judge district court in suits
seeking injunctions against the enforcement of federal statutes on the ground of unconsti-
tutionality. Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976) (repealing 28 U.S.C. § 2282). More
than half of the appeals from single-judge rulings in the first four Terms of the 1980's were
cases that would have been heard by three-judge courts prior to the 1976 reform. That
requirement surely would have reduced the likelihood that an act of Congress would be
struck down as a result of the idiosyncratic views of a single judge. In this regard it is
relevant to note that notwithstanding the wide spectrum of attitudes among the Burger
Court Justices, half of the appeals from single-judge courts were reversed with no more
than one dissent. This suggests that many of the holdings of unconstitutionality did reflect
views far from the mainstream of constitutional thinking.
390 The certiorari cases were Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480
(1983); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (UTUv. LIRR); and
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). The United States was not a party to
Verlinden or UTU v. LIRR, and DiFrancesco was a criminal prosecution. Thus neither case
came within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982). (The government sought leave to inter-
vene in Verlinden, but the court of appeals denied the motion.)
391 In 2 of the cases the United States supported the private party's request for review.
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983); Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982). In United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455
U.S. 678 (1982), the United States supported the petitioner on the merits but did not file a
brief at the certiorari stage, probably because it did not have the opportunity to do so;
review was granted only a few weeks after the petition was filed.
392 Two cases were dismissed for want ofjurisdiction. FCC v. League of Women Voters,
104 S. Ct. 3574 (1984); EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 S. Ct. 3499 (1984). The former was
a companion case to a plenary decision; the latter drew a dissent from two Justices. One
appeal was dismissed by stipulation of the parties after probable jurisdiction was noted.
Schweiker v. Rosofsky, 457 U.S. 1141 (1982). A fourth case became moot before the Court
could reach the merits. National Org. for Women v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
393 See note 398 infra.
394 For descriptions of the process, see S. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL
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seek review in the Supreme Court only if the Solicitor General
agrees to file the petition. The Solicitor General carefully screens
agency requests and files only those he thinks are truly worthy of
the Court's attention.3 95 Thus the narrow holding or the judgment
resting on an unusual set of facts is not likely ever to reach the
Court (except perhaps in the realm of criminal procedure), 396 and
the cases that do come before the Justices almost always involve
issues that at least arguably implicate government policies of some
general importance.
In this light, it would be quite defensible to simply assume that
every government petition reflects a compelling governmental in-
terest, and leave it at that. However, in classifying the cases in the
study, I have taken a more skeptical approach, asking whether the
lower court's ruling, if followed, would require the government to
revise a policy of general applicability or modify the operation of a
national program. 397 In the four Terms of the 1980's, between 25
and 35 plenary decisions appeared to fit this description.
3 98
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 105-07 (2d ed. 1984); Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme Court: The
Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 YALE L.J. 1442, 1453-59 (1969).
395 Rex Lee, who served as Solicitor General during the 1981 through 1984 Terms,
stated that his office sought review in "about one of six cases" that government agencies
asked him to take to the Supreme Court. Lauter, Lee Reflects on His Tenure as Solicitor General,
Nat'l LJ., May 13, 1985, at 5.
396 See United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1594 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983), discussed in note 490 infra.
397 See, e.g., Petition for Certiorari at 12-13, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984)
("The decision of the court of appeals, which declares invalid the Executive's adjustment of
[the United States' wide-ranging Cuban embargo] with respect to one subject-transactions
related to tourist and business travel-gives Cuba the opportunity to earn substantial sums
of hard currency that it can use to advance activities inimical to the interest of the United
States."); Petition for Certiorari at 17-18, Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (The
decision below "would . . . require the [Immigration] Service to admit every alien with a
claim to lawful permanent resident status, notwithstanding the determination by the immi-
gration inspector. . . that the alien is probably excludable for engaging in such violations
as smuggling drugs or aliens."); Petition for Certiorari at 11, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280
(1981) ("Henceforth, any person seeking to challenge the revocation or denial of a passport
pursuant to [a regulation] will file suit in the District of Columbia. . . . [T]he inability to
deny and revoke passports on national security grounds will significantly impair discharge
of [the] duties [of the Executive] in the volatile international arena.").
398 In some instances the government sought review not so much to vindicate a policy as
to avoid the prospect of litigation or liability in a large number of cases. For example, in
United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201 (1982), the government argued that the Court of
Claims' holding that it was empowered to review administrative determinations of the
amount of benefits payable under Part B of the Medicare program "threaten[ed] to intrude
the [court] into the carriers' day-to-day administration of the. . . program" and to "strain
the scarce resources of the Secretary in defending against relatively minor monetary
claims." Petition for Certiorari at 15-16. Along similar lines, the petition in Ruckleshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983), contended that the District of Columbia Circuit, in inter-
preting the attorneys' fees provision of an environmental statute, "ha[d] established a pre-
cedent that threaten[ed] to impose substantial burdens on the federal courts, administrative
agencies and the Justice Department by encouraging unproductive, expensive and time-
consuming litigation." Petition for Certiorari at 8. (Most of the petition, however, was
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For the Justices themselves, the government's portrayal of the
likely consequences of the decision below carries great weight-
more so in some areas of federal regulation than in others. At one
extreme is environmental law. In the seven Terms of the later Bur-
ger Court there were 14 plenary decisions interpreting modern en-
vironmental legislation. All but 2 of these were heard at the behest
of the Solicitor General.399 During this same period the Court did
not reject a single government petition in an environmental case.
400
In other words, this segment of the docket was shaped almost en-
tirely by the decisions of the Solicitor General.
No other area of the law quite matches this record, but a few
come close. In the same seven Terms the Court handed down 9
decisions involving the rights of armed forces personnel and other
issues relating to government employment.40 1 All but one had
been brought to the Court by the government.40 2 And no govern-
ment petitions were rejected.
I have already pointed out that in the last few years the Court
has begun to take a greater interest in the statutory issues raised by
the federal government's administration of the Social Security
Act.40 3 This development can be attributed in large part to the
combined effect of lower court decisions rejecting the govern-
ment's legal position and the Solicitor General's determinations
that these rulings were important enough to warrant Supreme
Court review. Five Social Security cases reached the plenary docket
in the first four Terms of the 1980's. All were brought to the Court
devoted to showing why the court of appeals was wrong.) In United States v. Clark, 454
U.S. 555 (1982), the Solicitor General argued that a Court of Claims ruling on an "impor-
tant issue involving the pay of federal employees threaten[ed] to impose substantial mone-
tary liability on the United States without Congressional authorization." Petition for
Certiorari at 7. I have generally excluded cases of this kind from the category of "compel-
ling governmental interests;" rather, I see them as involving doubtful recurring issues. See
section IV(C) infra. On the other hand, I have included a few cases in which lower courts
overturned administrative or executive practices on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Immi-
gration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984); Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
399 The two exceptions were Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), in which the
Court reversed the lower court's judgment over the opposition of the Solicitor General;
and Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978), a criminal prosecution
with constitutional overtones. See Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 622.
400 One government petition was summarily vacated for reconsideration in light of a
plenary decision in which the Government prevailed. United States Envtl. Protection
Agency v. Northern Plains Resource Council, 104 S. Ct. 54 (1983).
401 This figure does not include Title VII cases in which the government was the defend-
ant-employer. E.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711
(1983).
402 The one exception was a case in which the Court resolved a long-simmering issue
that had given rise to an intercircuit conflict. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460
U.S. 190 (1983); see Hruska Commission Report, supra note 356, at 283-84.
403 See notes 294-96 supra and accompanying text.
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by the government, and all resulted in government victories. Four
additional government cases were reversed or vacated summarily
during this period; there were none in which review was denied.40 4
Litigation arising out of proceedings in the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC") and its predecessor the Federal
Power Commission ("FPC") presents a somewhat more equivocal
picture. In the seven Terms 1977-1983, all 6 of the Court's deci-
sions reviewing FERC rulings came in cases brought to the Court
by the government. And the government won at least a partial vic-
tory in 5 of the 6 cases-the exception being an affirmance by an
equally divided Court.40 5 But the Court turned down 5 additional
cases in which the lower court had overturned a FERC decision and
the Solicitor General sought review. These data suggest that on the
basis of the petition and response the Justices make a preliminary
determination of the correctness of the judgment below, and that
ordinarily review is granted only if five or more Justices believe that
the lower court erred in rejecting the government's position.
Freedom of Information Act litigation presents an interesting
variation on this pattern. From 1977 through 1983 the Court re-
jected only 2 government petitions involving FOIA issues.40 6 And
the 5 FOIA cases that reached the plenary docket in the 1980's
were all brought to the Court by the government. In the last three
Terms of the 1970's only 2 out of 6 decisions were generated by
government petitions, but in 3 of the 4 other cases the government
supported the private party's application for review (and in the
fourth case it supported the petitioner on the merits). 40 7 In other
words, there was only one case in all seven Terms in which certio-
rari was granted over the government's opposition. And in all but
one of the plenary decisions the government won at least a partial
victory.40 8 Thus, with FOIA as with FERC, the Court seldom grants
review except when it is prepared to sustain the government's
position.409
Another variation on this pattern can be seen in the segment of
the docket devoted to residual issues involving government regula-
tion of business, primarily in the areas of banking, finance, and
404 The picture in the late 1970's was very different. See note 295 supra and accompany-
ing text.
405 FERC v. Shell Oil Co., 440 U.S. 192 (1979).
406 Long v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980); Willamette Indus., Inc. v. United States, 689 F.2d 865 (9th Cir.
1982) (relying on Long), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1052 (1983).
407 See Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 620 n.448.
408 The exception was Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102 (1980).




communications. Government petitions generated 13 out of the 19
plenary decisions in the later Burger Court, while 10 government
applications were turned down.410 In most of the rejected cases the
lower court had struck down an agency policy of broad applicabil-
ity.4 1 1 On the other hand, in the cases that did reach the plenary
docket, the results were overwhelmingly favorable to the govern-
ment: there was only one decision among the 13 in which the
agency failed to win at least a partial victory.4 12 Here too the data
imply that the Justices consider the merits as well as the importance
of the decision below in deciding whether to hear a case. But in
contrast to the FERC and FOIA segments of the docket, the Court
also accepted a few petitions that did not have the support of the
Solicitor General, and even took some cases in which the govern-
ment opposed the grant of review.413
These areas, of course, do not mark the full extent to which the
composition of the plenary docket is shaped by the Solicitor Gen-
eral's perceptions of what issues require a decision at the national
level. For example, in the preceding section of this article, I identi-
fied several segments of the Court's statutory work that are domi-
nated by conflict resolution. The two largest of these are taxation
and crimes. Only a minority of the cases in those areas were actu-
ally brought to the Court by the Solicitor General, but that fact
does not tell the full story. In most of the other cases that reached
the plenary docket, the government supported the petition for re-
view filed by a private party. And only a handful of the petitions
that the government did file failed to receive the requisite four
votes.4 14
410 Only 4 petitions were denied in the four Terms of the 1980's, compared with 6 in the
last three Terms of the 1970's. However, it would be wrong to attach much significance to
the relatively large number of rejected applications in the 1977-1979 period. For one
thing, the cases tend to be sui generis. For another, preliminary data on the certiorari
practice in the early and middle 1970's suggest that the 1977-1979 Terms were not repre-
sentative of the full decade.
411 Among the cases in the 1980-1983 Terms, 2 stand out: Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673
F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) (agency exceeded authority by using adjudication rather than
rulemaking to establish "new law" on rights of debtor in automobile repossession), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982) (White and O'Connor,JJ., dissenting); Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan v.
Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1981) (agency's statutory authority to
order savings and loan associations to cease and desist from "unsafe or unsound" practices
does not permit agency to impose standard of fairness in S&L loan transactions), cert. denied,
458 U.S. 1121 (1982). For discussion of the cases in the last three Terms of the 1970's, see
Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 608 & nn.382-83.
412 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The government's position did
gain the support of three Justices.
413 Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors (Schwab), 104 S. Ct. 3003 (1984);
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors (Bankers Trust), 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984);
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
414 In the seven Terms of the later Burger Court, the Justices rejected 6 government
petitions in tax cases and 3 involving the definition of federal crimes and penalties. One of
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Taken together, these data point to a recurring pattern that
dominates the segments of the docket devoted to taxation and
crimes; it can also be seen, less prominently, in other areas of statu-
tory law. When the government's position on a recurring issue is
rejected by a court of appeals, the government does not ordinarily
ask the Supreme Court to grant review unless the decision creates
an intercircuit conflict.415 Rather, the government adheres to its
the tax cases was, in essence, a cross-petition raising a procedural issue; the government
had won on the merits in the court below. Puerto Rico v. Blumenthal, 642 F.2d 622 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981). Another tax case and 2 of the criminal cases
were held for plenary decisions that rejected the government's position. Delta Metalform-
ing Co. v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 906 (1982)
(held for United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982)); United States v. Sher,
657 F.2d 28 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, 661 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121
(1982) (held for Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982)); United States v. Mearns,
599 F.2d 1296 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 934 (1980) (held for Bifulco v. United
States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980)). The remaining criminal case raised a problem of statutory
interpretation created by an inadvertent omission in the codification of the Interstate Com-
merce Act. See United States v. RSR Corp., 664 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1016 (1982). Corrective legislation was well advanced in Congress at the time the govern-
ment's petition was filed (as the government acknowledged), and indeed the bill became
law soon thereafter. Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 427, 96 Stat. 2097, 2168 (1983) (amending 49
U.S.C. § 11909(b) (1982)). Denial of review in the other 4 tax cases is more difficult to
understand. The 2 cases in the 1977-1979 Terms are discussed in Plenary Docket II, supra
note 13, at 615-17; the more recent petitions are considered in note 415 infra.
415 Acknowledged or otherwise indisputable conflicts were present in all but 2 of the
cases in these two areas that received plenary consideration at the government's behest.
The 2 remaining cases may well have involved conflicts, but other reasons for review were
probably of greater concern both to the government and to the Court. Thus, in United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984), the government claimed a conflict
with the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1927 (1984). But the main thrust of the petition was that the
court below, the Second Circuit, had "created an accountant work-product privilege, under
the rationale of an accountant-client privilege, that threaten[ed] to impede the Internal
Revenue Service's tax investigations of public corporations." Petition for Certiorari at 6.
Moreover, although the Fifth Circuit had questioned the Second Circuit's reasoning, 682
F.2d at 540-41, it had also stated, "We need not reach the issue of an accountant work
product doctrine because the IRS here summoned the tax pool analysis from the taxpayer
itself, not from an independent accountant," id. at 537-38 n.7. The government also
claimed a conflict in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), but even more than in
Arthur Young, other considerations probably prompted both the request for review and the
Court's decision to hear the case. See Plenary Docket II, supra note 13, at 620-21 n.449.
The government filed 4 unsuccessful petitions involving recurring issues of tax law. In
2 of them, the lower court had acknowledged a conflict. Estate of Van Home v. Commis-
sioner, 720 F.2d 1114, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2364 (1984); Hotel
Conquistador, Inc. v. United States, 597 F.2d 1348, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1032 (1980). (The taxpayer in Hotel Conquistador argued, however, that the other cir-
cuit's ruling was "no longer viable as precedent" because of an intervening Supreme Court
decision. Brief in Opposition at 8-9; see Plenary Docket H, supra, at 616.) In another of the
cases, the court below pointed to disarray in the circuits but expressed doubt that a "true
split" existed. Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 273 n.4 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). The fourth case certainly did not present an acknowledged con-
flict; nevertheless, the government made a strong argument for review. United States v.
Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2363 (1984). See Petition
for Certiorari at 29 (asserting that the lower court's holding "will encourage the prolifera-
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position until its view gains acceptance in another circuit. At that
point a certiorari petition may well be filed by the party opposing
the government. If that happens, the government will acquiesce in
the grant of review. If it does not, the government will continue to
litigate the issue, either in circuits where its position has already
been rejected or in circuits that have not passed on the point.
Sooner or later it will lose a case that can be taken to the Supreme
Court so that the conflict will be resolved.416
C. Doubtful Recurring Issues
In the third group of cases, constituting about one-sixth of the
total, there was no acknowledged conflict, nor did the application
for review invoke a compelling governmental interest. Rather,
what could be found in each case was a discrete issue that was
doubtful enough that there would be some efficiency in providing
an authoritative resolution that would forestall further litigation or
at least narrow the range of uncertainty.
Sometimes the issue had already given rise to two or more ap-
pellate decisions, though without a square conflict at the time re-
view was granted.4 17 A good example is Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 4 18 a decision of the 1982 Term. The question was whether
an employer commits an unfair labor practice by disciplining union
officials more severely than other union employees for taking part
in an unlawful work stoppage. The NLRB held that the employer
had violated the Act, and the court of appeals enforced the Board's
order.4 19 The employer filed a certiorari petition claiming an in-
tercircuit conflict on the issue.420 The Solicitor General, in opposi-
tion of abusive tax shelters, as promoters discover that they can avoid criminal responsibil-
ity, even for knowingly fraudulent schemes, if they can but devise a variation not anticipated by
statute, regulation, or case law.") (emphasis in original).
In Bureau of Economic Analysis v. Long, 454 U.S. 934 (1981), the government did not
seek plenary review; rather, it asked the Court to remand the case to the lower court for
reconsideration in light of intervening legislation. The Court acted in accordance with the
government's suggestion.
416 For further discussion of the government's litigation policies, see Hruska Commission
Report, supra note 356, at 349-61; Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 404 n.129 & authori-
ties cited; Bator, Luncheon Address, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REMARKS AND ADDRESSES AT
THE 61ST ANNUAL MEETING 66-72 (1984).
417 In a few cases, a conflict developed after the grant of plenary review. Compare
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 524 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd mem.,
679 F.2d 879 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 459 U.S. 1034 (1982), with Stevens v. Gateway Transp.
Co., 696 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); compare Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 550 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 432 U.S. 905 (1977), with
EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978).
418 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
419 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981).
420 Petition for Certiorari at 20-21, Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693
(1983).
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tion, argued that the principle of the decision below had been
accepted by all of the circuits that had considered the question.421
Reasonable people can differ over whether there was a genuine
conflict, or whether the various decisions could be reconciled on
their particular facts.422 What could not be disputed was that the
question was doubtful and recurring. Five years had passed since a
seminal ruling by the NLRB, and in that time the issue had been the
subject of several major appellate opinions and had generated sub-
stantial disagreement among the judges as to what considerations
were relevant and how much weight they should be given.423 Thus
the case was certworthy irrespective of whether or not there was a
true conflict.
In cases like Metropolitan Edison, review was justified because of
disarray in the circuits that arguably stopped short of actual con-
flict.424 That kind of disharmony was not present in all of the multi-
ple-appellate-decision cases, but sometimes the petitioner was able
to point to other circumstances that pointed to the desirability of
Supreme Court intervention. Consider, for example, Morrison-
Knudsen Construction Co. v. Director, OWCP,425 another decision of the
1982 Term. In supporting the petition for certiorari, the Solicitor
General (representing the nominal respondent) conceded that the
decision below was the first to hold that fringe benefits are "wages"
for the purpose of computing compensation benefits under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.426 But
he urged the Court to hear the case anyway and to reverse the judg-
ment. He noted that the court of appeals had "upset[ ] a long-es-
tablished administrative construction of the LHWCA." 427 This
strongly suggested that the issue was at least doubtful. But the
421 Brief for the NLRB in Opposition at 8-9.
422 Determining whether an intercircuit conflict existed is made more difficult by the fact
that arguably inconsistent decisions had been issued within two of the circuits that had
considered the questions. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478, 482 n. 1 (3d
Cir. 1981) (implying conflict with a decision of the Seventh Circuit, but noting that a later
Seventh Circuit case "appears to have limited the scope of" the earlier ruling); id at 484
(Van Dusen, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority decision is contrary to Third Circuit
precedent).
423 See, e.g., Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1080 (1983).
424 Other illustrations are Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, Furniture Store
Drivers v. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. 2557, 2563 (1984) (Court granted review "[b]ecause of the
confusion evident among the lower federal courts"); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 104 S. Ct.
1621, 1627 (1984) (similar); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 423 (1981) (Court
granted certiorari "[b]ecause of continuing uncertainty as to whether closed containers
found during a lawful warrantless search of an automobile may themselves be searched
without a warrant").
425 461 U.S. 624 (1983).
426 Brief for the Federal Respondent at 5.
427 Id. at 3.
[Vol. 60:947
CASE SELECTION
Benefits Review Board, acquiescing in the court of appeals deci-
sion, had announced its intention to apply the decision on a nation-
wide basis. The Solicitor General argued that this development
"will require substantial efforts by insurers to readjust the workers'
insurance program to account for the higher benefit payments that
will result."428 Perhaps that prediction was overstated; even so,
there could be no doubt that the question would recur, and in fact,
while the petition was pending, another circuit endorsed the con-
struction of the statute adopted by the lower court in Morrison-
Knudsen.429
A decision like Morrison-Knudsen forestalls the development of a
conflict that could otherwise have been anticipated in light of the
evidence of plausible contrary views on a recurring issue.430 The
case for immediate review was much weaker in Alfred L. Snapp &
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,431 a decision of the 1981 Term. The petition
presented the question whether "a state has standing as parens pa-
triae to rectify alleged employment discrimination against a small
number of its citizens in another jurisdiction." 432 The court below,
the Fourth Circuit, had upheld the state's standing. The petitioners
did not argue that this ruling created an intercircuit conflict, nor
did they point to confusion or disarray in the lower courts. Rather,
they emphasized the novelty of the holding below and the prospect
that it would "open up the federal courts to a whole new class of
lawsuit."4 33
A single decision by one court of appeals did not provide a
great deal of support for this dire prophecy. But while the petition
was pending, a similar case reached the Second Circuit. Citing
Snapp, that court too allowed the plaintiff-state to bring suit.43 4 The
Supreme Court held the Snapp petition a few months longer, then
granted review. 435 Upon plenary consideration, the Fourth Cir-
cuit's judgment was affirmed unanimously.
428 Id at 5.
429 Duncanson-Harrelson Co. v. Director, OWCP, 686 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982), va-
cated, 462 U.S. 1101 (1983).
430 Sometimes the evidence suggesting that a conflict might ultimately develop will be
furnished by the holdings of one or more district courts. Thus the cases discussed at note
440 infra can be regarded as more akin to the Metropolitan Edison or Morrison-Knudsen model
than to the case of first impression.
431 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
432 Petition for Certiorari at 15.
433 Id
434 Puerto Rico v. Bramkamp, 654 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121
(1982).
435 The Snapp petition was filed in February 1981. See 49 U.S.L.W. 3573 (U.S. Feb. 2,
1981). No action had been taken by the Court when the 1980 Term ended in early July of
that year. During the summer the Second Circuit issued its decision in Bramkamp; also, the
Third Circuit handed down a fragmented en banc decision in a case involving a state's
parens patriae standing in a very different context. Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306 (3d
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Some observers may be surprised by the Court's acceptance of
an expansive approach toward standing, even in this unique con-
text,43 6 but for present purposes what is striking about the case is
the fact that the Court agreed to hear it at all. Admittedly, it cannot
be said that the question was open-and-shut; the district courts in
both cases had rejected the assertion of parens patriae standing, and
so had a dissenting judge in the Fourth Circuit.43 7 To that extent
the Court did settle an issue that might have otherwise have contin-
ued to generate litigation. Yet in view of the consistent holdings by
the only two circuits that had passed on the question, the marginal
gain in certainty from a Supreme Court decision-especially an af-
firmance-was surely very small.
438
The remaining cases in this group were, in essence, cases of
first impression;439 however, the issue presented was one of wide
applicability, so that an authoritative ruling would resolve, to one
degree or another, many similar disputes. 440 In each of the cases,
the petitioner or appellant persuaded the Court that there were
good reasons for deciding the question immediately, rather than
awaiting further litigation.441
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982). Certiorari was not granted in Snapp until late
November 1981.
436 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 215-21 (1983).
437 These points were emphasized by the certiorari petition in the Second Circuit case,
although the petitioner conceded that "there [was] no conflict between circuits." Petition
for Certiorari at 22, Bramkamp v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
438 In Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court denied parens
patriae standing to a state, but the Fourth Circuit in Snapp cited that decision with approval,
and both majority and dissent agreed that it provided the framework for analysis. See
Puerto Rico v. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, 632 F.2d 365, 368-69 (4th Cir. 1980); id. at 370-71
(Hall, J., dissenting).
439 In a few cases the Court granted review to decide whether to modify or overrule an
existing line of precedents. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984)
("We granted certiorari to consider the propriety of" modifying the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule "so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-
faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective."); Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2736 (1984) ("We granted certiorari
to reexamine the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine" in antitrust).
440 In a few of the cases the issue had been addressed by one or more district courts at
the time review was granted, sometimes with results contrary to that of the appellate opin-
ion. Compare Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), with
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1029 (1lth Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2229
(1984); compare Edmondson v. Simon, 87 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Ill. 1980), with Nakshian v.
Claytor, 628 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156
(1981).
A difference of opinion between one court of appeals and a district court in another
circuit has never been treated as a conflict for the purpose of Supreme Court review. See
Harlan, supra note 55, at 552; R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 202, at 278-80. Thus I
do not include these among the "conflict" cases. However, the existence of a conflicting
district court decision certainly reinforces the point that the question is doubtful and
recurring.
441 For reasons I have developed elsewhere, the Court generally prefers to defer resolu-
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Sometimes the application for review argued that federalism
values were at stake. A state whose law or practice had been struck
down by a federal court would emphasize the threat to legitimate
policies shared by other states;442 an enterprise whose federal claim
had been rejected by a state court would warn of large-scale inter-
ference with national interests. 443 Arguments of this kind had spe-
cial force when the cases came to the Court, as they often did, on
appeal, because summary affirmance would settle the issue, at least
provisionally, for the entire nation.44
4
This particular exigency was not present in the cases that were
brought to the Court by certiorari. Instead, the petitioner argued
that although the lower court's ruling was binding as a precedent
only in a single state or circuit, it engendered grave uncertainty at
the level of primary activity in an important segment of the nation's
economy or political structure. A good example is Bankamerica
Corp. v. United States,445 a decision of the 1982 Term. This was a test
case of the federal government's position that section 8 of the Clay-
ton Act prohibits interlocking directorates between a bank and a
competing insurance company. The practice had been a common
one for many years, but the Ninth Circuit held, in agreement with
tion of a recurring issue until the question has been explored by several circuits. See Intercir-
cuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 404-06; see also California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2073-74
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); notes 453-54 infra and accompanying text.
442 See, e.g., Petition for Certiorari at 7, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
104 S. Ct. 900 (1984) (state, asserting novel eleventh amendment doctrine ultimately
adopted by the Court, argued that court of appeals decision, unless reversed, "will give
federal courts a free hand in the management of state programs despite the absence of any
federal interest at all."); Petition for Certiorari at 45, Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984)
(state, challenging Ninth Circuit's decision requiring comparative proportionality review in
death penalty cases, argued that the opinion below "raise[d] a whole new stumbling block
affecting the majority of death judgments throughout the nation."). See also Washington v.
United States, 460 U.S. 536 (1983) (amicus brief supporting grant of plenary review filed by
state of California and by Multistate Tax Commission).
443 See, e.g. ,Jurisdictional Statement at 25-26, Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) ("California and other states are establishing [fiscal] barriers" that
"conflict[] with federal policy and adversely affect[] foreign commerce"); Jurisdictional
Statement at 12, 14, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) ("The
[decision] below foreshadows grave practical consequences for this nation in that it can
only lead to serious division between those states which have access to energy resources
and those which do not. . . . iThere is a serious danger that other states will follow Mon-
tana's lead if the result below is permitted to stand."). Claims of this kind-in cases from
federal as well as state courts-sometimes received support from the Solicitor General. See,
e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) ("The court of ap-
peals' decision sustaining [a state statute], if not reversed, will afford significant encourage-
ment to nascent state efforts to eliminate nuclear power as an alternative source.").
444 See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Wash-
ington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536 (1983); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453
U.S. 609 (1981).
445 462 U.S. 122 (1983).
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the government, that it violated the statute.446 The Solicitor Gen-
eral, opposing the grant of review, emphasized that "the decision
below [was] the law only of the Ninth Circuit." 447 He also assured
the Court that insurance companies, banks, and their directors else-
where in the nation who disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision
would not expose themselves to criminal or treble damages liability
by maintaining the status quo.4 4 8 The petitioners, on the other
hand, insisted that without definitive guidance from the Supreme
Court, the lower court's ruling could set in motion "a wholesale
reordering of the managing bodies of a large segment of the finan-
cial community. '
' 449
Of particular interest here, the experienced counsel represent-
ing the petitioners also sought to anticipate and rebut the objection
that Supreme Court review should await further consideration of
the issue by other circuits. They argued that the case presented "a
pure legal question," that the issue was "precisely framed," and
that the majority and dissenting opinions in the court of appeals
were "as thorough expositions of the issue as the Court could rea-
sonably expect, however many circuits might plow the same
ground." 450
The opinions below were indeed thorough, but I suspect that
the able judges who authored them would have been the first to
agree that they had not necessarily said the last word on the sub-
ject. In all likelihood, what persuaded the Court to grant certiorari
was the probable impact of the Ninth Circuit's decision, coupled
with a preliminary view, shared by at least four Justices, that the
decision was wrong-the view that ultimately prevailed. The same
combination of circumstances probably explains the grant of review
in Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories,451 another
1982 Term case. The question there was whether the Robinson-
Patman Act applies to the sale of pharmaceutical products to state
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with pri-
446 United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1982).
447 Brief for the United States in Opposition at 19.
448 Id.
449 Petition for Certiorari at 8. Elaborating upon this point, the petition stated:
Since corporations may be sued under the antitrust laws wherever they are found
or transact business,. . . the court of appeals' decision would have a direct impact
on every bank holding company, bank and insurance company that does business
within the Ninth Circuit, regardless of its principal location. Thus, it would apply
to a significant number of financial institutions throughout the country. . ..
Moreover, as the only decision on this question, the court of appeals' opinion
would inevitably have a significant impact even on those banks and insurance com-
panies that are not found in the Ninth Circuit.
Id. at 7.
450 Id. at 14.
451 460 U.S. 150 (1983).
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vate pharmacies. The Fifth Circuit, the first appellate court to ad-
dress the question, held that it did not, but the Supreme Court
ruled otherwise. Similarly, in Steelworkers v. Sadlowski,452 the Court
reviewed the first decision to consider the validity, under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, of a union rule
prohibiting candidates for union office from accepting campaign
contributions from nonmembers. The District of Columbia Circuit
found that the rule violated the statute; the Supreme Court
disagreed.
When the Court accepts a case of first impression like
Bankamerica Corp. or Sadlowski, the effect is to preempt whatever per-
colation might otherwise have taken place in other circuits or
states. 453 Yet not long ago, all members of the Court joined in an
opinion recognizing the benefits to be had "from permitting several
courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before [the
Supreme] Court grants certiorari." 454 Thus, when the Court does
agree to consider the first appellate ruling on a doubtful recurring
issue, the inference is strong that four or more Justices, after study-
ing the petition and other preliminary papers, were prepared to
conclude that the decision was erroneous. Consistent with this hy-
pothesis, most of the Court's rulings on questions of first impres-
sion resulted in reversals.
455
D. Other Reasons for Granting Plenary Review
Intercourt conflicts, compelling governmental interests, and
doubtful recurring issues account for between two-thirds and three-
quarters of the cases that receive plenary consideration. The re-
maining decisions are a heterogenous group, but several overlap-
ping patterns can be identified.
I begin with a group of cases that is small in numbers but of
great importance from the standpoint of the Court's role in the
American system of government. These are the cases involving dis-
putes between sovereigns: state against state, or a state against the
federal government. As initially conceived, the category was lim-
ited to cases brought to the Court under its original jurisdiction.
452 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
453 See California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2073 (1985) (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("Pre-
mature resolution of the novel question presented has stunted the natural growth and re-
finement of alternative principles.").
454 United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568, 572 (1984). See also Hruska Commission
Report, supra note 356, at 219 (quoting report by Professor Clyde W. Summers) (noting
value of "successive considerations by several courts, each re-evaluating and building upon
the preceding decisions"). See note 441 supra.
455 In addition to the cases previously cited, see, e.g., Summa Corp. v. California, 104 S.
Ct. 1751 (1984); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984); Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984); Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232 (1981).
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Only 9 decisions in the 1980's-19 in all seven Terms of the later
Burger Court-fit this description. However, further reflection on
the "serious and important concerns of federalism" 456 that underlie
the original jurisdiction led me to think that perhaps all cases in-
volving direct clashes between state and federal sovereignties
should be included. If so, the category would expand, but it still
would not constitute a major element of the Court's plenary work.
No more than a dozen additional cases in the 1980's would come
within the broader definition,457 and some of them would surely
have received plenary consideration in any event because of an in-
tercircuit conflict, a decision striking down a federal statute, or
some other compelling reason.
458
A somewhat different picture emerges, at least initially, if we
look at all of the cases that were brought to the Court by state gov-
ernments invoking sovereign prerogatives in opposition to an exer-
cise of power by the national government. In the four Terms of the
1980's the Court rejected about 30 petitions of this kind.459 Many
of them invoked the tenth amendment, either explicitly or implic-
itly;460 others attacked lower court decisions that upheld claims of
national immunity against state regulation or taxation.461 But only
5 of the cases received any votes for plenary consideration.
462
456 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 744 (1981).
457 See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983) (holding that state can-
not revoke its consent to the federal government's acquisition of easements over wetlands
under the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act); United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720
(1982) (holding that contractors managing atomic laboratories owned by the federal gov-
ernment are not instrumentalities of the United States and thus are not immune from state
taxation); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (rejecting federal government's
claim that bed and banks of Big Horn River were held by the United States in trust for an
Indian tribe; holding instead that title to the riverbed passed to the state upon its admission
into the union).
458 See, e.g., Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983) (intercircuit con-
flict); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (government appeal from district courtjudg-
ment holding federal statute unconstitutional).
459 Cases filed by cities or other political subdivisions are not included in this tally. E.g.,
United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
459 U.S. 801 (1982). Nor are cases in which state governments sought to avoid obligations
imposed by federal regulatory programs, but did not invoke grounds directly implicating
state sovereignty. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 620 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir.) (Title VII), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980). The category also excludes cases in which a federal court
rebuffed a state's attempt to invoke the benefits of federal regulation. E.g., South Dakota v.
Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980).
460 E.g., South Dakota v. Goldschmidt, 635 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
984 (1981); New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 (1 st
Cir.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 449 U.S. 806 (1980).
461 E.g., United States v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 650 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir.
1981), afd mem., 456 U.S. 901 (1982); United States v. Maryland, 636 F.2d 73 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1982); United States v. Colorado, 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cir.
1980), aff'd mem. sub nom. Jefferson County v. United States, 450 U.S. 901 (1981).
462 Only 2 cases garnered more than a single vote. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001, 1002 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger CJ., and White, J., dissenting from
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Given that four members of the present Court have expressed
strong sympathy for preserving state prerogatives in exactly this
context,463 it is fair to conclude that the rejected cases did not pres-
ent substantial challenges to the exercise of national power.
The cases involving disputes between national and state sover-
eigns can best be seen as part of the larger segment of the Court's
work that grows out of the tensions inherent in a federal system.
Indeed, if there is a single theme that dominates the cases that do
not readily appear to meet orthodox criteria for plenary review, it is
that of resolving conflicts between state and national power. This
theme finds its principal expression in two classes of decisions:
those in which a state court rejected a federal claim, and those in
which a federal court invalidated state official action.
About one-third of the otherwise unclassified plenary cases
were brought to the Court by individuals or enterprises whose fed-
eral claims had been denied in the state courts.464 Some of the ap-
plicants did not even pretend to raise issues of general importance;
they asserted only that the state court had failed to follow control-
ling federal precedents. 465 In other cases, the certiorari petition or
jurisdictional statement did suggest broader implications, but fo-
cused primarily on the federal error of the decision below.
466
summary affirmance) ("I am troubled by the notion that a district court, by entering what is
in essence a private agreement between parties to a lawsuit, [can] invoke the Supremacy
Clause powers of the Federal Government to preempt state regulatory laws."); Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981)
(Brennan and White, JJ., dissenting).
463 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1027-33
(1985) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
464 This group includes Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Eng'g, P.C., 104 S. Ct. 2267 (1984), a decision that does not fit the classic pattern of Indian
rights litigation, see id. at 2270 (describing the case as "somewhat unusual in a central re-
spect"), but which is appropriately classified with cases in which a litigant has unsuccessfully
invoked federal law in opposition to state power. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3 ("The Supreme Court of North Dakota has closed the
courts of that State to suits by Indians against non-Indians concerning matters arising on
Indian reservations, even though such suits are not barred by any federal statute and do not
impermissibly infringe upon the federally protected sovereignty of the tribes.").
465 See, e.g., Petition for Certiorari at 8, 12, James v. Kentucky, 104 S. Ct. 1830 (1984)
(urging Court to review decision of Kentucky Supreme Court because it "conflicts with the
rationale of" Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981); describing Kentucky court's opinion
as "an obvious attempt. . . to circumvent the mandate of. . .Carter"); Jurisdictional State-
ment at 18, In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (suggesting summary reversal; arguing that
Missouri court's decision "is flatly in conflict with [Supreme Court precedents on commer-
cial speech]" and that "[n]o new constitutional problems are involved."); Petition for Certi-
orari at 7, Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981) (arguing that Louisiana Supreme Court
"has applied the. . . double jeopardy clause in a manner not in accord with the applicable
decisions of this Court" and that its opinion "ignores the clear ruling of the trial court" on
a factual issue).
466 For example, in Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984), the petition made brief
unelaborated references to decisions in other states holding impermissible "the considera-
tion of a subsequent interracial marriage in custody litigation." Petition for Certiorari at
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At first blush, the success of these applications might appear to
reflect acceptance by the Court of the idea that providing another
level of review for correctness is, without more, an appropriate use
of the Justices' time. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact
that on the merits the Court reversed a substantial majority of the
judgments it had agreed to consider.467 But there is another way of
looking at these cases. When a state court rejects an arguably meri-
torious federal claim, the possibility of an erroneous decision 468 im-
plicates concerns about the supremacy of federal law. To be sure,
the generalized hostility to federal rights that once seemed endemic
among state courts has largely disappeared, 469 but the political real-
ities that led the Framers to fear that federal claims would not re-
ceive sympathetic treatment at the hands of state judges may still
18. But the principal argument was that "[t]he holding below, if allowed to stand, would be
completely subversive of the numerous decisions throughout the federal judiciary outlaw-
ing state-enforced racial distinctions." Id. at 19. Similarly, the appellants in Sporhase v.
Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), stated that the issue was "important and substantial," Juris-
dictional Statement at 5, but their application for review was devoted largely to showing the
error in the Nebraska court's decision.
467 Some of the cases that proved to be easy affirmances for the Court may well have
received plenary consideration only because they fell within the obligatory jurisdiction.
E.g., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983); Rod-
riguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982). See notes 479-80 infra and accompa-
nying text. In other cases where the Court ultimately affirmed, the Solicitor General had
filed a memorandum agreeing with the petitioner or appellant that review should be
granted to correct an erroneous application of federal law. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,
463 U.S. 491 (1983); Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
375 (1983). A few cases were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. E.g., Princeton Univ. v.
Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619 (1981).
468 In this context, a decision is "erroneous" if the United States Supreme Court would
find it to be so. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson,J., dissenting) ("We
are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.");
notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
469 To appreciate the change in attitudes, one need only compare two resolutions
adopted by the Conference of State ChiefJustices, one in 1958, the other in 1982. In 1958,
the state judges contended that the Supreme Court "too often has tended to adopt the role
of policy-maker without proper judicial restraint." Report of the Committee on Federal State
Relationships As Affected by Judicial Decisions, 32 STATE GOV'T 60, 72 (1959). They expressed
"grave concern as to whether individual views of... a majority [of the Court], as to what is
wise or desirable do not unconsciously override a more dispassionate consideration of what
is or is not constitutionally warranted." Id. at 73; see also Resolution on Federal-State Relation-
ships As AffectingJudicial Decisions, 32 STATE GOV'T 74 (1959) (adopting committee report by a
vote of 36 to 8). A generation later, when the Supreme Court was again under attack for its
decisions favoring civil liberties claims, the statejudgbs spoke out against proposed legisla-
tion designed to eliminate the Court's jurisdiction over particular types of constitutional
cases. Although the legislation, if enacted, would have put an end to exactly the kind of
scrutiny that the state judges of 1958 found so irksome, their successors in 1982 "ex-
press[ed their] concern about the impact of these bills on state courts and view[ed] them as
a hazardous experiment with the vulnerable fabric of the nation's judicial systems." See 128
CONG. REC. S11,611 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Baucus). See generally Bator,
The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 629-31 &
passim (1981); O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts From the
Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 813-14 (1981).
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have their effect in particular controversies. 470 And although the
national interest does not require that the Court intervene every
time a state court fails to give due recognition to the commands of
the Constitution or an act of Congress, 471 the supremacy of federal
law would be placed at risk if the corrective process were brought
into play so infrequently that it no longer appeared to present a
real check on the forces of parochialism. 472 Thus it is understand-
able-and consistent with the Court's historic mission-that the
Justices would give plenary consideration to at least some cases in
which state courts have rejected federal claims even in the absence
of an issue of broader importance.
When a federal court strikes down state official action by ac-
cepting a federal claim of dubious merit, it poses no threat to the
supremacy of federal law. But if the decision gives undue weight to
the federal interest, it does endanger the countervailing values that
Justice Black sought to epitomize by the slogan "Our Federal-
ism." 4 7 Thus, if one accepts Justice Black's premise that the na-
tional government should protect federal rights, but "always
endeavor[] to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States," 474 cases of this kind can be seen
as the federalism-based counterparts of the supremacy clause cases
from state courts.
There can be no doubt that the Burger Court does largely
share the vision of the federal system articulated by Justice Black.
This attitude can be seen in the substance of the Court's deci-
sions;475 it also helps to explain the presence on the plenary docket
of a substantial cluster of otherwise unclassified cases-about equal
in number to the state court cases just discussed-in which federal
courts struck down state official action in response to the perceived
commands of federal law. Typically, the applications for review
were filed by state officials. 476 Some argued only error;477 others at
470 See generally Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977); but see
Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of
Judicial Parity, 10 HAST7NGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983).
471 See note 57 supra.
472 See Bator, supra note 469, at 635-36; Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword-
Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95
HARV. L. REV. 17, 55 (1981); Stolz, supra note 57, at 959-60; Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1043, 1062 (1977).
473 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
474 Id.
475 See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 906-08 &
passim (1984); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35
(1976).
476 In a few cases, review was sought by officials of a municipality or other political sub-
division. See, e.g., Escambia County v. McMillan, 104 S. Ct. 1577 (1984). Sometimes the
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least made an effort to suggest that the ruling below presented an
issue of general importance.
478
The supremacy and federalism cases have something else in
common: a high proportion of them came to the Court by appeal
rather than by writ of certiorari. Indeed, appeals probably ac-
counted for more than half of the unclassified decisions reviewing
state court rulings that rejected federal claims. But the high per-
centage of appeals should come as no surprise. To be sure, the
Court has the option of affirming summarily in cases that fall within
its mandatory jurisdiction; yet as previously pointed out, the obliga-
tion to decide the merits (and thus to establish a nationally binding
precedent) sometimes leads the Court to give plenary consideration
to an appeal even though the same case would have been denied
review if it had come up on certiorari. 479 Some appeal cases that
would probably have been rejected if the Court had not been con-
banner of states' rights was carried by a private litigant. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
477 See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S. Ct. 944
(1984); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
In Yount, the state as petitioner claimed a conflict with a Supreme Cotirt decision and with a
decision of the state supreme court; the latter, of course, is inevitable in any case where a
federal court grants habeas relief to a state prisoner. The petitioner in Wiggins conceded
that the issue presented was "one of first impression; apparently in any jurisdiction"; he
argued that the decision below "represent[ed] an unwarranted extension of the principle
established by this Court in Faretta [v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)]." Petition for Certi-
orari at 6-7. In Lonberger, the petitioner made no suggestion that a similar case had ever
arisen in any other court before, let alone that there was any sort of conflict. The applica-
tion for review in Smith v. Phillips was so single-mindedly devoted to the assertion of error
that its final paragraph merits quotation in full:
We recognize that certiorari is rarely granted and the record here shows that
the trial prosecutor was clearly wrong. But that wrongful conduct did not preju-
dice Phillips and it makes poor sense and worse law to punish the people of New
York State by requiring a new trial twelve years after the crime (with all of the
attendant problems) for a corrupt police officer who was convicted of two murders
on overwhelming proof of guilt by twelve jurors, not one of whom has been found
to be anything but impartial. By seeking certiorari, we seek no vindication for the
trial prosecutor. Rather, we seek vindication of the accepted legal principles from
which the court below so clearly departed, thereby unjustifiably interfering in a
most significant state criminal prosecution.
Petition for Certiorari at 16.
478 See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983); Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
In Slappy, the petitioner said in a footnote that the court of appeals decision was "also
inconsistent with the requirement of other circuits that prejudice be shown when counsel is
substituted over the defendant's objection," Petition for Certiorari at 20 n.6; however, the
principal theme of the request for review was that the Ninth Circuit's decision had "created
a totally new Sixth Amendment right" and was "contrary to one of this Court's decisions,"
id. at 9. Similarly, the appellant in Larsen claimed an intercircuit conflict on an issue of
standing, Jurisdictional Statement at 23-24, but primarily argued that the lower court's de-
cision was "a particularly grievous and unjust federal court intrusion into state legislative
action," id. at 9.
479 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 60:9471038
CASE SELECTION
strained to reach the merits are listed in the margin.4 0
The complementary interests in supremacy and "Our Federal-
ism" are implicated only in an attenuated way when a federal court
upholds the exercise of state power or a state court repudiates state
official action in response to a federal claim. Consistent with this
analysis, neither of these two classes of cases appears in large num-
bers among the otherwise unclassified plenary decisions. In fact,
the total number of cases of either kind that received plenary con-
sideration is rather small. In the first four Terms of the 1980's,
there were only 27 cases in which review was granted at the behest
of a litigant whose federal challenge to state official action had been
rejected by a federal court.481 And most of these involved in-
tercourt conflicts or other circumstances suggesting an issue of
general importance. No more than a handful of claimants' petitions
reached the plenary docket in the absence of such
considerations.4
8 2
Cases in which a state court subordinated state law to the per-
ceived commands of federal statutes or constitutional provisions
were somewhat more numerous, and a great deal more controver-
sial.48 3 In the same four Terms there were 35 plenary decisions of
this kind. What is more important, only a minority of them appear
to have involved intercourt conflicts or other orthodox justifica-
tions for review. Some of the petitioning officials did not even at-
tempt to show that issues of general importance were at stake.48
4
480 Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983);
Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1
(1982); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
481 Two of the cases were appeals from three-judge district courts. McCain v. Lybrand,
104 S. Ct. 1037 (1984); Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
482 In 4 cases not involving conflicts the Solicitor General supported the request for
review, arguing that the decision below was inconsistent with congressional policies. Capi-
tal Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Con-
servation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265 (1982).
The grant of certiorari in Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) is something of a
puzzle. The petitioners challenged a state statute imposing a residency requirement for
"minors who wish[ed] to attend public free schools while living apart from their parents or
guardians." Id at 322; see also note 303 supra. There was no conflict between circuits or
between state courts; on the contrary, the decision below was the first to consider a claim
such as the plaintiffs'. The lower court had upheld the statute, and the Supreme Court
affirmed with only one dissent. Although the Court described the issue as important, 461
U.S. at 325, nothing in the opinion explains why authoritative resolution could not have
awaited further consideration in the lower courts.
483 For a sampling of the controversy, compare Welsh, Whose Federalism?-The Burger
Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties Judgments, 10 HASINGS CONST. L.Q. 819 (1983) (gener-
ally critical of the Court's approach), with Schlueter, Judicial Federalism and Supreme Court
Review of State Court Decisions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079 (1984)
(generally sympathetic).
484 See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2536 (1984); Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637
(1983). In Johnson, a double jeopardy case, the state as petitioner asserted that the ruling of
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The Court's willingness to hear these cases can be seen as a
manifestation of hostility toward the underlying federal rights-for
the most part, rights invoked by criminal defendants. 48 5 This con-
clusion is further supported by the outcomes of the decisions. In
all but 5 of the cases that were decided on the merits, the judg-
ments were reversed. 48 6 And in 4 of the 5 affirmances there were
four votes for reversal. 48 7 But there are other possible explanations
for the presence of these cases on the docket. For example, some
commentators have argued that values inherent in our federal sys-
tem are damaged when a state court "over-read[s] Supreme Court
precedents and invalidate[s] state . . . official action on federal
grounds when the Supreme Court itself would not do so."488 It is
also worth keeping in mind that the 35 plenary decisions are far
outnumbered by cases in which litigants failed to persuade the
Court to hear a state court case sustaining a federal challenge to
the Ohio courts "contravene[d] the rights of the State of Ohio as a litigant" and "severely
hamperted] the function of Ohio Grand Juries." Petition for Certiorari at 15. In Casal, the
state argued that three separate grounds existed to validate a search held by the state court
to violate the fourth amendment. The petition did not claim a conflict, nor did it assert that
the issue was a recurring one; in fact, no cases were cited from any other jurisdiction.
485 Of the 35 cases, 26 arose out of criminal prosecutions. In exactly half of these the
defendant had succeeded in invoking the fourth amendment exclusionary rule-a rule that
elicits a less than enthusiastic response from the Court. See United States v. Leon, 104 S.
Ct. 3430 (1984); Florida v. Rodriguez, 105 S. Ct. 309, 311 (1984) (Stevens, J., joined by
Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that summary reversal in fourth amendment case "illus-
trates how far the Court may depart from its principal mission when it becomes transfixed
by the spectre of a drug courier escaping the punishment that is his due."); notes 332-42
supra and accompanying text.
A recent comment by ChiefJustice Burger can be read as supporting the interpretation
suggested in the text. In an interview with the Miami Herald, the Chief Justice was asked
whether there is any merit to the suggestion made by "a number of legal scholars" that the
Supreme Court "is itself responsible for its own crushing caseload, [in] that it selects cases
with an eye to advancing its own political agenda rather than simply those that present
urgent constitutional questions." The Chief Justice characterized the suggestion as "un-
mitigated nonsense," but added: "There are some law professors who would like us not to
review any criminal cases. But they just don't like to see the Supreme Court reversing what
the court majority decides is a miscarriage ofjustice." Miami Herald, May 8, 1985, at 16A,
col. 2.
486 In 4 cases the writ was dismissed on procedural grounds without a decision on the
merits.
487 Except for the cases disposed of without a decision on the merits, see note 486 supra,
the only state petition that did not have four or more votes for reversal was Arizona v.
Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305 (1984). The Court gave no reason for granting review in Rumsey;
perhaps the four Justices who had dissented in the case relied on by the Arizona court,
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), hoped to secure reconsideration of that
decision.
488 Stolz, supra note 57, at 971. As Professor Stolz points out, it was precisely this con-
cern that led Congress in 1914 to pass the legislation that for the first time authorized the
Supreme Court to review state court judgments that sustained federal claims. See also F.




The categories discussed thus far account for all but a few
dozen of the plenary decisions that did not involve intercircuit con-
flicts, compelling governmental interests, or doubtful recurring is-
sues. In a handful of cases the federal government sought review of
a constitutional ruling that had little importance beyond its particu-
lar facts.490 Another small group of decisions addressed matters of
federal court jurisdiction and procedure. 49' Apart from these clus-
ters and a few miscellaneous constitutional cases,49 2 what remains is
the residuum of the general federal law segment of the docket. But
the cases were not spread evenly among the various areas of statu-
tory law. Rather, half of them were concentrated in two areas of
federal regulatory power: labor and antitrust.49 3
In fact, a broader pattern can be discerned. Of the 199 general
federal law cases in the first four Terms of the 1980's, 123 were
filed by litigants other than the federal government. These peti-
tions, in turn, were divided about equally between cases that
presented intercircuit conflicts and cases that did not. The conflict
cases ranged widely among the issues that occupy a substantial po-
sition on the plenary docket. But of the nonconflict cases, two-
thirds involved issues of labor law or antitrust.
Two conclusions can be drawn from these data. First, in con-
sidering applications for review that raise questions of labor or anti-
trust law, the Court employs a relatively flexible set of criteria.
Cases will receive plenary consideration even though the need for
an authoritative decision is, from the standpoint of the national law,
less than overwhelming.4
94
Second, in all other areas of federal regulation the Court will
almost never grant a private petition in the absence of an intercir-
489 There were nearly 200 such cases in the first four Terms of the 1980's. See notes
505, 515 infra and accompanying text.
490 E.g., United States v. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984); United States v. Hasting, 461
U.S. 499 (1983). In Gouveia, the Court candidly explained that "[w]e granted certiorari to
review the Court of Appeals' novel application of our Sixth Amendment precedents." 104
S. Ct. at 2295. In Hasting, the government's certiorari petition emphasized the alleged er-
ror of the decision below and suggested that "summary reversal may be appropriate." Peti-
tion for Certiorari at 8.
491 If there was any one case in the four Terms in which the grant of review came as a
surprise to almost all observers, it was McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 104
S. Ct. 845 (1984) (reversing court of appeals order granting new trial in diversity products
liability case).
492 E.g., Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577
(1982), discussed in note 501 infra; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), discussed in note 526 infra.
493 Labor and antitrust issues accounted for two-thirds of the cases in this group that
were brought to the Court by litigants other than the federal government.
494 About half of the labor cases involved issues of employment discrimination under
Tide VII. See notes 238-53 supra and accompanying text.
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cuit conflict. Moreover, of the 20 or so nonconflict petitions that
did receive plenary consideration, about one-fourth had the sup-
port of the Solicitor General at the certiorari stage.495 The upshot
is that in the absence of an intercircuit conflict or the backing of the
Solicitor General, private litigants in all areas of statutory law other
than labor and antitrust accounted for little more than a dozen ple-
nary decisions in all four Terms.
V. Conclusion
For nearly sixty years, the Supreme Court has operated under
a jurisdictional dispensation 496 that gives it a very large measure of
discretion in selecting, from among the 4,200 applications for re-
view filed each Term, the 180 that will reach the plenary docket. If,
as is to be hoped, Congress acts to eliminate the remaining ele-
ments of the obligatory jurisdiction, the Court will have almost total
freedom to choose the cases that it will hear and decide on the mer-
its. 497 Yet as one examines the results of the case selection process
in the Burger Court, what stands out is the array of external forces
that shape and narrow the manner in which the Court exercises its
discretion. These forces operate at two levels: some give promi-
nence to particular issues or areas of the law, while others make it
more likely that the Court will consider particular controversies.
In Part III of this article, I discussed some of the circumstances
that contributed to the changes in the issues that occupied the at-
tention of the Court during the past decade and a half. Part IV
examined the selection of individual cases, largely from the per-
spective of the Court itself. To conclude the analysis, it is appropri-
ate to look briefly at the effect on the plenary docket of small but
extremely influential group of decision makers: the judges of the
courts whose decisions are subject to review by the Supreme
Court.49
8
The effect of lower court rulings can be seen most easily in
litigation involving the United States government. Suits to which
the government is a party account for more than one-third of the
495 See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 104 S. Ct. 2472
(1984); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984); First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
496 This is the phrase used by Professor Frankfurter. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDiS,
supra note 488, at 287. Although the legislation that made the Court's jurisdiction largely
discretionary was enacted in 1925, its effects were not fully felt until the 1927 or 1928
Term. See Plenary Docket I, supra note 13, at 1730 n.84.
497 See Intercircuit Tribunal, supra note 13, at 391-92.
498 The courts that fit this description are the federal courts of appeals, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254 (1982), state courts of last resort as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982), and federal




Court's plenary work-215 of the 584 appellate decisions in the
first four Terms of the 1980's.499 In very large part, cases of this
kind reach the plenary docket because of the way they were re-
solved in the courts below. By holding a federal statute unconstitu-
tional, or striking down a government policy, or refusing to follow
the ruling of another circuit, a court of appeals or district court cre-
ates a need for clarification of the law that can be met only by action
of the Supreme Court. Almost invariably, the Court will respond to
that need-whether the jurisdiction invoked be obligatory or (in
theory) discretionary. Conversely, if the lower court upholds the
government's position or accepts the view of its sister circuits, the
decision is very unlikely to receive plenary consideration.
The paradigm is the case in which the constitutionality of an
act of Congress is drawn into question. If the lower court finds
merit in the challenge, the government almost certainly will take
the case to the Supreme Court, and the Court almost certainly will
grant review. 50 0 But if the lower court upholds the statute, the odds
are very small that the controversy will receive plenary considera-
tion.50 1 Much the same may be said-though not quite as emphati-
cally-about cases in which executive or administrative policies of
wide general applicability are attacked on statutory or constitu-
tional grounds. If the lower court holds the policy invalid, there is a
very good chance that the case will reach the plenary docket.5 02 But
if the challenge fails, that is probably the end of the line for the
government's adversary. 50 3
In government litigation not involving the validity of statutes
or executive policies, the courts of appeals influence the composi-
tion of the plenary docket in a different way: by deciding whether
to follow existing appellate precedents on a recurring issue. If one
court rejects the view taken by other circuits that have considered
499 The latter figure excludes the 9 original jurisdiction cases.
500 See notes 389-92 supra and accompanying text (33 cases in 1980-1983 period).
501 In the four Terms of the 1980's the Court heard only 2 cases in which the lower
court had rejected a constitutional attack on an act of Congress. Both were brought by
appeal under the special provisions governing appellate review in Federal Election Cam-
paign Act cases. Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577
(1982); California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
502 The Court granted most of the petitions in which the government sought to vindi-
cate a policy that had been struck down by the lower court; however, in contrast to the
appeals from decisions invalidating acts of Congress, perhaps a dozen rulings in this cate-
gory were allowed to stand. About half of the rejected applications were filed by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission and the Federal Election Commission, two agencies that
litigate independently rather than through the Solicitor General.
503 In the four Terms of the 1980's, the Court granted no more than half a dozen peti-
tions filed by litigants whose attacks on executive or administrative policies had been re-
jected by the court below. Sometimes the government supported the application for review
in order to obtain a definitive national ruling. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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the question, the case becomes a strong candidate for plenary con-
sideration.50 4 But if the court agrees with earlier decisions on the
same point, the case is unlikely to reach the Supreme Court even if
the holding is adverse to the government's position.
505
A more complex set of variables comes into play in litigation
involving the constitutionality of official action by state govern-
ments.50 6 Certainly the Court, in deciding whether to grant review,
is influenced by the outcome of the decision below, but the nature
of the case is no less important. Civil suits may be treated differ-
ently from criminal prosecutions; state court rulings arouse differ-
ent concerns than rulings by federal courts.
Consider first the tens of thousands of state court criminal
prosecutions in which the defendant invokes the protections of the
Bill of Rights or the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. If the state court rejects the defendant's federal constitu-
tional arguments, his chances of persuading the Supreme Court to
hear the case are small indeed.50 7 But if the arguments prevail, and
504 Intercircuit conflicts accounted for almost half of the government litigation cases.
Among the decisions that were reviewed at the behest of a litigant opposing the govern-
ment, the proportion was three out of five; among the government's applications, the figure
was two out of five.
Solid figures on conflict cases denied review are not available, but the best available
evidence indicates that the number of such cases is very small. See Intercircuit Tribunal, supra
note 13, at 395-98.
505 In the absence of a conflict, litigants opposing the government succeeded in ob-
taining review in fewer than 30 cases in the four Terms. The number of nonconflict cases
heard at the behest of the Solicitor General was larger, but in most of these the government
sought to revive a statute or policy that had been struck down by the lower court. See notes
500-02 supra and accompanying text. The government did not often obtain--or seek-
review on an issue that had been repeatedly litigated in the courts of appeals but with re-
sults always adverse to its position.
In a few cases in which the government appeared as nominal respondent, the Solicitor
General supported the petitioner on the merits. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); City of
Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983); Burlington Northern, Inc. v. United States,
459 U.S. 131 (1982).
506 In most cases where state official action is challenged on federal grounds, the litigant
defending the exercise of state power will be an officer, agency, or political subdivision of
the state. However, the category also includes some cases in which only private parties
participate. Generally these are suits in which federal law is invoked as a defense to a state
law claim, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984); Fidelity Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982), or (less commonly) as a reply to a state
law defense, e.g., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400
(1983).
507 In the first four Terms of the 1980's, only 23 petitions filed by defendants in state
criminal prosecutions reached the plenary docket. (Another 35 cases were summarily re-
manded for reconsideration in light of an intervening plenary decision.) I do not have
figures for the total number of defendants' petitions that were filed during this period, but
paid cases alone averaged more than 150 per Term. And in the last three Terms of the
1970's-the most recent period for which data are available-the average number of filings,
including both paid and indigent cases, was about 600. If this pattern continued in the
1980's (and there is no reason to believe that it did not), the total number of defendants'
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the prosecutor is not satisfied with the result, he may well be able to
secure the four votes needed for review.
508
Given what I have said about the Court's function of preserv-
ing the supremacy of federal law,50 9 it may seem perverse that state
prosecutors' petitions are far more likely to receive a hearing than
those filed by defendants.510 However, two considerations may
help to explain the Court's preference. First, prosecutors, as "re-
peat players,"51 1 can be expected to exercise some selectivity in the
cases they take to the Supreme Court. Cases clearly controlled by
existing precedents, or involving only the routine application of es-
tablished rules to particular facts, generally will not be brought up
for review.5 12 But for the convicted defendant whose freedom is at
stake, only one case matters, and that case is worth pursuing to the
highest tribunal without considering very carefully whether it meets
articulated standards for review.5 13 In this light, we would expect
to find a much higher proportion of certworthy cases among prose-
cutors' petitions than among defendants'.
Second, when a state court rejects a criminal defendant's fed-
eral claim, there is another route by which the defendant can secure
a hearing in a federal court: habeas corpus. 514 Thus, even if the
petitions in the four Terms was around 2,400. A case of this kind. thus had only one chance
in a hundred of receiving plenary review.
508 The Court accepted 26 petitions in which prosecutors challenged state court rulings
that favored criminal defendants. Forty additional cases were remanded for reconsidera-
tion in light of recent plenary decisions. Obviously, these figures are only slightly higher
than the corresponding figures for defendants' petitions; however, they represent a sub-
stantially larger proportion of the cases filed. In the same four-Term period the Court
rejected only about 125 prosecutors' applications from state courts. In other words, a pros-
ecutor's petition had a one-in-seven chance of gaining plenary review.
The one-in-seven ratio actually understates the Court's propensity for granting prose-
cutors' petitions. Of the 40 reconsideration orders, 8 were issued in Missouri cases held for
the decision in Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), and another 8 involved
Alabama cases held for Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982). Four other Missouri peti-
tions were controlled by the decision in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983). And 7
cases filed by prosecutors resulted in summary reversals. Thus, even if we do not consider
reconsideration orders as grants of review, the prosecutor's odds were almost one in five.
509 See notes 57, 468-72 supra and accompanying text.
510 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1067-70 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
511 See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 L. & Soc'y REv. 95, 97-107 (1974).
512 That is the behavior one would expect. However, prosecutors do not always live up
to that standard. See California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2072 & n.4 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("state legal officers [have filed] petitions for certiorari in even the most frivo-
lous search and seizure cases," including some in which the lower court's judgment was
explicitly based on independent state grounds); see also cases cited in note 477 supra.
513 A nonindigent defendant who must pay his attorney may refrain from filing if the
case is truly hopeless. But most applications by state criminal defendants are filed in forma
pauperis, either pro se or by court-appointed counsel. While ethical standards do not re-
quire the filing of a certiorari petition, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 n.6 (1983), no
doubt many attorneys are willing to do so if the defendant wishes it.
514 Fourth amendment cases are an exception. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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defendant's certiorari petition appears to warrant scrutiny from the
standpoint of review for error, the Court may prefer to leave the
task to the district court as long as no issue of general importance is
involved.5
15
Consistent with this analysis, the Court takes a very different
approach to cases brought from state courts by civil litigants-liti-
gants who are likely to adhere more closely to established criteria
for review and who in any event cannot invoke federal habeas
corpus. In the first four Terms of the 1980's the Court heard 71
cases in which the state court had rejected a civil litigant's federal
claim,5 16 and only 9 in which the claim had been accepted. I do not
have data on the number of cases in which the Court declined to
hear a civil litigant's supremacy-based argument;51 7 however, re-
view-denied cases in which state courts had accepted a federal claim
numbered about 60.518 While the gap in the data precludes a firm
evaluation, the available evidence suggests that in the realm of civil
litigation the Court takes the supremacy function very seriously.
This means that when a state court rejects a colorable federal claim
outside the context of a criminal prosecution, there is a good
chance that the losing litigant will be able to secure Supreme Court
review. To the extent that state courts find merit in such claims, the
decisions are not likely to reach the plenary docket.51 9
When challenges to state official action are litigated in federal
rather than state court, a new element enters the picture: Justice
Black's vision of "Our Federalism." 520 We would expect concerns
about "Our Federalism" to weigh heavily in favor of cases in which
the opponent of state action has prevailed in the court below, and
the data indicate that this is precisely what happens. As previously
noted, there were only 27 cases in the four Terms 1980-1983 in
which the Court reviewed a federal court judgment rejecting a chal-
lenge to state official action, and most of these involved intercircuit
conflicts.521 Data are not available on the number of such cases
515 See Stolz, supra note 57, at 960-64. Of course, there is another possible explanation
for the Court's propensity for granting prosecutors' petitions rather than defendants': hos-
tility to the underlying constitutional claims. See note 485 supra.
516 See note 464 supra.
517 For whatever the information is worth, there were about 70 such cases in which one
or more Justices dissented from the denial of plenary review.
518 Dissents were filed in 6 of these cases.
519 The difference in selection patterns between civil and criminal cases may reflect, at
least in part, a more sympathetic attitude toward the federal rights typically asserted by civil
litigants in state courts. But the range of claims is so wide that it is difficult to generalize.
For example, economic or property rights were at stake in most of the cases involving the
commerce clause, the takings clause, and the preemption doctrines; but the Court also
heard a substantial number of state court cases in the realm of family law.
520 See notes 473-74 supra and accompanying text.
521 See notes 481-82 supra and acompanying text.
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filed, but without doubt they are very numerous; one need only
look at the weekly order lists to see case after case in which a state
or one of its officials (typically a prison warden) is listed as the
respondent.522
A very different pattern emerges when we look at the cases
brought for review from federal courts by state officials or other
litigants supporting the exercise of state power. In the first four
Terms of the 1980's, 122 cases of this kind received plenary consid-
eration, more than any other category except federal government
petitions. Admittedly, the volume of cases denied review was also
very large-nearly 400 in all. Nevertheless, the ratio of grants to
denials remains quite impressive, especially when one considers
that many of the rejected petitions were clearly meritless, and
others were controlled by intervening plenary decisions. 523 In
other words, consistent with what has been said about the Court's
commitment to "Our Federalism," a federal court decision striking
down an exercise of state authority stands a very good chance of
being reviewed, more so than a state court decision to the same
effect.524 However, in contrast to the state court cases, prosecutors'
petitions and civil cases were granted in about equal
proportions. 525
The discussion thus far has encompassed three major types of
litigation: suits to which the federal government is a party; state
court suits in which state official action is challenged on federal
grounds; and federal court suits involving challenges to state offi-
cial action. What remains are private lawsuits raising only ques-
522 About 60 cases in the first four Terms of the 1980's drew one or more dissents from
the denial of review.
523 The ratio was particularly high in cases that properly invoked the Court's obligatory
jurisdiction. Under 28 US.C. § 1254(2) (1982), an appeal as of right is available when a
federal court of appeals holds a state statute unconstitutional under federal law. In the first
four Terms of the 1980's the Court granted plenary review in more than half of the appeals
filed under that provision: 31 cases reached the plenary docket, while 25 were summarily
affirmed. (Five others were summarily vacated.)
Not surprisingly, the Court takes a very different approach to court of appeals deci-
sions that reject challenges to the constitutionality of state statutes. No data are available
on the number of such cases that were brought to the Court, but the number of cases heard
was no more than 10. Thus, apart from challenges to federal statutes and executive poli-
cies, see notes 500-03 supra and accompanying text, the suit attacking the constitutionality of
a state statute is probably the class of case in which lower court decisions have the greatest
influence on the composition of the plenary docket.
524 See notes 508, 518 supra and accompanying text.
525 The Court heard 28 cases in which state prosecutors sought review of decisions
granting habeas corpus to state prisoners (or reversing a district court's denial of the writ).
Review was denied in about 90 such cases. Civil suits accounted for the remaining 94 ple-
nary decisions; the number of denials in civil cases was about 300. I emphasize, however,
that these raw figures do not tell the full story. For example, the volume of civil cases is
swollen by petitions in which state officials challenged federal courts' awards of attorneys'
fees. In the first four Terms of the 1980's only 2 such cases received plenary consideration.
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tions of general federal law or the jurisdiction and procedure of
federal courts. 526 Suits of this kind accounted for 98 plenary deci-
sions in the first four Terms of the 1980's.
About half of the cases in this group followed the pattern seen
in federal government litigation not involving the validity of federal
statutes or policies: review was granted to resolve an intercourt
conflict. Thus it is fair to conclude that if the court below had fol-
lowed the holdings of other circuits on a recurring issue, the cases
almost certainly would not have reached the plenary docket.527 As
for the other decisions, a substantial majority appear to reflect a
different kind of lower court influence. In these cases it is plausible
to surmise that the Justices granted review because they believed
that the court below had wrongly decided an issue of some impor-
tance. Included here are most of the cases of first impression dis-
cussed in Part IV.528 Among the topics represented, issues of
antitrust and labor law were preeminent.5 29
This is not to say that all of the private lawsuits conform to one
or another of the patterns I have described. Here, as in other areas
of the Burger Court's work, there are a few decisions that do not
readily lend themselves to characterization. Moreover, in each
Term one can find some cases that can be classified easily enough
after the fact, but whose presence on the plenary docket could
never have been predicted on the basis of existing patterns.
From the standpoint of scholarship (and for the litigant who
would like to frame a petition in a way that will secure review), these
gaps are frustrating. But in a larger sense they are a source of reas-
surance. The Court is not a computer. Nor is it, to any great ex-
tent, a bureaucracy. Half or more of its cases will receive plenary
consideration in response to exigent needs of the legal system-
needs that would draw a similar response from almost any group of
Justices. But the remainder of the plenary docket is shaped in large
526 Three cases do not quite fit into any of the categories I have described; they were
brought to the Court by nongovernmental litigants opposing individuals who were seeking
redress against federal official action. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Sepa-
ration of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). On the merits, these can be seen as
government cases, since the Solicitor General argued for reversal. However, from the per-
spective of the selection process, another classification is necessary, since the government
did not file the applications for review. In fact, in Valley Forge the government actually
urged the Court to deny certiorari. See Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition at
5,7.
527 The assessment is supported by the fact that the lower court judgments were af-
firmed in well over half of the conflict cases involving only private litigants. In almost every
other group of plenary decisions (except conflict cases in which the federal government was
the respondent) the proportion of affirmances was no more than one-third.
528 See notes 445-55 supra and accompanying text.
529 See text following note 490 supra.
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part by the interests and predilections of the Justices now sitting.
In short, the Burger Court, like its predecessors, is a very human
institution. And although it performs a unique lawmaking func-
tion-a function that quite properly dominates the selection pro-
cess-it is also a Court whose members care about doing justice in
individual cases and elaborating upon precedents in the common
law tradition. This is not a tidy arrangement, but it is one that has
worked remarkably well for nearly two hundred years. '
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Appendix
The Changing Content of the Plenary Docket,
1955-1983 Terms
The purpose of this Appendix is to portray in concise tabular
form the major shifts in the composition of the plenary docket over
the three decades that encompass the Warren and Burger Courts.
The tables do not present a complete picture of the Court's work;
they do list most of the issues that have occupied a substantial place
on the docket at one time or another during these years. To focus
on broad patterns of change, I have not given year-by-year figures;
instead, I have noted the total number of decisions on the various
issues in each of four seven-Term periods: "early Warren" (1955-
1961), "later Warren" (1962-1968), "early Burger" (1970-1976),
and "later Burger" (1977-1983).
This arrangement, of course, omits the first two Terms of the
Warren Court and the first Term of the Burger Court. The omis-
sion of the 1953 and 1954 Terms probably will not disturb anyone;
the 1953 Term's cases were largely selected by the Vinson Court,
and as for 1954, that Term too was to some degree transitional,
with only eightJustices sitting for most of the Term. Greater regret
may be occasioned by the omission of the 1969 Term; yet in some
respects the inclusion of that Term (assuming it could be done
while still retaining periods of equal length) would have distorted
the picture even more. Of the Court's 109 plenary decisions, 13
did not decide or address any of the questions presented by the
parties. In addition, 16 cases argued in 1969 were set for reargu-
ment in the 1970 Term-far more than in any other recent Term.
Each of the tables except the last lists the issues that achieved
greatest prominence during a particular period. Some issues could
have been included in more than one table; when this was so, I gen-
erally chose the table that emphasized the changes within the Bur-
ger Court rather than the one that highlighted the difference from
the Warren Court. In borderline situations, I also considered the
substance of the decisions as evidence of the degree of the Court's




Issues More Prominent in the Work of the Warren Court
Than in the Burger Court
Early Later Early Later
Warren Court Warren Court Burger Court Burger Court
Issue (1955-1961) (1962-1968) (1970-1976) (1977-1983)
A. Police Practices and Rights of Criminal Defendants
Confrontation clause 0 8 5a 2
Voluntariness of
confessions 13 7 2 1
B. Other Civil Rights Issues
Reapportionment 0 18 11 7
C. Federalism and Separation of Powers Issues
Labor preemption 21 15 8 8
Federal tax liens and
state law 6 5 Ob 1
D. General Federal Law
Government challenges
to mergers 5 17 11 0
Antitrust (other
government cases) 18 21 5 6
Review of ICC 29 27 9 5
Review of FPC and
FERC 9 14 12 6
Review of NLRB 38 29 24 25
Railway Labor Act 9 9 3 2
Tax liability 37 29 18 15
Immigration and
naturalization 31 10 4 5
Federal Employers
Liability Act 20 7 1 1
E. Jurisdiction and Procedure of Federal Courts
Non-constitutional crim.
procedure 52 21 14 18
a. Only one decision after 1971.
b. One decision in 1969.
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TABLE II
Issues More Prominent in the Work of the Burger Court










Early Later Early Later
Warren Court Warren Court Burger Court Burger Court
(1955-1961) (1962-1968) (1970-1976) (1977-1983)
A. Police Practices and Rights of Criminal Defendants
nt 14 38 45 55




B. Other Civil Rights Issues
Commercial speech 0 0




Sex discrimination 0 0 H
Substantive due process 5 3 1H
Due process rights of
prisoners, etc. 0 1
Residual issues of
procedural due process 6 8 2!
Voting rights legislation 1 3
C. Federalism and Separation of Powers Issues
Scope of national powers 6 6
Separation of powers 2 4
Eleventh amendment
limitations 1 1
Indian treaties and laws
as limits on state
power 4 3 1:
State obligations under
federally funded
programs 0 2 I1
Federal-state conflicts
over property rights 2 4
Property disputes
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Early Later Early Later
Warren Court Warren Court Burger Court Burger Court
Issue (1955-1961) (1962-1968) (1970-1976) (1977-1983)
Freedom of Information
Act 0 0 6 12
Modem environmental
legislation 0 0 11 14
Private civil rights
litigation 0 3 5 10
E. Jurisdiction and Procedure of Federal Courts
Court of app. juris. (civil
cases) 5 1 5 6
a. Only one decision before 1975.
b. Two decisions in 1969.
TABLE III
Issues More Prominent in the Work of the Early
Burger Court Than in the Later Burger Court
Early Later Early Later
Warren Court Warren Court Burger Court Burger Court
Issue (1955-1961) (1962-1968) (1970-1976) (1977-1983)
A. Police Practices and Rights of Criminal Defendants
Self-incrimination
(excluding Miranda) 6 19 20 13
Guilty pleas 0 1 6a 3
Rights of indigent
defendants 4 10 8b 1
B. Other Civil Rights Issues
Regulation of obscenity 6 10 20 3
Defamation and the first
amendment 0 6 9 4
School desegregation 1 7 12 2
Other claims of racial
discrimination 3 18 1ic 6
Rights of illegitimates 0 2 8 4
Voting and access to
ballot 1 8 15 4
Residual equal protection 4 5 27 18
Vagueness and fair
warning 6 6 12 3
Due process in gov't
employment 4 0 7 1
Federalism-related limits
on fed. court power 7 6 24 7
a. Three decisions in 1969.
b. Only one decision after 1973.
c. Three decisions in 1969.
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TABLE IV
Issues More Prominent in the Work of the Later
Burger Court Than in the Early Burger Court
Early Later Early Later
Warren Court Warren Court Burger Court Burger Court
Issue (1955-1961) (1962-1968) (1970-1976) (1977-1983)
A. Police Practices and Rights of Criminal Defendants
Double jeopardy 9 3 12a 22
B. Other Civil Rights Issues
Freedom of speech and
the electoral process 0 0 4 10
Takings clause/just
compensation 7 2 3 11
Due process and
interstate federalism 3 2 1 8
Availability of remedies
under § 1983 1 2 5 13
Official immunities 0 1 3 16
C. Federalism and Separation of Powers Issues
State regulation of
interstate commerce 3 5 4 12
State taxation of
interstate commerce 6 6 8b 12
Federal laws as limit on
state taxing power 5 4 1 7
a. Three decisions in 1969.
b. All but 3 after 1973.
1985] CASE SELECTION 1055
TABLE V
Issues Manifesting No Recent Significant
Patterns of Change
Early Later Early Later
Warren Court Warren Court Burger Court Burger Court
Issue (1955-1961) (1962-1968) (1970-1976) (1977-1983)
A. Police Practices and Rights of Criminal Defendants
Jury selection and
composition (14th
Am.) 3 5 5 2
Rights of servicemen 8 1 3 0
B. Federalism and Separation of Powers Issues
Intergovernmental
immunities 8 2 2 2
C. General Federal Law
Patents, copyrights,
trademarks 5 10 8a 8
Fair Labor Standards Act 11 1 3 1
Federal crimes and
penalties 26 16 22 21
Tax procedure 12 5 6 7
Government employment 8 3 5 9
Federal Tort Claims Act 7 3 4 5
Bankruptcy 5 12 7 5
a. Two decisions in 1969.
